Yes, and note, no such parties exist today... the Taliban do NOT have the kinds of weapons the US provided to the mujahedeen, they do not have the anti-tank weapons, they do not have the anti-aircraft weapons.
Hence my point.
Afghanistan deja-vu: Lessons from the Soviet experience
- Thread starter seth gecko
- Start date
Hence my point.
Hey, if we leave then they are sandwiched between only two powerful enemies but at least we won't be wasting our blood and our treasure trying to reconstruct a country that considers us invaders. Like a referee in hockey, let's step out of the way and let the Taliban and Karzai fight it out.
The US lost interest in Afghanistan after the USSR pulled out. Other nations were involved in supplying the mujahadeen.....Pakistan, Saudi Arabia (and most of the Arab world), China, Iran (see info on Ismail Khan),etc, etc, and they did not leave at that time.
Pakistan is still aiding the Taliban. Saudi Arabia reportedly broke relations with the Taliban over OBL back in the late 1990's but are reportedly providing aid as a part of Pan-Islamism after the NATO invasion. China is supporting Karzai financially and reportedly providing covert aid to the Tailban. Iran is anti-Taliban as it suits them, but also anti-American. Iran & US troops conducted a joint operation in 2002 to oust the Taliban from Herat. It wouldn't be beyond them to provide aid to the enemy of their enemy.....isn't that what the US did through the 1980's????
I know what you're going to say....provide citations!!!
These are reportedly covert operations, so there will be none available until several years after NATO involvement ends and info becomes de-classified.
Someone please provide citations proving Israel has nukes. Everyone who needs to know, knows. The rest of us argue on the Interweb, none being more correct than the other.
But if anyone is so inclined, please look up Lt. Col John Nagl and his hilarious-if-taken-out-of-context quote about Pakistan's duplicity.
The Taliban is equipped and trained sufficiently that they can fight their style of fight against NATO. They have RPG's and LAW's. They have the ability to take out aircraft and mechanised armour, and have done so (remember the lone survivor of the SEAL-team and the disasterous rescue attempt by the Nighthawks?). The IED's are likely the Taliban's most effective means of fighting, but under the right conditions they have proven their ability to organize attacks (1 article I posted in this thread, 1 thread started by Woody, I beleive, that turned into a discussion of M16 vs AK). WE are fighting THEIR fight on THEIR ground increasingly on THEIR terms.
They have the same weapons, but likely not in the same quantity, as they were getting before. Soviets lost about 15000 total in their 10+ years there. NATO is at about 1500 to date.....I have no idea what ANA losses are, probably higher than NATO. I say it shouldn't be about the numbers....this ain't an arithmetic problem. Every loss represents somebodys father, son, husband or brother (also nephew, in-law, 3rd cousin, etc). Every loss on the Afghan side will likely draw in another "insurgent", as is their custom when a family member gets killed. Soviets have a history of throwing people into the fray (WW2 losses compared to other countries). NATO participants all have a different standard of acceptable losses; some countries have pulled out already, some are ready to. Some insist on staying the course. Everyone is different. And that also is a big problem.....unity of command. There is an excellent article out there by a Canadian....Col. Ian Hope.
When foreign boots hit Afghanistan with aggression, something kinda spooky takes place......they suddenly become Afghans instead of Pashtuns, Tajiks, Uzbek, etc. They unify to rout the invader. By not understanding their culture, NATO has made the same mistakes the USSR did 2 decades ago.
Lets hope it ends up better for all parties involved this time.
Going to be very busy for the next few days so I'll appoint.........WOODPECKR as my rep. Any questions or info anyone wants, ask the Wood!
Karzai: A double-crossing bastard! If only we knew.....wait, we did know!
Source: Associated Press
Author(s): Richard Lardner
Original Post: As US looks for exit in Afghanistan, China Digs in
Type: News Article
Date: 11/02/2009
At a former al-Qaida stronghold southeast of the Afghan capital, a state-owned Chinese company is at work on a $3 billion mine project to tap one of the world's largest unexploited copper reserves, a potential financial boon for an impoverished country mired in war.
The promise of a bright future at Aynak, however, cannot conceal the troubling reality of how business is often done in Afghanistan, according to critics of the Kabul government's decision to reject bids from competitors in the U.S., Canada and other countries.
The bidding process unfairly favored China, they allege, and epitomized the back-room deals and abuse of power that has turned Afghans against their government and undercut the U.S. military effort there.
Corruption and graft long have been ingrained in Afghanistan's public institutions. Yet the extent of this corrosion has taken on new significance as the White House considers expanding the U.S. commitment to a war unsupported by a growing number of Americans.
Widespread fraud in Afghanistan's presidential election in August has raised doubts about how quickly a stable and credible government can be installed. A U.N.-backed commission threw out nearly one-third of President Hamid Karzai's votes, setting the stage for a Nov. 7 runoff.
In his recent assessment of the situation in Afghanistan, the top U.S. commander warned that unchecked corruption has led alienated Afghans to support the Taliban-led insurgency.
Afghan officials insist the Aynak bidding was handled openly and honestly, and will create thousands of jobs. But several U.S. geologists and Western businessmen who watched the process closely disagree.
James Yeager, an American geologist who advised Afghanistan's minister of mines, says a few Afghan officials dominated a secretive selection process that gave the winner, China Metallurgical Group Corp., improbably high marks over its foreign competitors.
Said Tayeb Jawad, Afghanistan's ambassador to the United States, said the bidding process was above board. He said he pushed for the U.S. bidder, Phelps Dodge, to be awarded the Aynak rights, but that China offered to start work right away while Phelps wanted to wait until the country was safer.
"We can't afford to give the mining rights to a company that will sit on them for the next 10 or 15 years," Jawad said.
China Metallurgical, better known as MCC, has a poor track record with mining projects in other countries, according to Yeager and other critics. In neighboring Pakistan, for example, where MCC operates a copper mine, there's been little benefit to the local economy. But that information was ignored during the deliberations, they say.
The Aynak deal was awarded to the Chinese late 2007, but the project is only now getting under way. Before copper can be hauled from the ground, China must make a substantial investment to build a power-generating station, roads and a railway to move the metal.
Yeager and Larry Snee, a former U.S. Geological Survey official who also has worked in Afghanistan, contend that MCC probably will steer most of the jobs to Chinese workers.
"Of course, the Afghans are going to benefit," Snee said. "But will they get all they deserve?"
China needs huge quantities of raw materials to feed its rapid economic growth and energy demands. It is well positioned to become the dominant force in Afghanistan's potentially lucrative minerals sector, said Don Ritter, president of the Afghan-American Chamber of Commerce in McLean, Va.
"In what direction do (Afghanistan's) mines and minerals develop?" Ritter said. "Do they go the Eastern model, where everything is done behind a closed door? Or, is there an open, transparent competition, where the money is laid on the table without undue influence?"
