Pro-Putin and pro-Russia thread

oil&gas

Well-known member
Apr 16, 2002
17,178
3,459
113
Ghawar
The title could be misleading. I propose people posting and keeping
thoughts, news or articles that are not too pro-Ukraine in this thread.
This way the pro-Ukraine crowd would not be trolled by articles I am
going to post here.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Here Are 3 Ways to End the War in Ukraine. One Might Actually Work.
Aug 18, 2023
TOM MALINOWSKI

"Ukraine will never be a victory for Russia — never,” President Joe Biden said in a speech in Poland this year, and rightly so. For the war in Ukraine to end on terms consistent with American interests and ideals, Ukraine must be seen to have won, and Russia’s invasion must go down in history as a decisive failure, enough to deter other authoritarian powers from launching similar wars of aggression in the future.

That much is easy to say. But it raises a critical question. What is an achievable definition of victory for Ukraine (and defeat for Russia), at least in the current phase of a contest that’s likely to continue in some form for many years?

There are at least three possible answers to this question.

The first and most obvious way for Ukraine to win would be for its armed forces to take back all the territory Russia has unlawfully seized since its first invasion in 2014 — including Crimea. This would be a fantastic outcome. It is still possible. And the United States should do everything possible to support it, including, if Congress approves more funding, by providing the more advanced weapons Ukraine has requested.

At the same time, if we’re honest, we have to acknowledge that Ukraine may not achieve total military success in the next year or two. Its counteroffensive is making progress, but slowly and painfully. The Russian military, though battered and demoralized, has remained resilient, even against advanced Western weapons and tactics. And Russia has a seemingly endless supply of young men whose lives it is willing to waste in this war.

Meanwhile, there is no guarantee that the United States and its allies will continue paying for Ukraine’s offensive operations for as long as it takes. Getting Biden’s recent supplemental funding request for Ukraine through the House of Representatives will be hard, and that money would last only through early 2024. Putin knows that the leading Republican candidate for president next year, former President Donald Trump, would end U.S. support for Ukraine, and that there are others like him in Europe. A forever war favors Putin, not Ukraine.

A second way for Ukraine to win — at least theoretically — would be through a diplomatic agreement. Earlier this month, 40 countries, including China and the United States, met in Saudi Arabia to discuss President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s 10-point plan for peace, which would require the withdrawal of all Russian troops from Ukraine, the return of abducted children and justice for war crimes. Any settlement based on that plan would, of course, be wonderful.

But Russia under Putin has never ended its wars at the negotiating table; at best it has frozen them, keeping its options open. Russia has shown zero interest in making concessions that would come close to the minimal requirements of Ukraine and its allies. As long as his military avoids total collapse, and he believes there is a chance of political change in the West, Putin will likely keep sacrificing Russians to stay in the fight.

So if Russia manages to stymie plans A and B, where would that leave us by, say this time next year? Should Ukraine and its allies simply carry on, hoping for a breakthrough in 2025 or beyond? Given what’s at stake — not just the survival of Ukraine but of the whole international order — that would be risky. It would make success dependent on events we cannot predict or control, including on the outcome of elections in Western countries, including the United States. And while we have no right to tell Ukrainians to stop fighting before their country is whole, we also have no right to expect them to keep fighting at any cost.

Fortunately, there is a third possible way to satisfy the need for Ukrainian success and Russian failure, over which Putin would have no veto.

In this scenario, the United States would give the Ukrainian military whatever it needs to advance as far as possible in its counteroffensive. At an appropriate point next year, Ukraine would declare a pause in offensive military operations and shift its primary focus to defending and rebuilding liberated areas while integrating with Western institutions. Then, at its July, 2024 summit in Washington, NATO would invite Ukraine to join the Western alliance, guaranteeing the security of all territory controlled by the Ukrainian government at that point under Article 5 of the NATO treaty.

Offering Article 5 protection to Ukrainian territory in this fashion would be akin to admitting a divided Germany to NATO after World War II and to America’s security pact with South Korea after the armistice that halted the Korean War without reunifying the Korean Peninsula. This would be a defensive pact, but not a commitment to take direct part in any future offensive operations Ukraine might choose to undertake.

The Biden administration has said the war must end before Ukraine can join NATO, because it does not want to risk direct U.S. involvement. But it has not defined what it means, in this context, for the war to be “over.” Must there be a formal peace treaty? Must there be a period of months or years in which Russia does not fire a single shell into Ukraine? Tying Ukrainian NATO membership to such conditions would give Putin another incentive never to meet them.

