More broadly, though, October 7 represented the moment Hamas’s emphasis shifted from legacy to social media — and, critically, when the main driver of output switched from Hamas itself to its armed wing, the Al-Qassam Brigades. “Since October 7, the group’s media operations are unsurprisingly dominated by the Al-Qassam Brigades’ media and its spokesman, Abu Obayda,” Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi, Fellow of the Middle East Forum, tells me. “This reflects the reality of the war in which it is Hamas’s operatives in Gaza who primarily control the narrative and not its political leaders in exile in Qatar and elsewhere. And, it is, after all, the group’s status as a military ‘resistance’ force that matters most to supporters around the world and observers more generally.”
As far as social media campaigns go, it has undoubtedly been a success. In the days following Hamas’s attack, the group’s Telegram channel tripled in followers, from 340,000 to 1.3 million followers. Prior to the massacre, its average post received 25,000-30,000 views, a figure which increased tenfold to more than 300,000. Similarly, Al-Qassam Brigades’ account grew from 205,000 subscribers on 7 October to 619,000 on 12 October. Both accounts remain active, though they are barred in certain regions, such as the EU, UK, US and Israel.
Also noticeable was the style of their content. In late October, I attended an IDF screening of footage from Hamas’s attack. What struck me was the video-game-like nature of the violence; terrorists ran around shooting civilians as if they were in Grand Theft Auto. In the weeks since, the first-person has remained their favoured style, with much of Al-Qassam’s content designed to portray its troops as elite soldiers.
If this all seems crude, its impact cannot be discounted. On 13 October, Hamas released a video on Telegram that purported to show its terrorists soothing a crying baby; another fighter bandages the foot of an Israeli toddler. This type of footage may not have much purchase in the West, but more than 1.4 million watched it on Al-Jazeera’s Facebook page for Egypt. Former advisor to Palestinian Authority, Ghaith al-Omari, said the videos had convinced many in the Arab world that, unlike Isis, Hamas “are humane and respect Islamic laws of War”.
Such widespread dissemination follows a simple but effective structure. Content begins at the primary level: from official Hamas and Al-Qassam Brigades’ channels and accounts. It then travels to unofficial accounts and supporters (though these are also increasingly becoming banned as social media companies crack down). These accounts typically reshare official content but also generate their own material. Examples include the Gaza Now Facebook account (which had 4.9 million followers before being banned) and Instagram’s @eye.on.palestine (which has 9.6 million and can still be accessed in certain countries).
The third level consists of a range of informal pro-Palestinian groups and channels, including those set up by influencers. This is arguably the most effective level of dissemination as it uses ordinary people — seemingly unaffiliated to Hamas – to tell “authentic” stories of suffering. What emerges is often described as the “true” picture or story from Gaza and is coupled with the popular hashtags — #IsraeliCrimes, #AlAqsa, #FreePalestine, #StandWithPalestine — that allow this sort of content to go globally viral.=
If Israel is overwhelmingly dominant on the ground, it is hopefully outmatched by Hamas and its supporters online. #freepalestine is found on 39 times more Facebook posts than #standwithisrael. On Instagram, pro-Palestinian hashtags are found on 26 times more posts than pro-Israel ones.
This is war fought on two planes; and if Israel is doing its best to level Hamas in Gaza, it is losing badly across the world online. The irony, of course, is that nowhere is Hamas clearer about who it is and what it wants than in its output. As an IDF official told me recently: “if Western audiences actually listened to the interviews given by Hamas officials, the Israeli media effort could just shut down. Hamas makes the case for Israel’s war against them better than any Israeli official ever could.”
As far as social media campaigns go, it has undoubtedly been a success. In the days following Hamas’s attack, the group’s Telegram channel tripled in followers, from 340,000 to 1.3 million followers. Prior to the massacre, its average post received 25,000-30,000 views, a figure which increased tenfold to more than 300,000. Similarly, Al-Qassam Brigades’ account grew from 205,000 subscribers on 7 October to 619,000 on 12 October. Both accounts remain active, though they are barred in certain regions, such as the EU, UK, US and Israel.
Also noticeable was the style of their content. In late October, I attended an IDF screening of footage from Hamas’s attack. What struck me was the video-game-like nature of the violence; terrorists ran around shooting civilians as if they were in Grand Theft Auto. In the weeks since, the first-person has remained their favoured style, with much of Al-Qassam’s content designed to portray its troops as elite soldiers.
If this all seems crude, its impact cannot be discounted. On 13 October, Hamas released a video on Telegram that purported to show its terrorists soothing a crying baby; another fighter bandages the foot of an Israeli toddler. This type of footage may not have much purchase in the West, but more than 1.4 million watched it on Al-Jazeera’s Facebook page for Egypt. Former advisor to Palestinian Authority, Ghaith al-Omari, said the videos had convinced many in the Arab world that, unlike Isis, Hamas “are humane and respect Islamic laws of War”.
Such widespread dissemination follows a simple but effective structure. Content begins at the primary level: from official Hamas and Al-Qassam Brigades’ channels and accounts. It then travels to unofficial accounts and supporters (though these are also increasingly becoming banned as social media companies crack down). These accounts typically reshare official content but also generate their own material. Examples include the Gaza Now Facebook account (which had 4.9 million followers before being banned) and Instagram’s @eye.on.palestine (which has 9.6 million and can still be accessed in certain countries).
The third level consists of a range of informal pro-Palestinian groups and channels, including those set up by influencers. This is arguably the most effective level of dissemination as it uses ordinary people — seemingly unaffiliated to Hamas – to tell “authentic” stories of suffering. What emerges is often described as the “true” picture or story from Gaza and is coupled with the popular hashtags — #IsraeliCrimes, #AlAqsa, #FreePalestine, #StandWithPalestine — that allow this sort of content to go globally viral.=
If Israel is overwhelmingly dominant on the ground, it is hopefully outmatched by Hamas and its supporters online. #freepalestine is found on 39 times more Facebook posts than #standwithisrael. On Instagram, pro-Palestinian hashtags are found on 26 times more posts than pro-Israel ones.
This is war fought on two planes; and if Israel is doing its best to level Hamas in Gaza, it is losing badly across the world online. The irony, of course, is that nowhere is Hamas clearer about who it is and what it wants than in its output. As an IDF official told me recently: “if Western audiences actually listened to the interviews given by Hamas officials, the Israeli media effort could just shut down. Hamas makes the case for Israel’s war against them better than any Israeli official ever could.”
