p.s. IAEA's Feb and March reports
Full of things like:
11. In summary, in the event of a full resumption of implementation by Iran of its nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA, the Agency would not be able to re-establish continuity of knowledge in relation to the production and inventory of centrifuges, rotors and bellows, heavy water and UOC.
22. Since 23 February 2021, the Agency has not had access to the data and recordings collected by its surveillance equipment installed at FEP to monitor any withdrawals by Iran of IR-1 centrifuges from those held in storage for the replacement of damaged or failed IR-1 centrifuges installed at FEP. On 10 June 2022 this surveillance equipment was removed and no data has since been recorded for verification and monitoring (para. 29.1).
31. On 21 January 2023, during a routine inspection without advance notification – also known as an unannounced inspection (UI)47 – at FFEP, the Agency detected that, while the two IR-6 cascades were still being fed with UF6 enriched up to 5% U-235 to produce UF6 enriched up to 60% U-235, they were interconnected in a way that was substantially different from the design information declared by Iran in the most recently updated DIQ
[p.s. the cascades that enriched to 84%]
62. As of 12 February 2023, the estimated total enriched uranium stockpile in the form of UF6 of 3402.0 kg comprised:
• 1555.3 kg of uranium enriched up to 2% U-235 (–289.2 kg since the previous quarterly report);
• 1324.5 kg of uranium enriched up to 5% U-235 (+294.6 kg);
• 434.7 kg of uranium enriched up to 20% U-235 (+48.3 kg); and
• 87.5 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 (+25.2 kg).
[about 23 kg @60% is needed for a modern nuke]
65. Since 23 February 2021, the Agency has not:
• had access to the data from its on-line enrichment monitors and electronic seals, or access to the measurement recordings registered by its installed measurement devices: on 10 June 2022 this monitoring equipment was removed and placed in storage at the respective locations under Agency seals, and therefore ceased operation (para. 67.1);
• been provided with any information or access to data from containment and surveillance measures relating to the transfer to UCF of UOC produced in Iran or obtained from any other source (para. 68);
• had access to the data and recordings collected by its surveillance equipment installed to monitor the production of UOC, and since 11 June 2022, when this surveillance equipment was removed, has ceased operation;
• been provided with any information on the production of UOC or on whether it has obtained UOC from any other source (para. 69).
4. Nevertheless, as indicated in the Director General’s report of 30 May 2022 (GOV/2022/26), despite the Agency providing Iran with numerous opportunities, in different formats through exchanges and meetings in Vienna and Tehran, to clarify these safeguards issues, they remained unresolved. 6 Iran had still not provided explanations that were technically credible. Nor had Iran informed the Agency of the current location(s) of the nuclear material or equipment contaminated with nuclear material, or both, that were moved from Turquzabad to an unknown location in 2018.
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