But Ukraine joining NATO could itself be how the war ends, consistent with Biden’s current policy — and at a time and on terms set by Ukraine and its allies, not by Russia. Gaining security within NATO as a strong, pluralistic, democratic state would absolutely count as a victory for Ukraine — arguably as big as quickly regaining Crimea. It might make it politically possible for Zelenskyy, if he so chooses, to emphasize nonmilitary strategies for reclaiming any parts of his country still under Russian occupation, which Ukraine’s allies would also continue to support — potentially including anything from diplomacy and sanctions to blockade and sabotage.

Adding a democratic Ukraine in NATO would mark the utter and permanent defeat of Putin’s crusade to absorb it into a Russian empire. Because it would be hard to reverse after ratification by 32 NATO member parliaments, NATO accession — ideally by the end of 2024 — would also frustrate Putin’s plan to draw out the war until political winds in the West change.

Yes, Russian forces could try to go on the offensive again, but the likely futility of attacking fortified Ukrainian positions now backed by the threat of NATO firepower would be a strong deterrent. Meanwhile, sanctions on Russia would remain; its economic and military strength would continue to erode; and Putin could only watch as his frozen assets abroad are drawn down to pay for Ukraine’s reconstruction. He would be left with no agency and no options.

To be clear: this approach would not require Ukraine to cede any territory to Russia (contrary to what a NATO official suggested this week). Ukraine and its allies would continue to pursue the country’s reunification within its 1991 borders. Nor should anyone pressure Ukrainians to adopt this approach — only they can decide whether and when shifting to consolidating their gains while joining NATO makes sense.

But Biden and other Western leaders should tell them that this is an option they will have if their counteroffensive is still grinding on next year. It could prove the best chance to achieve the victory that Ukraine and the democratic world need soon, while making it both Putin- and Trump-proof.

 
Last edited:
Who Killed Yevgeny Prigozhin?
Ted Snider
Aug 28, 2023

Although Wagner leader Yevgeni Prigozhin had reportedly been banished to Belarus after his brief and spectacularly unsuccessful rebellion, he seemingly enjoyed a surprising freedom of movement. He apparently traveled between Belarus and Africa and traveled frequently between St. Petersburg and Moscow. He even made a very public and conspicuous appearance in July at the Russia-Africa summit where he met with African representatives and praised Vladimir Putin. But on August 23, Prigozhin was killed in a plane crash.

It could have been an accident: planes crash, and Prigozhin flew often. It could have been a murder. There is no shortage of people who might have wanted Prigozhin dead. Forces in Niger – whose coup government had just requested Wagner’s help and whom Prigozhin had just praised – or parties with an interest in Niger, or an interest in arresting Russia’s influence in Africa, might have wanted to put an end to his recent campaign to recruit mercenary soldiers to Africa. Ukraine or Poland, upon whose border Wagner’s forces were massing, might have wanted to eliminate him. The US or Ukraine might have wanted to destabilize Russia by rekindling the struggle between Moscow, the Ministry of Defense and now angry and vengeful Wagner forces. Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu or Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov, whom Prigozhin wanted removed, might have wanted to remove him.

But most people will point to Putin. Most people will say that Putin was just waiting to kill him to remove a threat and punish a traitor.

President Biden and CIA Director William Burns had both previously predicted that Putin would kill Prigozhin. Both suggested that Prigozhin shouldn’t fire his food taster. But despite Burns’ claim that Putin is “the ultimate apostle of payback,” the many media claims over the years that Putin habitually arranges the murders of opponents are unsupported. The late Stephen Cohen, who was Professor Emeritus of Politics and director of Russian Studies at Princeton, dismisses the charge in a single sentence, declaring it the easiest accusation against Putin to refute “because there is no actual evidence . . . to support it.”

In his biography of Putin, Philip Short dedicates more pages to the charge but comes up with a slightly more accusatory but similar verdict. By not punishing people who arranged killings, Putin may have “allowed a climate to develop” in which powerful people could order killings. But “contrary to widespread belief in the West,” Putin “did not” authorize the killings. Short reports that, “once the fog of conspiracy theories cleared,” responsibility for some of the most famous killings were “traced back to the entourage of Chechen leader, Ramzan Kadyrov.” Short calls the evidence massed against Putin in one of the most famous cases “entirely circumstantial.” Of the long list of “high-profile” killings in Russia, Short concludes that “with the exception of Litvinenko, none had been killed at Putin’s behest.” Short argues that in a list of ten suspicious deaths compiled by the Washington Post, “only the death of Alexandr Litvinenko can be laid firmly at Putin’s door. All the others appear to have been killed for reasons unconnected with the Kremlin.” Cohen argues that, despite the verdict that Putin was “probably” responsible for Litvinenko, “there is still no conclusive proof” even for that one death. Of the two cases that cemented Putin’s reputation as a murderous thug in the media, Cohen says that “Not a shred of actual proof points to Putin in either case.”

