Train Wreck Via Rail derailment in Aldershot/Burlington
- Thread starter HOF
- Start date
However, as you can read above, there may have been a number of highly significant contributing factors.You are right. The train was travelling at 67 mph in a 15 mph switch zone. So, unfortunately, the engineers were responsible for their own deaths.
Hence the backtracking :frusty:So dump all you want, I just don't give a shit.
Go back and read posts # 43 through #47.It was somebody just thinking out loud without any hard evidence. I cant think of one "significant contributing factor" for going 4x as fast when the train is doing the riskiest manouever of switching tracks. Can you?
None of us have any hard evidence all of us are "speculating."
does this mean there is no display on the trains showing like a google map with the tracks and little lights and icons? really? i'm sure they have some kind of control center somewhere. and i'm also sure that the switch isn't changed on a whim. it would be almost trivial for some google hot-shot to make a mashup that updates frequently.
its very hard to believe that safety depends on the engineers "remembering" that they'd been told.
its very hard to believe that safety depends on the engineers "remembering" that they'd been told.
Following the US NTSB report another Signal block was added on the Brunswick Line after Kensington Station inbound towards Washington.Yes, the human factor and the error of expectancy. Also as Aardy mentioned earlier in that Amtrack collision, perhaps the signal was BEFORE the station and they forgot it as they left. Or that the switch was changed after they left the station.
Clearly rail safety will be enhanced from this day forward by the increased awareness of speed by Engineers, but we wion't really know the timing of the switching etc until the TSB reports more.
I'm sure that CN does possibly in Toronto. However, not all railroad control centres are created equal.i'm sure they have some kind of control center somewhere.
Would it affect your feelings more if it were "First Responders" or Law Enforcement"? Or if they crashed under your bridge?
Your vague remarks and photo of a missing girl are vague. Guess you got caught up in the media hoopla! Asshole.
https://terb.cc/vbulletin/showthrea...ns-of-Mariam-Makhniashvili-found-under-bridge...
Backtracking? You're an idiot!Hence the backtracking :frusty:
In fact, it was an apology for not being clear.
ctv250, ogibowt and rubmeister piss off.
You are actually missing one very important scenario that doesn't involve the deceased engineers being at fault: the signal system did not display the correct aspects to notify the train crew that they were lined for the crossover route. The subsequent investigation will be looking into this possibility, and it would not be an unprecedented or isolated incident if this is found to be the case.I posted the above back at post 27.
The train sped through the switch because whoever was driving missed the flashing yellow signal light.
There are a couple of scenarios.
1. There were 3 drivers. One was training. 3 is unsual, so they were probably talking too much rather than concentrating on the task at hand and whoever was driving completely missed the flashing yellow telling him to reduce to 15 mph. This is most likely the case. The driver was distracted.
2. The 2 regular drivers have driven the VIA train over that route so many times that they know it like the back of their hand and they don't usually switch tracks at that location. Force of habit tells them it's straight ahead on the same track as always, but this time, Rail Traffic Control needed to switch him over to the siding track for whatever reason. They didn't figure that they would be switching tracks.
The statement that the train was travelling at four times the "speed limit" that the media has been blasting in their headlines is very misleading to the general public. You can see this in people's responses - amazement that a train crew could be so reckless to exceed the "speed limit" by such a large amount. This is not the same as a driver travelling 240 km/h in a 60 km/h zone.
If the track is lined for the straight route through the signal plant, in other words not lined to go through a crossover, the allowable track speed in the timetable is 80 mph. When lined for the crossover route in this particular signal plant, due to the size of switches in place, the allowable diverging speed for the train is 15 mph.
If the properly displayed signal indication was missed by the train crew, or the signals were not displayed properly for the train crew, then the train will naturally be travelling at a speed approximately four times the "speed limit". This could happen anywhere, at any time, on the railway. Luckily, it's a relatively rare occurrence.
i don't know anything about train signals, so this is just a question...i see mention of "signal light". singular. can it be? only one? and no radio transmission to light up a signal in the train itself? who designed this system? wnd when? sounds like it's a 100 years old.
Larry these may help answer your question about signals http://trn.trains.com/en/sitecore/c... of Railroading/2006/05/Railroad signals.aspx and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_American_railroad_signals also the above video. (Read first and then watch the video, it will make a lot more sense).
In a nutshell and certainly not a complete explanation, North American railways (or 'railroads' if you're American) are controlled by CTC (centralized traffic control) when you see signals. There are other methods of train control where there are no signals, or 'dark territory', which require train crews to obtain written permission from the rail traffic controller (RTC or dispatcher) to occupy defined sections of track. This is obviously a very cumbersome method that requires a lot of radio communication between the train crew and the RTC and manually recorded authorities that allow a train to occupy a section of track. Because of this, you'll always see signals/CTC on heavily used corridors and the train crews are responsible to observe the signal indications to advise them of the upcoming track conditions and requirements for train operation (mainly speed of the train).