Yeager has distributed a 78-page report on the Aynak contract in which he contends that M. Ibrahim Adel, Afghanistan's minister of mines, and his associates shut out legal, financial and technical experts who could have helped them on the decision.
Yeager doesn't accuse Adel or anyone else from benefiting personally by awarding the work to MCC. But the final decision, Yeager says, was dictated by bureaucrats concerned with dollar amounts and personal preferences.
A spokesman for Adel said by e-mail that Yeager may have had a stroke while he was in Afghanistan, and that possibly compromised his understanding of what happened.
Yeager says his health was fine while he was in Afghanistan between 2006 and 2007. "That's just to discredit me," he said. "These are the games they play."
One of the losing competitors for the contract was Hunter Dickinson, a global mining company based in Vancouver, Canada. Robert Schafer, Hunter Dickinson's chief of business development, said an Afghan official told him that its bid had been shown to the Chinese while the proposals were being evaluated.
Schafer said he "wasn't surprised at all" to learn that MCC won.
Wang Baodong, a spokesman for the Chinese Embassy in Washington, did not address the allegations. He said China is committed to pursuing economic, trade and investment projects in Afghanistan that benefit both countries.
China has contributed little to improving security in Afghanistan, yet with the Aynak deal, stands to gain from the sacrifices made by the U.S. and NATO in troops and money.
"The world isn't fair," said Robert Kaplan, a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security in Washington. "A worse outcome to staying and helping the Chinese would be withdrawing and losing a great battle in the war against radical Islam."
Source: Associated Press
Author(s): Richard Lardner
Original Post: As US looks for exit in Afghanistan, China Digs in
Type: News Article
Date: 11/02/2009
At a former al-Qaida stronghold southeast of the Afghan capital, a state-owned Chinese company is at work on a $3 billion mine project to tap one of the world's largest unexploited copper reserves, a potential financial boon for an impoverished country mired in war.
The promise of a bright future at Aynak, however, cannot conceal the troubling reality of how business is often done in Afghanistan, according to critics of the Kabul government's decision to reject bids from competitors in the U.S., Canada and other countries.
The bidding process unfairly favored China, they allege, and epitomized the back-room deals and abuse of power that has turned Afghans against their government and undercut the U.S. military effort there.
Corruption and graft long have been ingrained in Afghanistan's public institutions. Yet the extent of this corrosion has taken on new significance as the White House considers expanding the U.S. commitment to a war unsupported by a growing number of Americans.
Widespread fraud in Afghanistan's presidential election in August has raised doubts about how quickly a stable and credible government can be installed. A U.N.-backed commission threw out nearly one-third of President Hamid Karzai's votes, setting the stage for a Nov. 7 runoff.
In his recent assessment of the situation in Afghanistan, the top U.S. commander warned that unchecked corruption has led alienated Afghans to support the Taliban-led insurgency.
Afghan officials insist the Aynak bidding was handled openly and honestly, and will create thousands of jobs. But several U.S. geologists and Western businessmen who watched the process closely disagree.
James Yeager, an American geologist who advised Afghanistan's minister of mines, says a few Afghan officials dominated a secretive selection process that gave the winner, China Metallurgical Group Corp., improbably high marks over its foreign competitors.
Said Tayeb Jawad, Afghanistan's ambassador to the United States, said the bidding process was above board. He said he pushed for the U.S. bidder, Phelps Dodge, to be awarded the Aynak rights, but that China offered to start work right away while Phelps wanted to wait until the country was safer.
"We can't afford to give the mining rights to a company that will sit on them for the next 10 or 15 years," Jawad said.
China Metallurgical, better known as MCC, has a poor track record with mining projects in other countries, according to Yeager and other critics. In neighboring Pakistan, for example, where MCC operates a copper mine, there's been little benefit to the local economy. But that information was ignored during the deliberations, they say.
The Aynak deal was awarded to the Chinese late 2007, but the project is only now getting under way. Before copper can be hauled from the ground, China must make a substantial investment to build a power-generating station, roads and a railway to move the metal.
Yeager and Larry Snee, a former U.S. Geological Survey official who also has worked in Afghanistan, contend that MCC probably will steer most of the jobs to Chinese workers.
"Of course, the Afghans are going to benefit," Snee said. "But will they get all they deserve?"
China needs huge quantities of raw materials to feed its rapid economic growth and energy demands. It is well positioned to become the dominant force in Afghanistan's potentially lucrative minerals sector, said Don Ritter, president of the Afghan-American Chamber of Commerce in McLean, Va.
"In what direction do (Afghanistan's) mines and minerals develop?" Ritter said. "Do they go the Eastern model, where everything is done behind a closed door? Or, is there an open, transparent competition, where the money is laid on the table without undue influence?"
Yeager has distributed a 78-page report on the Aynak contract in which he contends that M. Ibrahim Adel, Afghanistan's minister of mines, and his associates shut out legal, financial and technical experts who could have helped them on the decision.
Yeager doesn't accuse Adel or anyone else from benefiting personally by awarding the work to MCC. But the final decision, Yeager says, was dictated by bureaucrats concerned with dollar amounts and personal preferences.
A spokesman for Adel said by e-mail that Yeager may have had a stroke while he was in Afghanistan, and that possibly compromised his understanding of what happened.
Yeager says his health was fine while he was in Afghanistan between 2006 and 2007. "That's just to discredit me," he said. "These are the games they play."
One of the losing competitors for the contract was Hunter Dickinson, a global mining company based in Vancouver, Canada. Robert Schafer, Hunter Dickinson's chief of business development, said an Afghan official told him that its bid had been shown to the Chinese while the proposals were being evaluated.
Schafer said he "wasn't surprised at all" to learn that MCC won.
Wang Baodong, a spokesman for the Chinese Embassy in Washington, did not address the allegations. He said China is committed to pursuing economic, trade and investment projects in Afghanistan that benefit both countries.
China has contributed little to improving security in Afghanistan, yet with the Aynak deal, stands to gain from the sacrifices made by the U.S. and NATO in troops and money.
"The world isn't fair," said Robert Kaplan, a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security in Washington. "A worse outcome to staying and helping the Chinese would be withdrawing and losing a great battle in the war against radical Islam."
Here's something from Nagl.
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/obamaswar/interviews/nagl.html
Another great quote in this one...... "Predictions are difficult, especially about the future".
Ex-military guys can be soooo stupid some times.
But not me.
I am so smart...I am so smart.....S-M-R-T!!! (Props to Homer J. Simspon)
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/obamaswar/interviews/nagl.html
Another great quote in this one...... "Predictions are difficult, especially about the future".
Ex-military guys can be soooo stupid some times.
But not me.
I am so smart...I am so smart.....S-M-R-T!!! (Props to Homer J. Simspon)
China knows how to deal with radical Muslims. Just ask the 8 Unghurs (check spelling) awaiting execution. Let see what happens if the Taliban and/or Al Queda ever attack a Chinese installation or person.
