oldjones said:
Perhaps I could persuade you to amplify your last point. I just can't make the leap to Adam Smith, who I always thought abhorred state intervention in the marketplace. .
No problem. The most common quote that Smith did not think it was "abnormal for people to get together in their common interest" is:
“People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for
merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a
conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise
prices.”
Although he did not think government regulation would be effective in preventing this, he nonetheless did not think government regulation should encourage it:
“But though the law cannot hinder people of
the same trade from sometimes assembling together, it ought to do
nothing to facilitate such assemblies, much less to render them
necessary."
For more details see
http://socserv2.socsci.mcmaster.ca/~econ/ugcm/3ll3/smith/wealth/
oldjones said:
Surely it's not the joining, but the monopoly that may result, that distorts the market. And it seems we agree unions are not monolpolies. .
No, we don’t agree on that. My comment was with regard to your claim that it could also be said that employers have monopoly power. Unions would not have bargaining power if they did not have some monopoly power.
oldjones said:
My understanding of Rand is that it requires those benefiting from/covered by a union-negociated collective agreement to pay union dues to finance that negociation irrespective of whether they want membership in the union. As a quid pro quo I believe the 'closed shop' is not legal—you can make her pay, you can't make her join. Middle ground I'd have thought and no members-only monopoly.
Employers have always treated workers as a collective—"the wage for weavers is tuppence a day take it or leave it"—rather than bargaining one on one. One-on-one would be that free market, would it not? So is a refusal to bargain individually restraint of trade?
Surely the employer's insistance on dealing on a group basis entitles the workers to form their own group to negociate with them. I just don't see the applicability of anti-trust laws at all, and I had thought that they'd failed in court when applied to unions.
That depends on the work involved. In my line of work, even when there is a union, there is a lot of individual negotiation about where on the pay scale you are as factors such as "market differential" are taken into account (e.g. usually economics professors get some market differentials automatically but English professors have a tougher time unless they have exceptional publication records).
Without a union, employers are forced to raise (and when feasible) lower wage rates in response to market conditions. Indeed for occupations like the CUPE workers in Toronto, the employer would likely be what are called “price takers” (I should say that I have not lived in Toronto for a few years so I have not been following the details). Given that many other employers higher the same type of workers, both employers and workers would likely have to take the market wage as given, if it where not for unions in.
As far as anti trust laws, I believe that orginally courts upheld them until they were changed. However, I'm too lazy to find a link supporting this.