A signal can consist of a single light (aspect), two aspects, or three aspects. The combination of colours (red, green, yellow) and the display of the aspects (solid or flashing) provides information to the train crew on the upcoming track conditions and the speed at which to operate the train. There are many different combinations of signal displays that the train crew, more specifically the conductor, must memorize to properly instruct the engineer on how to operate the train. Of course, a signal with three aspects can provide many more combinations than a signal with two aspects, thus providing more detailed information to the train crew on how to proceed with the operation of the train.
You'll see three aspect signals, or 'home' signals, at the beginning of a signal plant (or interlocking) which consists of cross-overs or turnouts that allow trains to change tracks. The route that the train is lined for, either the straight route or the diverging route (lined for a cross-over to change tracks), is controlled by the RTC. The RTC does not actually control the signal display itself, but the routing of the track chosen by the RTC will cause the home signals to display the appropriate aspects. For example, if a train is lined for the straight route, the home signal would likely show a green-red-red (reading the signals from top to bottom) which is the most permissive signal indication and does not require a train crew to adjust their speed. If the RTC has lined the route to take a cross-over onto another track, the home signal will display a more restrictive signal indication requiring the train crew to adjust their speed. In fact, not just the home signal will provide this warning to the train crew, but usually one or more block signals further down the track as an advanced warning to the train crew of the upcoming track condition.
As mentioned above, the signal system operates using a 'block' system, or sections of track that have electric circuits running through the rails and these circuits are confined to only that section of track through the use of insulated joints at either end of the block. At each end of the block, you'll see a signal bridge or standing signal masts with either one or two aspects that provide information on the track conditions in that block.
If a block is empty, or not occupied by a train, the electric circuit is travelling in the individual rails and this provides information to the CTC system on how to display the block signal. When a train passes over the insulated joints (at the same location of the block signal), the steel wheels of the train will short the circuit in that block and 'tell' the block signal to display an all red signal, or a 'stop' indication to prevent trailing trains from entering this block until the block is cleared by the current train. This system was designed this way so that if a rail was broken, the circuit would be shorted and the signal would drop to red to prevent a train from entering this block and running over the rail defect. There are other examples of how the 'short circuit = stop signal' provides protection to trains from entering a block with unfavourable conditions. You'll see this in action if you're driving on the Gardiner or standing on a railway overpass. As soon as a train passes a signal, you'll see it drop to all red. The actual block signal display will not only take into account the condition of its own block, but also the adjacent blocks further down the track in the same travelling direction.
In the case of the VIA derailment, the preliminary report suggests that the VIA was lined by the RTC for the diverging route to change tracks. If the signals were working properly, the train crew would have left the Aldershot Station and passed signals informing them of the upcoming track condition and they would have known to reduce their speed to 15 mph. If the signal system was not working properly, they may have seen entirely permissive signals, or a 'clear' signal (green-red on the block signals, and green-red-red on the home signals at King Road) and they would have continued at full speed, or more likely continuing to accelerate as they left Aldershot Station.
We'll have to wait until the investigation is concluded before we know for sure. RIP.
A signal can consist of a single light (aspect), two aspects, or three aspects. The combination of colours (red, green, yellow) and the display of the aspects (solid or flashing) provides information to the train crew on the upcoming track conditions and the speed at which to operate the train. There are many different combinations of signal displays that the train crew, more specifically the conductor, must memorize to properly instruct the engineer on how to operate the train. Of course, a signal with three aspects can provide many more combinations than a signal with two aspects, thus providing more detailed information to the train crew on how to proceed with the operation of the train.
You'll see three aspect signals, or 'home' signals, at the beginning of a signal plant (or interlocking) which consists of cross-overs or turnouts that allow trains to change tracks. The route that the train is lined for, either the straight route or the diverging route (lined for a cross-over to change tracks), is controlled by the RTC. The RTC does not actually control the signal display itself, but the routing of the track chosen by the RTC will cause the home signals to display the appropriate aspects. For example, if a train is lined for the straight route, the home signal would likely show a green-red-red (reading the signals from top to bottom) which is the most permissive signal indication and does not require a train crew to adjust their speed. If the RTC has lined the route to take a cross-over onto another track, the home signal will display a more restrictive signal indication requiring the train crew to adjust their speed. In fact, not just the home signal will provide this warning to the train crew, but usually one or more block signals further down the track as an advanced warning to the train crew of the upcoming track condition.
As mentioned above, the signal system operates using a 'block' system, or sections of track that have electric circuits running through the rails and these circuits are confined to only that section of track through the use of insulated joints at either end of the block. At each end of the block, you'll see a signal bridge or standing signal masts with either one or two aspects that provide information on the track conditions in that block.