9/11 is when the Taliban took their quarrel to the west. It's not just about power, even worse, its about God. And you, the infidel must die. when the battle becomes about God, there are no rules and logic gets tossed out the window. We (read westerners) want to play by the rules, humane weapons, rules of engagement, winning hearts and minds. All great noble goals but....no battle was ever decisively won playing by the rules. This battle will play out for years until we tire of it and bring our people home. We don't have the will (balls) to totally clean house as needed.
Who knows where the truth lies? One version is that the Taliban had no idea what OBL was planning for 9/11 and that they were quite pissed off he brought the U.S. into Afghanistan where the Taliban already controlled 90% of the country.
Agreed. I compare this to a hockey game where the West is constrained by 1,000 rules and the Taliban observes no rules and plays dirty.
British Army tells its soldiers to 'bribe' the Taleban with "bags of gold"
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/Afghanistan/article6919516.ece
British forces should buy off potential Taleban recruits with “bags of gold”, according to a new army field manual published yesterday.
Army commanders should also talk to insurgent leaders with “blood on their hands” in order to hasten the end of the conflict in Afghanistan.
The edicts, which are contained in rewritten counter-insurgency guidelines, will be taught to all new army officers. They mark a strategic rethink after three years in which British and Nato forces have failed to defeat the Taleban. The manual is also a recognition that the Army’s previous doctrine for success against insurgents, which was based on the experience in Northern Ireland, is now out of date.
The new instructions came on the day that Gordon Brown went farther than before in setting out Britain’s exit strategy from Afghanistan. The Prime Minister stated explicitly last night that he wanted troops to begin handing over districts to Afghan authorities during next year — a general election year in Britain.
Addressing the issue of paying off the locals, the new manual states that army commanders should give away enough money to dissuade them from joining the enemy. The Taleban is known to pay about $10 (£5.95) a day to recruit local fighters.
Major-General Paul Newton said: “The best weapons to counter insurgents don’t shoot. In other words, use bags of gold in the short term to change the security dynamics. But you don’t just chuck gold at them, this has to be done wisely.”
British commanders in Afghanistan and Iraq have complained that their access to money on the battlefield — cash rather than literal gold — compares poorly with their US counterparts.
Adam Holloway, a former army officer and the Tory MP for Gravesham in Kent, said that the idea was a matter of “shutting the door after the horse has bolted”. He added: “I know that a number of generals thought in 2006 that, rather than send a British brigade to Helmand, they should buy off people in the tribal areas. Now it’s too late.”
Mr Brown told the Lord Mayor’s Banquet at Guildhall in the City last night that a summit of Nato allies would be held in London in January, which could set a timetable for the transfer of security control to the Afghans starting in 2010. Military sources said that the first areas to be involved would probably be in the north and west of Afghanistan — not in Helmand in the south, where British troops are based.
The counter-insurgency field manual also highlights the importance of talking to the enemy. “There’s no point in talking to people who don’t have blood on their hands,” General Newton said, launching the document in London.
Britain’s early experience of handing out cash in Afghanistan proved abortive. About £16 million in cash was given to farmers to stop them growing poppy crops for the heroin trade, which helps to fund the Taleban. The money is believed to have had little impact on the opium yields.
The manual says that money can be the answer, if it is prudently distributed. “Properly spent within a context of longer-term planning, money offers a cost-effective means for pulling community support away from the insurgents and provides the military with a much-needed economy of force
measure,” it says. “Unemployed and under-employed military-aged males typically provide the richest vein from which insurgents recruit ‘foot soldiers’. Short-term, labour-intensive projects are therefore the best way to disrupt such recruiting.”
“The counter-insurgent should be careful not to be over-generous since this will distort local economic and social activity and may lead to unproductive dependency.”
The positive impact of military units going into battle with bags of cash at their disposal is underlined in the manual by the experience of a top British commander who served in Iraq. “The hoops that I had to jump through to get the very few UK pounds that were available were . . . amazing; the American divisional commanders were resourced and empowered in ways that we could only dream of,” he says.
“UK commanders on recent operations have not had quick access to the same levels of cash as . . . their US counterparts,” the manual says. “Where possible, mission command should apply to money as much as any other weapon or enabling system.”
It is more than eight years since the Army last published a counter-insurgency doctrine, when the main lessons contained in it arose from operations in Northern Ireland and the Balkans.
General Newton, Assistant Chief of Defence Staff Development Concepts and Doctrine, said that new ideas were needed to cope with the media-savvy insurgents who are fighting in Afghanistan and that there was no place for arrogance on the part of the British military hierarchy, relying on their experience of past campaigns.
The Americans complained in Iraq that the British in Basra too often referred to the lessons of Northern Ireland in dictating how the insurgency should be handled.
A bomb disposal specialist from 33 Regiment Royal Engineers was killed by an explosion near Gereshk in central Helmand province on Sunday, the Ministryof Defence said yesterday. He was part of the Counter-IED (improvised explosive device) Task Force and the 97th member of the Armed Forces to die in Afghanistan this year.
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/Afghanistan/article6919516.ece
British forces should buy off potential Taleban recruits with “bags of gold”, according to a new army field manual published yesterday.
Army commanders should also talk to insurgent leaders with “blood on their hands” in order to hasten the end of the conflict in Afghanistan.
The edicts, which are contained in rewritten counter-insurgency guidelines, will be taught to all new army officers. They mark a strategic rethink after three years in which British and Nato forces have failed to defeat the Taleban. The manual is also a recognition that the Army’s previous doctrine for success against insurgents, which was based on the experience in Northern Ireland, is now out of date.
The new instructions came on the day that Gordon Brown went farther than before in setting out Britain’s exit strategy from Afghanistan. The Prime Minister stated explicitly last night that he wanted troops to begin handing over districts to Afghan authorities during next year — a general election year in Britain.
Addressing the issue of paying off the locals, the new manual states that army commanders should give away enough money to dissuade them from joining the enemy. The Taleban is known to pay about $10 (£5.95) a day to recruit local fighters.
Major-General Paul Newton said: “The best weapons to counter insurgents don’t shoot. In other words, use bags of gold in the short term to change the security dynamics. But you don’t just chuck gold at them, this has to be done wisely.”
British commanders in Afghanistan and Iraq have complained that their access to money on the battlefield — cash rather than literal gold — compares poorly with their US counterparts.
Adam Holloway, a former army officer and the Tory MP for Gravesham in Kent, said that the idea was a matter of “shutting the door after the horse has bolted”. He added: “I know that a number of generals thought in 2006 that, rather than send a British brigade to Helmand, they should buy off people in the tribal areas. Now it’s too late.”
Mr Brown told the Lord Mayor’s Banquet at Guildhall in the City last night that a summit of Nato allies would be held in London in January, which could set a timetable for the transfer of security control to the Afghans starting in 2010. Military sources said that the first areas to be involved would probably be in the north and west of Afghanistan — not in Helmand in the south, where British troops are based.