A skeptical cloud over the case against Putin in the death of Prigozhin is the flamboyant blowing up of his plane in Russian skies just outside Moscow. Assassinations are usually made of more subtle stuff.

The strongest circumstantial case against Putin is the seemingly more coordinated than coincidental firing, or demoting, of General Sergei Surovikin on the same day. On June 27, The New York Times reported that, according to US officials, Surovikin “had advance knowledge of Yevgeny Prigozhin’s plans to rebel against Russia’s military leadership.” When Prigozhin demanded the removal of Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov, he nominated Surovikin to replace him. Surovikin lost his job, and Prigozhin lost his life on the same day: a coincidence that at least suggests a coordinated plan, if Surovikin did, in fact, know of the rebellion and kept the knowledge from the Kremlin, to remove the two most powerful men behind the mutiny.

It may be long before the evidence is in – if it is ever in – on what happened the day Yevgeni Prigozhin died. But, though there is a case against Putin, it is far from a closed case. And, despite the constant claims, there is not a well-established line of high profile killings ordered by Putin to add to the evidence. There are also a number of other parties with a motive that should not be allowed to walk away just yet. That list includes, not just Putin, but ousted elements in Niger; parties, including the US, France and the political West with an interest in Niger and broader influence in Africa; countries, including the US and Ukraine, with an interest in restarting the Wagner-Moscow war; Poland with its Wagner crowded Belarusian border; and even other elements, like Shoigu and Gerasimov, in Russia who had felt Prigozhin’s danger.

 
Who Killed Yevgeny Prigozhin?
Ted Snider
Aug 28, 2023

Although Wagner leader Yevgeni Prigozhin had reportedly been banished to Belarus after his brief and spectacularly unsuccessful rebellion, he seemingly enjoyed a surprising freedom of movement. He apparently traveled between Belarus and Africa and traveled frequently between St. Petersburg and Moscow. He even made a very public and conspicuous appearance in July at the Russia-Africa summit where he met with African representatives and praised Vladimir Putin. But on August 23, Prigozhin was killed in a plane crash.

It could have been an accident: planes crash, and Prigozhin flew often. It could have been a murder. There is no shortage of people who might have wanted Prigozhin dead. Forces in Niger – whose coup government had just requested Wagner’s help and whom Prigozhin had just praised – or parties with an interest in Niger, or an interest in arresting Russia’s influence in Africa, might have wanted to put an end to his recent campaign to recruit mercenary soldiers to Africa. Ukraine or Poland, upon whose border Wagner’s forces were massing, might have wanted to eliminate him. The US or Ukraine might have wanted to destabilize Russia by rekindling the struggle between Moscow, the Ministry of Defense and now angry and vengeful Wagner forces. Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu or Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov, whom Prigozhin wanted removed, might have wanted to remove him.

But most people will point to Putin. Most people will say that Putin was just waiting to kill him to remove a threat and punish a traitor.

President Biden and CIA Director William Burns had both previously predicted that Putin would kill Prigozhin. Both suggested that Prigozhin shouldn’t fire his food taster. But despite Burns’ claim that Putin is “the ultimate apostle of payback,” the many media claims over the years that Putin habitually arranges the murders of opponents are unsupported. The late Stephen Cohen, who was Professor Emeritus of Politics and director of Russian Studies at Princeton, dismisses the charge in a single sentence, declaring it the easiest accusation against Putin to refute “because there is no actual evidence . . . to support it.”

In his biography of Putin, Philip Short dedicates more pages to the charge but comes up with a slightly more accusatory but similar verdict. By not punishing people who arranged killings, Putin may have “allowed a climate to develop” in which powerful people could order killings. But “contrary to widespread belief in the West,” Putin “did not” authorize the killings. Short reports that, “once the fog of conspiracy theories cleared,” responsibility for some of the most famous killings were “traced back to the entourage of Chechen leader, Ramzan Kadyrov.” Short calls the evidence massed against Putin in one of the most famous cases “entirely circumstantial.” Of the long list of “high-profile” killings in Russia, Short concludes that “with the exception of Litvinenko, none had been killed at Putin’s behest.” Short argues that in a list of ten suspicious deaths compiled by the Washington Post, “only the death of Alexandr Litvinenko can be laid firmly at Putin’s door. All the others appear to have been killed for reasons unconnected with the Kremlin.” Cohen argues that, despite the verdict that Putin was “probably” responsible for Litvinenko, “there is still no conclusive proof” even for that one death. Of the two cases that cemented Putin’s reputation as a murderous thug in the media, Cohen says that “Not a shred of actual proof points to Putin in either case.”

