Pro-Putin and pro-Russia thread
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Air superiority is not likely what the U.S. and NATO want Ukraine to
achieve. Hence Ukraine will be getting F-16 not F-35 and I guess they
may not be fully supplied with the fighter jets soon enough. Parity
will be good enough.
This is indeed the strategy of US/NATO which is to bleed
Russia to its demise.
No? Why
not? Is
there some
reason why you
think
that?
Surely we already
have parity. It's been
more than a year but
Russia still hasn't managed
to
defeat the Ukrainian air force
despite it being a
fraction
of the size. If
that's not parity, then
what definition do you use?
There are real, tangible, strategic
reasons not
to deploy
F-35s to Ukraine.
OpSec.
I propose that's not really the NATO strategy.
The Ukraine-Russia conflict has reached a stalemate
Aug 25, 2023
KARTIK BOMMAKANTI
The war between Russia and Ukraine, which broke last year following the former’ invasion, is deadlocked. Ukraine’s counter-offensive has stalled or at least the progress made by Ukrainian ground forces has been limited. Just as the initial Russian offensive stalled due to an impressive Ukrainian fightback and were gradually reversed, Ukraine—if not suffering exactly the reverses Moscow did—has remained incapable of breaking through Russian defences as the result of its counteroffensive.
Three specific factors are responsible for the current operational impasse. Firstly, neither side has been able to or has shown a readiness to prosecute this military campaign decisively. Secondly, fears of escalation, if new weapons were introduced during the course of the war for the last 18 months, have tempered the intensity of combat, but done little to end it. Finally, low morale, which has been prominently visible among Russian forces for most of the active combat in the last one-and-a-half years, is becoming evident among Ukrainians. Prosecuting a military campaign with limited means has been the feature of the Russia-Ukraine war. Russia never fully committed and deployed the kind of capabilities necessary to win the war decisively. Ukraine has done the same, but for different reasons.
Why has the war reached its current impasse?
Firstly, Russia’s much touted cyber capabilities were nowhere nearly as potent as expected and the Russian leadership, for still unexplained reasons, did not use combat airpower. Explanations for the non-use of airpower, at best and anecdotally, have ranged from the Russian Air Force’s lack of experience in multi-domain operations with ground forces, to risk aversion and poor pilot training. Compounding these failures was Moscow’s ground offensive, which involved poor strategy and long supply lines that made Russian forces sitting ducks for the Ukrainians. Russia, however, is regrouping after blunting Ukraine’s current counteroffensive, largely due to the Russian military’s build-up of formidable defensive fortifications packed with landmines, which Moscow invested in establishing while 12 armoured brigades of the Ukrainian Army were away training in North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) countries. Inadequate use of combat power and sustainment have given opportunities to both sides to regroup and fight back.
Kyiv, for its part, has not suffered from Russia’s inadequate application of military power. At least not deliberately, Ukraine’s leadership has been fettered by its ally and primary military supplier—NATO. Notwithstanding the limited success Ukraine has had in its counteroffensive, its military progress has been substantially constrained due to insufficient military support from its NATO ally. Indeed, according to United States (US) intelligence, Kyiv will fail to secure its key goal of seizing Melitopol, which is vital if Ukrainian forces are to capture Crimea. Melitopol also serves as a land bridge with a railroad and highways, enabling Russia to keep its forces supplied across occupied Ukraine from the Crimean Peninsula. Capturing Melitopol, let alone Crimea, now looks increasingly difficult. At least so far, these factors have played a vital part in preventing both sides from prosecuting the war to a decisive conclusion.
Secondly, the US—the largest external contributor to Ukraine’s military effort—has dithered in supplying the Ukrainians with the kinds of weapons systems and capabilities that Kyiv has sought since the first days of the Russian invasion. If anything, leaked documents from American intelligence made a grim assessment going back to April this year, confirming that Ukraine’s counteroffensive will likely fail due to inadequate supply of equipment and ammunition by NATO, preventing the Ukrainian forces from recapturing Russian occupied areas of Ukraine.
Since the onset of hostilities, the US refused to send High Altitude Mobility Rocket Systems (HIMARS) and when it did supply them, it was only a limited number in late June 2022, which was four months after the Russian invasion. Following the Ukrainian establishment of what the Americans called “a proof of concept”, or Ukraine’s effective use of HIMARS, did Washington commit to dispatching more HIMARS. The latest manifestation of this US-led NATO hesitation in supporting the Ukrainians is the West’s, especially Washington’s, resistance to employ combat airpower against the Russians. Notwithstanding Washington’s consent of late to allow some European members of NATO to train Ukrainian fighter pilots for the use of F-16s, the pilots will not be combat ready to fly the jets until the summer of 2024. As one British expert aptly put it: “We [NATO] have always given them [Ukraine] what they need just about in time. Now we may be giving them what they need, just about too late.”