The counter-insurgency field manual also highlights the importance of talking to the enemy. “There’s no point in talking to people who don’t have blood on their hands,” General Newton said, launching the document in London.
Britain’s early experience of handing out cash in Afghanistan proved abortive. About £16 million in cash was given to farmers to stop them growing poppy crops for the heroin trade, which helps to fund the Taleban. The money is believed to have had little impact on the opium yields.
The manual says that money can be the answer, if it is prudently distributed. “Properly spent within a context of longer-term planning, money offers a cost-effective means for pulling community support away from the insurgents and provides the military with a much-needed economy of force
measure,” it says. “Unemployed and under-employed military-aged males typically provide the richest vein from which insurgents recruit ‘foot soldiers’. Short-term, labour-intensive projects are therefore the best way to disrupt such recruiting.”
“The counter-insurgent should be careful not to be over-generous since this will distort local economic and social activity and may lead to unproductive dependency.”
The positive impact of military units going into battle with bags of cash at their disposal is underlined in the manual by the experience of a top British commander who served in Iraq. “The hoops that I had to jump through to get the very few UK pounds that were available were . . . amazing; the American divisional commanders were resourced and empowered in ways that we could only dream of,” he says.
“UK commanders on recent operations have not had quick access to the same levels of cash as . . . their US counterparts,” the manual says. “Where possible, mission command should apply to money as much as any other weapon or enabling system.”
It is more than eight years since the Army last published a counter-insurgency doctrine, when the main lessons contained in it arose from operations in Northern Ireland and the Balkans.
General Newton, Assistant Chief of Defence Staff Development Concepts and Doctrine, said that new ideas were needed to cope with the media-savvy insurgents who are fighting in Afghanistan and that there was no place for arrogance on the part of the British military hierarchy, relying on their experience of past campaigns.
The Americans complained in Iraq that the British in Basra too often referred to the lessons of Northern Ireland in dictating how the insurgency should be handled.
A bomb disposal specialist from 33 Regiment Royal Engineers was killed by an explosion near Gereshk in central Helmand province on Sunday, the Ministryof Defence said yesterday. He was part of the Counter-IED (improvised explosive device) Task Force and the 97th member of the Armed Forces to die in Afghanistan this year.
I have a few days off, so here's more stuff.....
Is Iran Supporting the Insurgency in Afghanistan?
Publication: Terrorism Monitor Volume: 7 Issue: 33November 6, 2009 12:46 PM Age: 12 daysCategory: Terrorism Monitor, Global Terrorism Analysis, Home Page, Military/Security, Iran, Afghanistan By: Chris Zambelis
EFP's ("superbombs") seized in Baghdad
Violence and instability in Afghanistan continue to rage in the form of an organic insurgency shaped by local identities, networks, and interests. Operating under the nebulous rubric of the Taliban, the insurgents in Afghanistan have evolved in sophistication, lethality, and geographic scope in recent years. While the presence of transnational radical Islamists led by al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan augments the tactical and operational capabilities of the insurgents, myriad factors help fuel the violence that confronts the American-led Coalition. The reach of regional state actors, for instance, impacts the insurgency in Afghanistan. The machinations of Afghanistan’s neighbors, in essence, define its geopolitics. Pakistan’s impact on Afghan politics, society and the insurgency receives the most attention. Another influential actor in Afghanistan that is drawing more attention of late, however, but whose role in Afghan affairs is far less understood, is Iran.
Iran’s interests and reach into Afghan society are well known. Official U.S. and regional sources, however, often paint a confusing picture of the nature of Iran’s activities in Afghanistan. Iran is frequently described as a force for stability in Afghanistan, with interests that largely converge with those of the U.S. mission there, namely their shared opposition to the Taliban and al-Qaeda. Yet reports that Iranian-made munitions are finding their way into the hands of the Taliban coupled with allegations that Iran is actively providing insurgents with operational and material support are increasingly making headlines. These claims are echoed in General Stanley A. McChrystal’s unclassified August 2009 assessment of the situation in Afghanistan (McChrystal is commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan). [1] At the same time, General McChrystal’s report cites Iran as a source of development aid and support for Kabul. These apparently contradictory assessments of Iran’s activities in Afghanistan are underlined by what the report calls Tehran’s “ambiguous role” in Afghanistan. U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates has also accused Tehran of playing a “double game” in Afghanistan through its alleged support for armed factions and its friendly relations with Kabul (Agence France-Presse, June 12; Asia Times [Hong Kong], July 8). In spite of Kabul’s close ties with Tehran, Afghan security sources have made similar claims implicating Iran in the insurgency in Afghanistan (RFE/RL, June 22, 2007).
An Iranian Footprint on the Battlefield
Proof of Iran’s role in aiding the insurgency in Afghanistan, according to U.S. and regional sources, is based on evidence that Iran has provided weapons, explosives, and other forms of material support to elements of the Taliban and other militants since 2007. British forces reportedly intercepted at least two shipments of Iranian-made arms in Helmand province in southern Afghanistan between April and June 2007 (BBC, June 11, 2007). British forces also claimed to have uncovered Russian-made SA-7 “Strella” and SA-14 “Gremlin” man portable, low-altitude surface-to-air missiles that are believed to have originated in Iran (The Times [London], March 1). Armor-piercing bullets, mortars, C-4 plastic explosives, and anti-tank mines of Iranian origin are also reported to have appeared on the battlefield (The Times, March 1; August 5, 2007). A ten-ton cache of arms and munitions of Iranian, Chinese and Russian manufacture was uncovered in western Afghanistan’s Herat province, located beside the border with Iran (RFE/RL, September 14, 2007). More recently, Afghan police reported seizing explosives-packed jerry cans they believed to have originated in Iran during a search of militants traveling on the Bagram-Kabul highway (Weesa [Kabul], September 9). The Afghan National Army (ANA) claims to have uncovered 14 Iranian-made missiles of unidentified specification in Herat (Tolo TV [Kabul], October 19). Detonators for explosives and related items reported to have originated in Iran have also been uncovered throughout Afghanistan (Asharq al-Awsat, September 12).
Many observers have traced the appearance of advanced armor piercing explosives in Afghanistan, namely Explosively-Formed Penetrators (EFPs - an advanced form of shaped charge), back to Tehran (Wired, January 28; al-Jazeera [Doha], February 27, 2007). Significantly, the appearance of EFPs in the arsenal of armed factions in Iraq was also blamed on Iran. Dubbed a “superbomb” for their ability to pierce armored vehicles, including battle tanks, EFPs have been blamed for many U.S. and Coalition casualties in Afghanistan (Gulf Times [Doha], July 4, 2007; Wired, August 23, 2007).
