Appellant argues that (1) the UN insignia violates Army uniform regulations (AR 670-1) by transferring his allegiance to the United Nations, 50 MJ at 734, and (2) the order stems from an illegal deployment of the Armed Forces because President Clinton misrepresented the nature of the deployment to Congress and failed to comply with the United Nations Participation Act [UNPA]. These arguments fail because they would unacceptably substitute appellant’s personal judgment of the legality of an order for that of his superiors and the Federal Government.
This Court has held that an Air Force Captain disobeyed a lawful order when he refused to fly as a training instructor on a fighter plane that was used in Vietnam. The Noyd court noted that "[m]ilitary service is . . . a matter of status," like becoming a parent, rather than just a contractual relationship and that status establishes special duties between the soldier and the Government.. It further noted that "the fact that a person in a military status determines that he has undergone a change of conscience does not, at that instant and from that time on, endow him with the right to decide what orders are compatible with his conscience.".
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It is not a defense for appellant to claim that the order is illegal based on his interpretation of applicable law. An order is presumed to be lawful and the defense has the burden to prove illegality unless the order is "palpably illegal on its face." This does not, however, allow a soldier to disobey an order because he believes it to be palpably illegal. A case remarkably similar to this one is United States v. Wilson. Private Wilson was denied conscientious-objector status and, after an unauthorized absence, wrote a statement explaining, in part, "I will refuse to wear the uniform of a soldier ever again. I am doing this out of my deeply felt convictions . . . and because the Army has given me no other alternative." When he later refused to obey an order to wear his uniform, he was charged with willful disobedience. This Court upheld an instruction that personal scruples were not a defense. Citing United States v. Noyd, supra, the Court in Wilson reasoned that personal beliefs could not justify or excuse disobedience by a soldier of a lawful order.
His position is like that of the civilian whose religion or conscience is in conflict with lawful orders of the Government . . . [T]o allow scruples of personal conscience to override the lawful command of constituted authority would "in effect . . . permit every citizen to become a law unto himself.". As Noyd indicated, the freedom to think and believe does not excuse intentional conduct that violates a lawful command.The Court in Noyd also noted that allowing private judgment by a soldier as to which orders to obey would be "unthinkable and unworkable," and would mean that "the military need for his services must be compromised.". Appellant’s arguments are essentially the same ones that were made there, and they should be rejected on the same basis.
We recently reiterated the limited nature of the grounds upon which the lawfulness of an order may be challenged in the context of denied conscientious-objector status. We determined that there was no constitutional right or statutory provision that gave an appellant "authority for a self-help remedy of disobedience.".