A skeptical cloud over the case against Putin in the death of Prigozhin is the flamboyant blowing up of his plane in Russian skies just outside Moscow. Assassinations are usually made of more subtle stuff.

The strongest circumstantial case against Putin is the seemingly more coordinated than coincidental firing, or demoting, of General Sergei Surovikin on the same day. On June 27, The New York Times reported that, according to US officials, Surovikin “had advance knowledge of Yevgeny Prigozhin’s plans to rebel against Russia’s military leadership.” When Prigozhin demanded the removal of Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov, he nominated Surovikin to replace him. Surovikin lost his job, and Prigozhin lost his life on the same day: a coincidence that at least suggests a coordinated plan, if Surovikin did, in fact, know of the rebellion and kept the knowledge from the Kremlin, to remove the two most powerful men behind the mutiny.

It may be long before the evidence is in – if it is ever in – on what happened the day Yevgeni Prigozhin died. But, though there is a case against Putin, it is far from a closed case. And, despite the constant claims, there is not a well-established line of high profile killings ordered by Putin to add to the evidence. There are also a number of other parties with a motive that should not be allowed to walk away just yet. That list includes, not just Putin, but ousted elements in Niger; parties, including the US, France and the political West with an interest in Niger and broader influence in Africa; countries, including the US and Ukraine, with an interest in restarting the Wagner-Moscow war; Poland with its Wagner crowded Belarusian border; and even other elements, like Shoigu and Gerasimov, in Russia who had felt Prigozhin’s danger.

So according to your "sources", Putin's a really nice guy who doesn't kill his top aides and generals and dissidents and pretty much anyone he doesn't like?!.... 🥴
 
  • Like
Reactions: bver_hunter
So basically you want a thread where you can spout off bullshit and your appeasement and not get challenged on it.

Oh honey.

Everyone is welcomed here. I just don't want Zelensky's fan boys and
the anti-Putin folks to feel like they are being trolled.
 
So according to your "sources", Putin's a really nice guy who doesn't kill his top aides and generals and dissidents and pretty much anyone he doesn't like?!.... 🥴

Putin's other top aides were smart enough to know whom
their master wanted to take out but pretended otherwise.
Joseph Stalin was a master of the art finding scapegoats for
the killing of dissenters he engineered.

Do you think Prigozhin was so dumb as to fly near Kremlin
from Belarus knowing how ruthless Putin could be?
 
  • Like
Reactions: snitter
Do you think Prigozhin was so dumb as to fly near Kremlin
from Belarus knowing how ruthless Putin could be?
What are you saying here? You think he's still alive? You think he was killed first and then put on the plane? He got on the plane but it wasn't supposed to be going there? What's your theory exactly?
 
But Trump says he can stop the war within 24 hours.:ROFLMAO::ROFLMAO::ROFLMAO::ROFLMAO::ROFLMAO::ROFLMAO:

Trump was obviously exaggerating his power as a peacemaker
which is no surprise. That being said it is indeed not impossible
for Trump as the next president to cut off military aid to Ukraine.
 
These Ukraine threads are getting old man. Same old, same old. We know all the arguments by now right? lol.


Arguments between the pro-Ukraine and pro-Russia side may be
getting old. It is where the war is going and how it is going to end
that is of relevance to the course of world history.
 
Everyone is welcomed here. I just don't want Zelensky's fan boys and
the anti-Putin folks to feel like they are being trolled.
Um, you appear to be trolling yourself.
 
  • Like
Reactions: Frankfooter
Everyone is welcomed here. I just don't want Zelensky's fan boys and
the anti-Putin folks to feel like they are being trolled.

Everyone is welcome, unless they call out your bullshit. Got it.

Also one doesn't have to be a Zelensky fan boy or anti poutine to know that appeasement is just a horribly bad idea and that Russia is in the wrong.

Also, we know you are not trolling, you seriously believe the nonsense you are posting, but then I am old, from a time when a troll was someone who posted bullshit to get people upset, not someone who disagreed with you.
 
  • Like
Reactions: glamphotographer
With F16s arriving in Ukraine, I do not see Russia being able to stall the Ukrainian advance. In the short term, the F16s will serve as a weapons platform able to use the vast array of NATO weapons sitting in warehouses, in the long term when Ukraine has a lot of F16s then it will have air superiority.