In addition to allegedly providing weapons and related support to insurgents in Afghanistan, Iran is also accused of operating militant training and logistical camps across the country, particularly in the western provinces of Herat and Farah, as well as on Iranian soil, specifically the eastern provinces of Kerman and Khorasan along the Iranian-Afghan border (Weesa, January 29). Colonel Rahmatullah Safi, police chief for Afghanistan’s western provinces of Herat, Baghdis, and Farah, reported that at least twenty armed militants had crossed the border on pickup trucks from Iran into Farah en route to confront Coalition forces (RFE/RL, June 22, 2007).
Evaluating the Evidence
In spite of the appearance of Iranian-origin weapons on Afghan soil and reports that Tehran is actively supporting the insurgency in Afghanistan, U.S. and regional officials, including the Kabul government, appear to take great care not to accuse Iran of operating a deliberate policy aimed at undermining the NATO and U.S. mission and overall stability in Afghanistan. A number of reasons may be behind this logic. First, there may be little concrete evidence of official Iranian involvement in the transfer of weapons to insurgents in Afghanistan. Instead, corrupt elements within the Iranian security forces or independent smugglers may be trafficking weapons and explosives across the border for profit or in exchange for opium (Asia Times, June 22, 2007). Cross-border smuggling is a part of life on the Iranian-Afghan frontier. Moreover, from a technical perspective, military officials and other observers have suggested that the EFPs and other forms of IEDs that are linked to Iranian support or expertise often contain a uniquely Afghan signature in their design and deployment, even though some of the dual-use components used to manufacture these devices may have originated in Iran due to the high volume of bilateral trade between Iran and Afghanistan. The technology for deploying EFPs and other sophisticated IEDs is also widely available these days due to the Internet and communication between militants with experience in various theaters, making it possible that local insurgents have procured the necessary materials and expertise themselves to effectively deploy EFPs and other advanced weapons systems (Wired, August 23, 2007).
Washington understands that Tehran’s support to Kabul is crucial to Afghan and regional stability. The presence of Iranian-origin weapons in Afghanistan may not necessarily prove that Iran is formally operating a policy designed to sabotage the U.S.-led Coalition effort. Factions within the Iranian security services, however, namely the elite Quds (Jerusalem) Force, may be following an agenda parallel to Tehran’s normal diplomatic and economic relations with Kabul and stated commitment to support peace and stability in Afghanistan. An elite special operations organization within Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) that emerged in the 1980s, the Quds Force aims to advance key aspects of Iranian foreign policy. The track record of the Quds Force includes special operations in theaters as varied as Lebanon, Iraq, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sudan, and Afghanistan.
The reported presence of Quds Force operatives in Afghanistan likely represents an effort on the part of Tehran to counter growing U.S. diplomatic pressure against its nuclear program and other points of contention. Iran also feels threatened by the robust U.S. military presence on its eastern and western flanks. In other words, Tehran may see an opportunity to hit back at Washington in a limited manner in Afghanistan to increase its bargaining leverage on other matters it deems vital to Iranian security and interests. On the U.S. side, Washington may have long ago accepted Tehran’s “ambiguous role” as a constructive and obstructive force in Afghanistan as a necessary cost of U.S. intervention. While highlighting the alleged role of the Quds Force in supporting elements of the insurgency in Afghanistan, General McChrystal’s assessment also mentions that Iran’s current policies and activities do not threaten the U.S.-led Coalition’s short-term mission, but does maintain that Iran is capable of threatening the mission in the long-term. [2]
........long article, so continued in next post...........
Is Iran Supporting the Insurgency in Afghanistan?
Publication: Terrorism Monitor Volume: 7 Issue: 33November 6, 2009 12:46 PM Age: 12 daysCategory: Terrorism Monitor, Global Terrorism Analysis, Home Page, Military/Security, Iran, Afghanistan By: Chris Zambelis
EFP's ("superbombs") seized in Baghdad
Violence and instability in Afghanistan continue to rage in the form of an organic insurgency shaped by local identities, networks, and interests. Operating under the nebulous rubric of the Taliban, the insurgents in Afghanistan have evolved in sophistication, lethality, and geographic scope in recent years. While the presence of transnational radical Islamists led by al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan augments the tactical and operational capabilities of the insurgents, myriad factors help fuel the violence that confronts the American-led Coalition. The reach of regional state actors, for instance, impacts the insurgency in Afghanistan. The machinations of Afghanistan’s neighbors, in essence, define its geopolitics. Pakistan’s impact on Afghan politics, society and the insurgency receives the most attention. Another influential actor in Afghanistan that is drawing more attention of late, however, but whose role in Afghan affairs is far less understood, is Iran.
Iran’s interests and reach into Afghan society are well known. Official U.S. and regional sources, however, often paint a confusing picture of the nature of Iran’s activities in Afghanistan. Iran is frequently described as a force for stability in Afghanistan, with interests that largely converge with those of the U.S. mission there, namely their shared opposition to the Taliban and al-Qaeda. Yet reports that Iranian-made munitions are finding their way into the hands of the Taliban coupled with allegations that Iran is actively providing insurgents with operational and material support are increasingly making headlines. These claims are echoed in General Stanley A. McChrystal’s unclassified August 2009 assessment of the situation in Afghanistan (McChrystal is commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan). [1] At the same time, General McChrystal’s report cites Iran as a source of development aid and support for Kabul. These apparently contradictory assessments of Iran’s activities in Afghanistan are underlined by what the report calls Tehran’s “ambiguous role” in Afghanistan. U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates has also accused Tehran of playing a “double game” in Afghanistan through its alleged support for armed factions and its friendly relations with Kabul (Agence France-Presse, June 12; Asia Times [Hong Kong], July 8). In spite of Kabul’s close ties with Tehran, Afghan security sources have made similar claims implicating Iran in the insurgency in Afghanistan (RFE/RL, June 22, 2007).
An Iranian Footprint on the Battlefield
Proof of Iran’s role in aiding the insurgency in Afghanistan, according to U.S. and regional sources, is based on evidence that Iran has provided weapons, explosives, and other forms of material support to elements of the Taliban and other militants since 2007. British forces reportedly intercepted at least two shipments of Iranian-made arms in Helmand province in southern Afghanistan between April and June 2007 (BBC, June 11, 2007). British forces also claimed to have uncovered Russian-made SA-7 “Strella” and SA-14 “Gremlin” man portable, low-altitude surface-to-air missiles that are believed to have originated in Iran (The Times [London], March 1). Armor-piercing bullets, mortars, C-4 plastic explosives, and anti-tank mines of Iranian origin are also reported to have appeared on the battlefield (The Times, March 1; August 5, 2007). A ten-ton cache of arms and munitions of Iranian, Chinese and Russian manufacture was uncovered in western Afghanistan’s Herat province, located beside the border with Iran (RFE/RL, September 14, 2007). More recently, Afghan police reported seizing explosives-packed jerry cans they believed to have originated in Iran during a search of militants traveling on the Bagram-Kabul highway (Weesa [Kabul], September 9). The Afghan National Army (ANA) claims to have uncovered 14 Iranian-made missiles of unidentified specification in Herat (Tolo TV [Kabul], October 19). Detonators for explosives and related items reported to have originated in Iran have also been uncovered throughout Afghanistan (Asharq al-Awsat, September 12).