If a block is empty, or not occupied by a train, the electric circuit is travelling in the individual rails and this provides information to the CTC system on how to display the block signal. When a train passes over the insulated joints (at the same location of the block signal), the steel wheels of the train will short the circuit in that block and 'tell' the block signal to display an all red signal, or a 'stop' indication to prevent trailing trains from entering this block until the block is cleared by the current train. This system was designed this way so that if a rail was broken, the circuit would be shorted and the signal would drop to red to prevent a train from entering this block and running over the rail defect. There are other examples of how the 'short circuit = stop signal' provides protection to trains from entering a block with unfavourable conditions. You'll see this in action if you're driving on the Gardiner or standing on a railway overpass. As soon as a train passes a signal, you'll see it drop to all red. The actual block signal display will not only take into account the condition of its own block, but also the adjacent blocks further down the track in the same travelling direction.
In the case of the VIA derailment, the preliminary report suggests that the VIA was lined by the RTC for the diverging route to change tracks. If the signals were working properly, the train crew would have left the Aldershot Station and passed signals informing them of the upcoming track condition and they would have known to reduce their speed to 15 mph. If the signal system was not working properly, they may have seen entirely permissive signals, or a 'clear' signal (green-red on the block signals, and green-red-red on the home signals at King Road) and they would have continued at full speed, or more likely continuing to accelerate as they left Aldershot Station.
We'll have to wait until the investigation is concluded before we know for sure. RIP.
A lot more discussion here by people who are railfans or work in the industry.
http://www.railroad.net/forums/viewtopic.php?f=59&t=93188
http://www.railroad.net/forums/viewtopic.php?f=59&t=93188
Several interesting points.A lot more discussion here by people who are railfans or work in the industry.
http://www.railroad.net/forums/viewtopic.php?f=59&t=93188
True, however, do you know how many times in Canada there has been a railway accident attributed to signal failure?You are actually missing one very important scenario that doesn't involve the deceased engineers being at fault: the signal system did not display the correct aspects to notify the train crew that they were lined for the crossover route. The subsequent investigation will be looking into this possibility, and it would not be an unprecedented or isolated incident if this is found to be the case.
The statement that the train was travelling at four times the "speed limit" that the media has been blasting in their headlines is very misleading to the general public. You can see this in people's responses - amazement that a train crew could be so reckless to exceed the "speed limit" by such a large amount. This is not the same as a driver travelling 240 km/h in a 60 km/h zone.
If the track is lined for the straight route through the signal plant, in other words not lined to go through a crossover, the allowable track speed in the timetable is 80 mph. When lined for the crossover route in this particular signal plant, due to the size of switches in place, the allowable diverging speed for the train is 15 mph.
If the properly displayed signal indication was missed by the train crew, or the signals were not displayed properly for the train crew, then the train will naturally be travelling at a speed approximately four times the "speed limit". This could happen anywhere, at any time, on the railway. Luckily, it's a relatively rare occurrence.
Zero. (to the best of my knowledge).
I realize that there is always a first time, but odds are - this won't be it. The railways will persue even the suggestion of a defective signal very aggresively I will tell you.
The switch and the signal are interlocked. You cannot move the swtich without causing the signal to go flashing yellow. Burnt out bulb? The train stops as he would only see the remaining reds.
I do not believe it is possible to have the switch moved and the light go green - which would have to be the scenario for the signal to have been defective.
As you know, on mainline track, there would be 3 lights on the signal mast. All of which are normally red - which means stop. In order for the train to enter the block, the signal must change from red to green on the approach of the train. He has to have either a green, flashing green, yellow, or flashing yellow. Move the switch - the only option is for the signal to go to yellow. You can't move the switch and have red go to green. (The only exception might be if someone recently worked on the switch / signal and wired it up improperly without running it through a test prior to putting it back into service. Always a possibility.
As you stated though, we will need to wait for the report to come out.
One suggestion made on Railroads.net is that the Switch was "picked" i.e. that it wasn't all the way open hence causing the derailment.
The switch in that location is remotely controlled from Mac yard and according to the media, it had been moved to direct the train into the siding.
Yes, but given that it could have been picked - one set of trucks goes onto the switch and the second set keeps going straight ahead. . .The switch in that location is remotely controlled from Mac yard and according to the media, it had been moved to direct the train into the siding.
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Confused
Even if that was true, coming back onto the main line might have a speed issue also.
Would appreciate something from the obviously more informed than me.
FAST
Wonder why the train was being directed to a siding, unless that "siding" was not dead ended, and had a switch to reroute back to the main line.The switch in that location is remotely controlled from Mac yard and according to the media, it had been moved to direct the train into the siding.
Even if that was true, coming back onto the main line might have a speed issue also.
Would appreciate something from the obviously more informed than me.
FAST
