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In any case, more such scenes from Gaza, broadcast or tweeted over many weeks, will almost certainly prompt some West Bank Palestinians and Arab Israelis, otherwise sickened by terror, to lash out at Israeli civilians and police, while giving Israeli messianists an opening to galvanize moderate Israelis. On Thursday, a Palestinian opened fire on a Jerusalem police station, injuring two, before being fatally shot himself; and settlers reportedly opened fire on a Palestinian ambulance in a-Sawiya, killing a father and son. (The ambulance was carrying the bodies of four others whom settlers had killed earlier in nearby Qusra.) But it seems necessary to note in this context that when Gazans were polled by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, Palestine’s most authoritative opinion-research firm, just before the aborted P.A. legislative elections in May, 2021, Hamas barely scratched thirty per cent. So one might assume that two-thirds of Gazan civilians who have now been killed or displaced were likely not Hamas supporters. (Correspondingly, it seems equally tragic that many of Hamas’s victims on Saturday at both the
Nova music festival and in the kibbutzim along the border—Be’eri, Kfar Aza, Nahal Oz, and others—were supporters of Israel’s democratic peace movement; in the November, 2022, election, about ninety per cent of the votes in these ravaged kibbutzim supported parties either advancing or open to a two-state process.)
Israel’s strategic-affairs minister, Ron Dermer, told Bloomberg that Israel will “exact such a heavy price” that Hamas will not threaten Israel or “any civilized” country around the world. In this environment, it is not a simple matter for Blinken to be, on the one hand, the backstop for Israel’s looming actions in Gaza, and, on the other, a voice for strategic caution and the initiator of a diplomatic track. But there is a precedent. In the 1973 Yom Kippur War, to which this week’s surprise attack is often
compared, Secretary of State
Henry Kissinger—whose family, like Blinken’s, was scarred by the Holocaust—in effect, created a window for Israel’s military encirclement of the Egyptian Third Army, thereby trapping it on the eastern side of the Suez Canal; he and President Nixon’s National Security Council even put the U.S. on
defcon 3, the highest state of armed-forces readiness for peacetime, when the Soviets threatened to intervene. But then Kissinger restrained the Israeli government, making clear that the U.S. would not tolerate Israeli plans to bombard and decimate the Third Army. He wanted to insure that Israel would not be defeated, but he also saw that the appearance of military stalemate, and the war’s disruption of the status quo, had created diplomatic opportunities.
“Never waste a crisis,” Steven Simon, a former national-security adviser in the Obama White House, and the author of “
Grand Delusion: The Rise and Fall of American Ambition in the Middle East,” told me. “The U.S. should establish a small contact group of important players, including Saudi Arabia, to validate and sell a post-conflict plan. This would entail the handoff of Gaza to the U.N., once the guns have cooled, pending the invigoration of the Palestinian Authority and commitment to Palestinian national rights.” Biden’s Administration had already opened a diplomatic track of this kind, which Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran may well have been trying to derail—namely, the effort to
normalize relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia, which the Administration has been pursuing for the past year, as a complement to the Abraham Accords. The more recent effort was designed to include various new concessions to the P.A. Granted, Netanyahu and his annexationist allies had tried to insure that any concessions would be too trivial to provide Palestinians a horizon for any form of self-determination. And some have concluded that this initiative is a casualty of the violence: it is “for now, off the table,” Ian Bremmer, of the Eurasia Group, a political-consultancy firm, said. But the Palestinian issue seems the thorniest reason that the Saudi leader Mohammed bin Salman, has so far refused to consummate a deal. It might be possible for Blinken to double-down on the plan now—and more important, to stipulate a process that widens the scope of Palestinian rights and confirms control of the Jordanian Waqf, its Islamic religious trust—over the al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem.
Does analysis of Palestinian opinion justify intensified diplomatic effort? Khalil Shikaki, the director of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, in Ramallah, told me, “If the option right now is survival in an environment in which the only way you can have your basic rights is through violence, then Hamas is the answer, and Hamas will be very popular.” Nor is the prospect of Hamas prompting a much wider escalation “far-fetched.” If, however, Palestinians “have real choices, viable choices between diplomacy and violence, good governance or Hamas’s authoritarianism, well, I think the answer is pretty clear. The overwhelming majority would want diplomacy over violence. The overwhelming majority would want good governance over authoritarianism.”
What, then, should any expanded Palestinian component of a notional Saudi deal promise? “You have three issues,” Shikaki said. “You have the misery in Gaza and the impossibility of governing it. You have the legitimacy of the Palestinian Authority and the need to renew that. And you have the Israel-Palestine dimension that is purely about peace—that is the two-state solution and making it viable.” First, in Gaza, people need “rule of law” and “living conditions that are sustainable,” he said. “And that isn’t really going to happen under Hamas rule.” Rather, Gaza “has to be part of the West Bank and the Palestinian Territories,” which means that “the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank has to be the Palestinian Authority in Gaza as well.” But, Shikaki said, that means, second, that the P.A. needs to seem plausible again by holding an election, which is the eventual path to unification and legitimacy. Mahmoud Abbas, the Palestinian President, “will likely wait and see Israel destroying his rival and show Gazans and West Bankers both that Hamas cannot deliver prosperity or stability.”
As for the Biden Administration, Shikaki speculated that “it still hopes that Abbas can be a partner to deal with Saudi Arabia.” And, if the Administration wants to pursue this, it should make the two-state solution seem viable—“land for peace.” The challenge is public cynicism. “The most dramatic means of reversing public opinion would be to transfer at least a large part of Area C”—the sixty per cent of the West Bank that is entirely in Israeli hands, and where most of the settlements are planted—“to the Palestinian Authority. That would certainly be sending the signal to both the extremists in Israel and to Palestinians who have come to the conclusion that the two-state solution is dead,” Shikaki said. He added, “It’s complicated, absolutely. But if the Administration thinks that the Saudi deal might be sufficient to make this happen, so let it be.”
This may all seem merely hypothetical. Mohammed bin Salman, whose relations with the Biden Administration have been strained, would be key to rehabilitating Gaza, building Palestine, and integrating Israel in the region. But the U.S. is key to Saudi defenses and long-term integration into Western financial and technological markets. And for the U.S., Israel, and the Gulf states, Iran remains a reason to pull together. Blinken, in any case, is not a stranger to reasonable ideas. And American diplomacy, advanced warily when guns are firing, could perhaps organize responses when guns fall silent.