Many observers have traced the appearance of advanced armor piercing explosives in Afghanistan, namely Explosively-Formed Penetrators (EFPs - an advanced form of shaped charge), back to Tehran (Wired, January 28; al-Jazeera [Doha], February 27, 2007). Significantly, the appearance of EFPs in the arsenal of armed factions in Iraq was also blamed on Iran. Dubbed a “superbomb” for their ability to pierce armored vehicles, including battle tanks, EFPs have been blamed for many U.S. and Coalition casualties in Afghanistan (Gulf Times [Doha], July 4, 2007; Wired, August 23, 2007).
In addition to allegedly providing weapons and related support to insurgents in Afghanistan, Iran is also accused of operating militant training and logistical camps across the country, particularly in the western provinces of Herat and Farah, as well as on Iranian soil, specifically the eastern provinces of Kerman and Khorasan along the Iranian-Afghan border (Weesa, January 29). Colonel Rahmatullah Safi, police chief for Afghanistan’s western provinces of Herat, Baghdis, and Farah, reported that at least twenty armed militants had crossed the border on pickup trucks from Iran into Farah en route to confront Coalition forces (RFE/RL, June 22, 2007).
Evaluating the Evidence
In spite of the appearance of Iranian-origin weapons on Afghan soil and reports that Tehran is actively supporting the insurgency in Afghanistan, U.S. and regional officials, including the Kabul government, appear to take great care not to accuse Iran of operating a deliberate policy aimed at undermining the NATO and U.S. mission and overall stability in Afghanistan. A number of reasons may be behind this logic. First, there may be little concrete evidence of official Iranian involvement in the transfer of weapons to insurgents in Afghanistan. Instead, corrupt elements within the Iranian security forces or independent smugglers may be trafficking weapons and explosives across the border for profit or in exchange for opium (Asia Times, June 22, 2007). Cross-border smuggling is a part of life on the Iranian-Afghan frontier. Moreover, from a technical perspective, military officials and other observers have suggested that the EFPs and other forms of IEDs that are linked to Iranian support or expertise often contain a uniquely Afghan signature in their design and deployment, even though some of the dual-use components used to manufacture these devices may have originated in Iran due to the high volume of bilateral trade between Iran and Afghanistan. The technology for deploying EFPs and other sophisticated IEDs is also widely available these days due to the Internet and communication between militants with experience in various theaters, making it possible that local insurgents have procured the necessary materials and expertise themselves to effectively deploy EFPs and other advanced weapons systems (Wired, August 23, 2007).
Washington understands that Tehran’s support to Kabul is crucial to Afghan and regional stability. The presence of Iranian-origin weapons in Afghanistan may not necessarily prove that Iran is formally operating a policy designed to sabotage the U.S.-led Coalition effort. Factions within the Iranian security services, however, namely the elite Quds (Jerusalem) Force, may be following an agenda parallel to Tehran’s normal diplomatic and economic relations with Kabul and stated commitment to support peace and stability in Afghanistan. An elite special operations organization within Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) that emerged in the 1980s, the Quds Force aims to advance key aspects of Iranian foreign policy. The track record of the Quds Force includes special operations in theaters as varied as Lebanon, Iraq, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sudan, and Afghanistan.
The reported presence of Quds Force operatives in Afghanistan likely represents an effort on the part of Tehran to counter growing U.S. diplomatic pressure against its nuclear program and other points of contention. Iran also feels threatened by the robust U.S. military presence on its eastern and western flanks. In other words, Tehran may see an opportunity to hit back at Washington in a limited manner in Afghanistan to increase its bargaining leverage on other matters it deems vital to Iranian security and interests. On the U.S. side, Washington may have long ago accepted Tehran’s “ambiguous role” as a constructive and obstructive force in Afghanistan as a necessary cost of U.S. intervention. While highlighting the alleged role of the Quds Force in supporting elements of the insurgency in Afghanistan, General McChrystal’s assessment also mentions that Iran’s current policies and activities do not threaten the U.S.-led Coalition’s short-term mission, but does maintain that Iran is capable of threatening the mission in the long-term. [2]
........long article, so continued in next post...........
.....continued from previous post.......
Iran’s Stake in Afghanistan
Understanding the dynamics of Iranian involvement in Afghanistan is essential to grasping the U.S.-Iranian interface in Afghanistan. On account of its geography and the ethnic, linguistic, and sectarian links its people share with millions of Afghans, Iran’s influence and interests in Afghanistan go back millennia. By virtue of its growing regional influence and historic links to Afghanistan, Iran is crucial to Afghanistan’s development and prospects for long-term peace and stability. Examples of Iran’s influence and reach in Afghanistan abound:
• Iran has emerged, among other things, as the fourth largest source of foreign direct investment in Afghanistan in 2009 (Ferghana.ru, April 12). Iranian investment includes major developments in sectors as varied as critical infrastructure, energy, agriculture, health care, and communications.
• Iran also provides humanitarian aid on a wide scale. Iran’s efforts encompass the development of Afghan educational and cultural institutions and the empowerment of civil society organizations.
• Tehran has also been keen on shoring up its contacts with local political leaders and other notables, including local warlords and tribal leaders in Afghanistan’s western provinces (IWPR [Kabul], October 12).
While the locus of the Iranian presence in Afghanistan is found in the country’s western provinces such as Herat, Iran’s diplomatic, economic, and cultural influence is felt throughout much of the country, a reality not lost on the government in Kabul.
In spite of reports alleging Iranian support for the Taliban, in reality Iran stands to lose a great deal with the resurrection of a Taliban-led order in Afghanistan. The emergence of the Sunni fundamentalist and virulently anti-Shi’a Taliban represented a major threat to Iran at the height of its power prior to 2001. The rise of the Taliban added to the stream of Afghan refugees, especially Shi’a Afghans, who sought refuge in Iran. The influx of refugees seeking sanctuary in Iran added to the already large refugee community residing in Iran since the years of the anti-Soviet struggle. Over 1.5 million Afghan refugees are believed to reside in Iran today, an issue that remains a point of contention between Tehran and Kabul. [3] The assassination of 11 Iranian diplomats in the northern Afghan city of Mazar-i-Sharif in August 1998 after the Taliban overran the city almost sparked an Iranian invasion. Iran at the time, along with Russia and India, was a staunch supporter of the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance forces operating in northern Afghanistan. Iranian opposition to the Taliban and its al-Qaeda ally was such that Tehran cooperated closely with Washington in the run-up to Operation Enduring Freedom by providing vital intelligence support for the U.S. war effort. While Tehran may relish seeing the United States stumble in Afghanistan, the prospects of having to contend with a reinvigorated Taliban backed by al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and in neighboring Pakistan is not likely to sit well in Tehran.