Finally, morale is taking a hit amongst Ukrainian men. Military age men are avoiding combat duties on the frontlines by bribing military officials at recruitment centres across Ukraine, compelling Ukrainian President Volodymr Zelenskyy to crackdown on corruption. The flight of fighting age men from Ukraine spells ominous signs for Ukraine’s military campaign to evict the Russian occupation of Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. If this resistance were to persist, Kyiv might be compelled not to press ahead with its counteroffensive and battle lines could stabilise and settle around where they are today. This would fundamentally mean Russia retaining most of what it annexed from Ukraine in 2014 and Kyiv securing the remainder of the country. Yet, this possibility might not hold, because Moscow, now chuffed by its formidable defence, is likely planning and preparing its own offensive for the second time.
The mutual fear of escalation has only prolonged the conflict with no end in sight. The recent operational setbacks the Ukrainians have suffered does not spell defeat for Kyiv, and, as we have seen throughout the course of this war, they are capable of reversing losses. However, this time, as noted earlier, NATO’s military aid may have come little too late and when coupled with a decline in Ukrainian morale, the chances of a stalemate are likely to be high or at least the Ukrainian military abandoning their offensive and retreating to defensive positions is entirely possible. Regardless of the eventual outcome, one thing that has been validated by this conflict is that the defence, as Clausewitz put it, tends to be stronger than the offence in war. Just as the Russian offensive against Ukraine in February 2022 was substantially thwarted by a robust defence by the Ukrainian military, the Russian military’s defensive measures today have likewise significantly eroded the Ukrainian counteroffensive. There is also another lesson from this war—that if a war is to be fought and won decisively, even if the war is limited in its aims, it cannot and should not mean the application of limited means. Indeed, the aims maybe limited, but means used must be disproportionate and the effort maximum.
www.orfonline.org
Aug 25, 2023
KARTIK BOMMAKANTI
The war between Russia and Ukraine, which broke last year following the former’ invasion, is deadlocked. Ukraine’s counter-offensive has stalled or at least the progress made by Ukrainian ground forces has been limited. Just as the initial Russian offensive stalled due to an impressive Ukrainian fightback and were gradually reversed, Ukraine—if not suffering exactly the reverses Moscow did—has remained incapable of breaking through Russian defences as the result of its counteroffensive.
Three specific factors are responsible for the current operational impasse. Firstly, neither side has been able to or has shown a readiness to prosecute this military campaign decisively. Secondly, fears of escalation, if new weapons were introduced during the course of the war for the last 18 months, have tempered the intensity of combat, but done little to end it. Finally, low morale, which has been prominently visible among Russian forces for most of the active combat in the last one-and-a-half years, is becoming evident among Ukrainians. Prosecuting a military campaign with limited means has been the feature of the Russia-Ukraine war. Russia never fully committed and deployed the kind of capabilities necessary to win the war decisively. Ukraine has done the same, but for different reasons.
Why has the war reached its current impasse?
Firstly, Russia’s much touted cyber capabilities were nowhere nearly as potent as expected and the Russian leadership, for still unexplained reasons, did not use combat airpower. Explanations for the non-use of airpower, at best and anecdotally, have ranged from the Russian Air Force’s lack of experience in multi-domain operations with ground forces, to risk aversion and poor pilot training. Compounding these failures was Moscow’s ground offensive, which involved poor strategy and long supply lines that made Russian forces sitting ducks for the Ukrainians. Russia, however, is regrouping after blunting Ukraine’s current counteroffensive, largely due to the Russian military’s build-up of formidable defensive fortifications packed with landmines, which Moscow invested in establishing while 12 armoured brigades of the Ukrainian Army were away training in North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) countries. Inadequate use of combat power and sustainment have given opportunities to both sides to regroup and fight back.
Kyiv, for its part, has not suffered from Russia’s inadequate application of military power. At least not deliberately, Ukraine’s leadership has been fettered by its ally and primary military supplier—NATO. Notwithstanding the limited success Ukraine has had in its counteroffensive, its military progress has been substantially constrained due to insufficient military support from its NATO ally. Indeed, according to United States (US) intelligence, Kyiv will fail to secure its key goal of seizing Melitopol, which is vital if Ukrainian forces are to capture Crimea. Melitopol also serves as a land bridge with a railroad and highways, enabling Russia to keep its forces supplied across occupied Ukraine from the Crimean Peninsula. Capturing Melitopol, let alone Crimea, now looks increasingly difficult. At least so far, these factors have played a vital part in preventing both sides from prosecuting the war to a decisive conclusion.