Afghanistan and the Iranian War on Drugs
Much has been said about the rapid expansion of the opium trade in Afghanistan and the nexus between transnational drug trafficking, insurgency, and international terrorism in South and Central Asia. Few countries, however, have felt the impact of this trend more than Iran, especially on the domestic social level. Iran has one of the highest rates of drug addiction in the world. An October 2009 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) study estimates that at least one million Iranians are addicted to opiates; Iranians are believed to consume at least 15 percent of the world’s opium, and these figures are believed to be on the rise. [4] Iran’s borders with Afghanistan and Pakistan place it along one of the world’s busiest and most violent narcotics trafficking routes; 40 percent of the opium that flows out of Afghanistan is estimated to transit Iran before making its way to global markets. Iran also boasts the highest rate of opium seizures in the world. [5] Iran’s counter-narcotics efforts, however, have come at a steep price. Tehran is contending with increasingly violent bands of traffickers operating within its borders, many of whom are linked to militant groups in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, in effect blurring the lines between organized crime and violent militancy. Based on current trends, the ongoing violence and instability in Afghanistan will only exacerbate Iran’s domestic problems relating to the drug trade.
Conclusion
Iran’s strategic calculus in Afghanistan is shaped by the interplay of local, regional, and international dynamics. While the robust Western military presence in the region poses serious challenges to Iran, there is little evidence to suggest that Tehran’s strategy involves an intensive effort to support the Taliban’s efforts to oust NATO and Coalition forces from Afghanistan. To achieve such an objective would require a far more vigorous and transparent effort on Tehran’s part to inflict significant damage on the Coalition on a regular basis. Such an approach would vindicate the claims of Iran’s nefarious motives in Afghanistan, thus further harming Iran’s standing in the international community. Ongoing violence and instability in Afghanistan is a recipe for future flows of refugees, increased opium traffic, and violent militancy spilling over Iran’s borders. Such a scenario is not in Iran’s interest.
The rapidly-expanding Taliban insurgency and the growing instability in Pakistan pose the greatest threats to the U.S.-led Coalition in Afghanistan, not Iran. Instead, Iran appears keen on playing a delicate balancing game that enables it to leverage its influence in Afghanistan, thereby bolstering its bargaining position on issues such as its nuclear program and the political future of Afghanistan and Iraq. At the same time, Iran has the potential to raise the stakes in Afghanistan if need be, as it does in Iraq, and to do so with devastating consequences for the United States in the event of a future crisis; indeed, a potential U.S. invasion of Iran, for instance, or for that matter, a potential Israeli attack on Iran, is sure to play itself out in Afghanistan.
Notes:
1. See “COMISAF’S Initial Assessment, Secretary of Defense Memorandum June 2009, Initial United States Forces – Afghanistan (USFOR-A) Assessment,” Stanley A. McChrystal, General, U.S. Army Commander, United States Forces – Afghanistan, International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan, 30 August 2009, 2-10, media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/documents/Assessment_Redacted_092109.pdf
2. Ibid
3. See “Afghanistan and Pakistan: Understanding and Engaging Regional Stakeholders,” Karim Sadjadpour, Testimony before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, March 31, 2009, www.carnegieeurope.eu/publications/
4. See “Addiction, Crime and Insurgency: The Transnational Threat of Afghan Opium,” United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), October 2009, p. 1.
5. Ibid, pp.2, 7.
Iran’s Stake in Afghanistan
Understanding the dynamics of Iranian involvement in Afghanistan is essential to grasping the U.S.-Iranian interface in Afghanistan. On account of its geography and the ethnic, linguistic, and sectarian links its people share with millions of Afghans, Iran’s influence and interests in Afghanistan go back millennia. By virtue of its growing regional influence and historic links to Afghanistan, Iran is crucial to Afghanistan’s development and prospects for long-term peace and stability. Examples of Iran’s influence and reach in Afghanistan abound:
• Iran has emerged, among other things, as the fourth largest source of foreign direct investment in Afghanistan in 2009 (Ferghana.ru, April 12). Iranian investment includes major developments in sectors as varied as critical infrastructure, energy, agriculture, health care, and communications.
• Iran also provides humanitarian aid on a wide scale. Iran’s efforts encompass the development of Afghan educational and cultural institutions and the empowerment of civil society organizations.
• Tehran has also been keen on shoring up its contacts with local political leaders and other notables, including local warlords and tribal leaders in Afghanistan’s western provinces (IWPR [Kabul], October 12).
While the locus of the Iranian presence in Afghanistan is found in the country’s western provinces such as Herat, Iran’s diplomatic, economic, and cultural influence is felt throughout much of the country, a reality not lost on the government in Kabul.
In spite of reports alleging Iranian support for the Taliban, in reality Iran stands to lose a great deal with the resurrection of a Taliban-led order in Afghanistan. The emergence of the Sunni fundamentalist and virulently anti-Shi’a Taliban represented a major threat to Iran at the height of its power prior to 2001. The rise of the Taliban added to the stream of Afghan refugees, especially Shi’a Afghans, who sought refuge in Iran. The influx of refugees seeking sanctuary in Iran added to the already large refugee community residing in Iran since the years of the anti-Soviet struggle. Over 1.5 million Afghan refugees are believed to reside in Iran today, an issue that remains a point of contention between Tehran and Kabul. [3] The assassination of 11 Iranian diplomats in the northern Afghan city of Mazar-i-Sharif in August 1998 after the Taliban overran the city almost sparked an Iranian invasion. Iran at the time, along with Russia and India, was a staunch supporter of the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance forces operating in northern Afghanistan. Iranian opposition to the Taliban and its al-Qaeda ally was such that Tehran cooperated closely with Washington in the run-up to Operation Enduring Freedom by providing vital intelligence support for the U.S. war effort. While Tehran may relish seeing the United States stumble in Afghanistan, the prospects of having to contend with a reinvigorated Taliban backed by al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and in neighboring Pakistan is not likely to sit well in Tehran.
Afghanistan and the Iranian War on Drugs
Much has been said about the rapid expansion of the opium trade in Afghanistan and the nexus between transnational drug trafficking, insurgency, and international terrorism in South and Central Asia. Few countries, however, have felt the impact of this trend more than Iran, especially on the domestic social level. Iran has one of the highest rates of drug addiction in the world. An October 2009 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) study estimates that at least one million Iranians are addicted to opiates; Iranians are believed to consume at least 15 percent of the world’s opium, and these figures are believed to be on the rise. [4] Iran’s borders with Afghanistan and Pakistan place it along one of the world’s busiest and most violent narcotics trafficking routes; 40 percent of the opium that flows out of Afghanistan is estimated to transit Iran before making its way to global markets. Iran also boasts the highest rate of opium seizures in the world. [5] Iran’s counter-narcotics efforts, however, have come at a steep price. Tehran is contending with increasingly violent bands of traffickers operating within its borders, many of whom are linked to militant groups in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, in effect blurring the lines between organized crime and violent militancy. Based on current trends, the ongoing violence and instability in Afghanistan will only exacerbate Iran’s domestic problems relating to the drug trade.