Secondly, the US—the largest external contributor to Ukraine’s military effort—has dithered in supplying the Ukrainians with the kinds of weapons systems and capabilities that Kyiv has sought since the first days of the Russian invasion. If anything, leaked documents from American intelligence made a grim assessment going back to April this year, confirming that Ukraine’s counteroffensive will likely fail due to inadequate supply of equipment and ammunition by NATO, preventing the Ukrainian forces from recapturing Russian occupied areas of Ukraine.
Since the onset of hostilities, the US refused to send High Altitude Mobility Rocket Systems (HIMARS) and when it did supply them, it was only a limited number in late June 2022, which was four months after the Russian invasion. Following the Ukrainian establishment of what the Americans called “a proof of concept”, or Ukraine’s effective use of HIMARS, did Washington commit to dispatching more HIMARS. The latest manifestation of this US-led NATO hesitation in supporting the Ukrainians is the West’s, especially Washington’s, resistance to employ combat airpower against the Russians. Notwithstanding Washington’s consent of late to allow some European members of NATO to train Ukrainian fighter pilots for the use of F-16s, the pilots will not be combat ready to fly the jets until the summer of 2024. As one British expert aptly put it: “We [NATO] have always given them [Ukraine] what they need just about in time. Now we may be giving them what they need, just about too late.”
Finally, morale is taking a hit amongst Ukrainian men. Military age men are avoiding combat duties on the frontlines by bribing military officials at recruitment centres across Ukraine, compelling Ukrainian President Volodymr Zelenskyy to crackdown on corruption. The flight of fighting age men from Ukraine spells ominous signs for Ukraine’s military campaign to evict the Russian occupation of Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. If this resistance were to persist, Kyiv might be compelled not to press ahead with its counteroffensive and battle lines could stabilise and settle around where they are today. This would fundamentally mean Russia retaining most of what it annexed from Ukraine in 2014 and Kyiv securing the remainder of the country. Yet, this possibility might not hold, because Moscow, now chuffed by its formidable defence, is likely planning and preparing its own offensive for the second time.
The mutual fear of escalation has only prolonged the conflict with no end in sight. The recent operational setbacks the Ukrainians have suffered does not spell defeat for Kyiv, and, as we have seen throughout the course of this war, they are capable of reversing losses. However, this time, as noted earlier, NATO’s military aid may have come little too late and when coupled with a decline in Ukrainian morale, the chances of a stalemate are likely to be high or at least the Ukrainian military abandoning their offensive and retreating to defensive positions is entirely possible. Regardless of the eventual outcome, one thing that has been validated by this conflict is that the defence, as Clausewitz put it, tends to be stronger than the offence in war. Just as the Russian offensive against Ukraine in February 2022 was substantially thwarted by a robust defence by the Ukrainian military, the Russian military’s defensive measures today have likewise significantly eroded the Ukrainian counteroffensive. There is also another lesson from this war—that if a war is to be fought and won decisively, even if the war is limited in its aims, it cannot and should not mean the application of limited means. Indeed, the aims maybe limited, but means used must be disproportionate and the effort maximum.
The Ukraine-Russia conflict has reached a stalemate
The Ukraine-Russia conflict has reached a stalemate
www.orfonline.org
Putin is like 3 decades Zelensky's senior. I do expect he is theThis thread will be dead.
first one to go. I won't even rule out the possibility Putin may kick
the bucket before the war is over.
Make it your signature picture I suggest. it is fun.
F35 vs F16... or maybe, just spitballing here, the F35 is the newest and the best and thus brutally expensive, whereas the F16s are surplus. Hell western countries are still replacing their air forces with the F35.
Also considering how badly Russia is doing, the F16 is good enough. Fuck man in jest but at this stage Ukraine could probably kick ass with WWI gear, where is Snoopy these days.
As for the second point, it would be nice, they did start all this shit, it would be nice to fuck their shit up so they can't cause problems for a generation.
However it just isn't possible, the country is large and has too much natural resources and there are too many fellow travelers like China, Iran and Best Korea. Doesn't mean we can't try, any little bit help, but demise... no. File that up there with Ukraine driving onto Moscow for shit that won't happen. Pity.
Western countries are still replacing their artillery with M777.
A few big reasons jump to mind. The F-16 has a lot more in common with the platforms Ukrainian pilots are already flying, so training time is shorter. Ukrainian test pilots also have already flown it. It's also better tested for specific roles. It's used by a lot more counties and there are a lot more to go around, so better/easier supply. Parts and maintenance are also simpler. And then the big one: Operational Security (OpSec). Russia has a lot of radar systems pointed at Ukrainian skies right now. You don't want to expose your stealth aircraft to enemy radar more than you have to. Every radar return helps the enemy learn.
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In the "Pro-Putin pro-Russian" thread? Doesn't this post make Putin look even more like an asshole?
He probably wont answer but this question needs to be said. Oil&Gas do you support ethnic cleansing?
That question is better directed to NATO members who
are funding Putin's war through purchase of sanctioned
Russian oil and gas.
I am betting my money on the side in the conflict who
has the upper hand which is not necessarily the side
taken by the good guys.
Like in the Iran-Iraq war the west and its ally Israel played both
sides. They supported Saddam Hussein's Iraq, who was at
the time a firm ally of the west, while supplying intelligence
to Iran. The war was stretched from 1980 to 1988 at the cost
of destruction of hundreds of thousands of lives. But then
those were lives of Muslims and Arabs which are worth the
price of weakening both Iran and Iraq.
This time around the west again will not lift a finger to end
the conflict any time soon. They will continue supplying old and
worn out weapons to Ukraine while funding Putin's war through
purchase of sanctioned Russian energy exports. With prices
of its oil export capped Russian can still get by but would
not be able to carry on the war indefinitely.
The war could go on until both sides are exhausted I am afraid.
are funding Putin's war through purchase of sanctioned
Russian oil and gas.
I am betting my money on the side in the conflict who
has the upper hand which is not necessarily the side
taken by the good guys.
Like in the Iran-Iraq war the west and its ally Israel played both
sides. They supported Saddam Hussein's Iraq, who was at
the time a firm ally of the west, while supplying intelligence
to Iran. The war was stretched from 1980 to 1988 at the cost
of destruction of hundreds of thousands of lives. But then
those were lives of Muslims and Arabs which are worth the
price of weakening both Iran and Iraq.
This time around the west again will not lift a finger to end
the conflict any time soon. They will continue supplying old and
worn out weapons to Ukraine while funding Putin's war through
purchase of sanctioned Russian energy exports. With prices
of its oil export capped Russian can still get by but would
not be able to carry on the war indefinitely.
The war could go on until both sides are exhausted I am afraid.
Perhaps I should let you know my response to your question is directly
below your post on my screen. Sometimes I would not bother to quote
a post if my comments follow right below it. I could have missed questions
from posters on my ignore list which don't show up on my screen.
And to get back to your question I am one of those who want to see
Putin withdraw from Ukraine tomorrow. Unfortunately it looks like the
war is getting nowhere.
oil&gas bafflegab holds no stock with me.
Ukraine has one of two options, resistance or annihilation. So I'll ask again, do you support ethnic cleansing?
Ukraine has one of two options, resistance or annihilation. So I'll ask again, do you support ethnic cleansing?
Just like with climate change though, no one knows who you think the good guys are because you flip flop posting things and never give your own opinion.
I'd argue the side with the upper hand is the side that spends over $2Tn on defense vs the side that just doubled their budget this year to $160Bn. Or the side that has halted their enemies advance and pushed it back despite being outnumbered more than 5 to 1. Maybe the side whose special forces have just demonstrated they can insert units behind enemy lines anytime they want and the enemy hasn't even realized that yet?
You conveniently neglect mentioning that China supported both sides too, and Russia was involved. No one wanted to see nuclear weapons in the hands of either country, so they were happy to let them fight amongst themselves to prevent it.
And if you really think Russia cares about lives more than the west, why are they indiscriminately bombing apartment buildings and parks? They don't even care about their own soldiers lives. Have you ever compared a Russian first aid kit to a Ukrainian one?
What about Russian involvement in proxy wars? Your comments are pretty one-sided.
So in Iraq and Iran the west was racist. But you think they'll do the same think with Ukrainians. So the west is also racist towards white Europeans?
Russia is literally using WWI and WWII weapons and equipment. Cold war equipment is still more advanced than a lot of what Russia is fielding. But you also ignore HIMARS, M777, F-16, Javelin, HARM, SHRIKE, PATRIOT, etc. None of which are old and worn out. Many NATO countries are still in the process of upgrading to M777 and HIMARS, the F-16 remains in service in many nations and has had multiple upgrades and refits, PATRIOT is still the best ABM defense system in the world receiving constant updates.
Estimates are that every day Ukraine loses a Battalion's with of soldiers. But Russia is losing a combat brigade group's worth. Russia is struggling to recruit and sending troops into the field with a week of training and WWI uniforms with a bolt action rifle and no other equipment in some cases, Ukraine is recruiting a million more soldiers and still has a waiting list of ready-trained special forces soldiers from other nations to replenish the Foreign Legion
Don't be afraid. You're just misinformed and wrong.