Conclusion
Iran’s strategic calculus in Afghanistan is shaped by the interplay of local, regional, and international dynamics. While the robust Western military presence in the region poses serious challenges to Iran, there is little evidence to suggest that Tehran’s strategy involves an intensive effort to support the Taliban’s efforts to oust NATO and Coalition forces from Afghanistan. To achieve such an objective would require a far more vigorous and transparent effort on Tehran’s part to inflict significant damage on the Coalition on a regular basis. Such an approach would vindicate the claims of Iran’s nefarious motives in Afghanistan, thus further harming Iran’s standing in the international community. Ongoing violence and instability in Afghanistan is a recipe for future flows of refugees, increased opium traffic, and violent militancy spilling over Iran’s borders. Such a scenario is not in Iran’s interest.
The rapidly-expanding Taliban insurgency and the growing instability in Pakistan pose the greatest threats to the U.S.-led Coalition in Afghanistan, not Iran. Instead, Iran appears keen on playing a delicate balancing game that enables it to leverage its influence in Afghanistan, thereby bolstering its bargaining position on issues such as its nuclear program and the political future of Afghanistan and Iraq. At the same time, Iran has the potential to raise the stakes in Afghanistan if need be, as it does in Iraq, and to do so with devastating consequences for the United States in the event of a future crisis; indeed, a potential U.S. invasion of Iran, for instance, or for that matter, a potential Israeli attack on Iran, is sure to play itself out in Afghanistan.
Notes:
1. See “COMISAF’S Initial Assessment, Secretary of Defense Memorandum June 2009, Initial United States Forces – Afghanistan (USFOR-A) Assessment,” Stanley A. McChrystal, General, U.S. Army Commander, United States Forces – Afghanistan, International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan, 30 August 2009, 2-10, media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/documents/Assessment_Redacted_092109.pdf
2. Ibid
3. See “Afghanistan and Pakistan: Understanding and Engaging Regional Stakeholders,” Karim Sadjadpour, Testimony before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, March 31, 2009, www.carnegieeurope.eu/publications/
4. See “Addiction, Crime and Insurgency: The Transnational Threat of Afghan Opium,” United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), October 2009, p. 1.
5. Ibid, pp.2, 7.
Here's another perspective on the subject from an equally-qualified source
Summary -- In Afghanistan, legitimacy comes more from the just use of power than it does from transparent elections. With that in mind, the United States should move beyond the country's disputed election and send the soldiers and resources that the war's U.S. generals are asking for.
MARK MOYAR is Professor of National Security Affairs at the U.S. Marine Corps University.
One would be hard-pressed to find a news article or editorial on the Afghan election that did not mention the word "legitimacy." Success in Afghanistan, it has been repeated ad nauseam, hinges on winning popular support through governmental legitimacy, with elections crucial to that process. Yet if that were true, why has the Taliban been so effective at gaining supporters? Mullah Muhammad Omar has not organized elections, nor has he enacted the "reforms" Westerners demand of the regime in Kabul, such as the inclusion of diverse groups in the government.
The short answer is that in Afghanistan how power is acquired matters less than how it is used. Two factors determine the political allegiance of the elites who dominate Afghanistan's rural politics: security and basic governance. And on both counts the Taliban often score higher than the government in Kabul. The key to improving the government's fortunes lies not in better election monitors but in maintaining order and providing governance.
From decades of bitter experience, Afghans know that those who support the stronger side in a military conflict are less likely to suffer bodily harm, now and in the future. Accordingly, popular assistance to the Taliban and other Afghan insurgents has risen sharply in areas where those insurgents have increased their military presence and inflicted casualties on NATO or Afghan government personnel. Calculations about future military power, meanwhile, have been affected by growing fears that the United States will eventually abandon Hamid Karzai to the Taliban wolves. "At the beginning everyone supported the Americans," according to Hanif Shah Hosseini, a member of the Afghan parliament interviewed recently by The Wall Street Journal's Yochi Dreazen and Anand Gopal. "But now a lot of locals don't believe in a U.S. or government victory anymore. They expect the Americans to leave, so they are casting their support to the Taliban."
Afghans want a government, meanwhile, that performs traditional administrative functions, such as resolving disputes, in a just fashion. If someone violates their irrigation rights, they want the authorities to exact the standard fine of 31 pounds of wheat. If a thief takes one of their goats, they expect that the culprit will be found and compelled to transfer five of his goats to the victim. In such administrative matters, the Taliban's shadow governments have generally proven more energetic and impartial than Karzai's government.
The key to improving the government's fortunes lies not in better election monitors but in maintaining order and providing governance. Good governance also includes preventing officials from abusing their power. In many places, the Afghan National Police have acquired a reputation for thievery and sexually abusing girls and boys. Civil servants have routinely demanded bribes in return for construction permits, medical care, and most everything else they control. In terms of preventing corruption, once again, the Taliban has outperformed the Afghan government with regrettable frequency.
If Washington is to help Kabul turn its fortunes around, it is going to have to address both security and governance with equal fervor. In the short term, reversing the deterioration requires more American troops. Events over the past year have shown that existing NATO and competent Afghan forces together cannot meet the challenges at hand. Gaining the military dominance required to build popular support requires a persistent presence, not 30 minutes in a village every few days, as is often the case today. By increasing its troop levels, the United States will also beef up the number of capable Afghan forces, because when American and Afghan units partner together (as General Stanley McChrystal is advocating), the Americans can get hitherto passive Afghan policemen and soldiers to patrol and fight.
Placing American combat advisers and troops alongside the Afghans will help address the governance problem as well. In provinces where U.S. troops go everywhere with the Afghan National Police, the American presence deters the police from setting up the roadside checkpoints they have customarily used to shake down passers-by. The Americans do not allow the Afghan policemen to beat civilians over the head with rocks or burn detainees with hot oil, which they have been known to do elsewhere.
Ultimately, Afghanistan's own elites will have to provide the leadership necessary for adequate security and governance. While Western development experts tend to focus on building national institutions, such institutions are worthless if their leaders are dolts or thieves, as is true in many Afghan institutions today. American tutelage has helped troubled nations, from South Korea to El Salvador, produce new leaders that privilege national well-being over personal welfare. Historically, however, such results have taken at least a decade to achieve. This process has started only recently in most Afghan ministries, so one should not expect a self-sufficient Afghanistan anytime soon.
The American public and its politicians may be unwilling to keep American troops in Afghanistan for another decade if casualties continue at present levels. But if McChrystal receives the troops he has requested and forges fruitful partnerships with Afghan forces, the infusion of American troops may succeed in sharply bringing the violence down within the next one to two years, as occurred in Iraq during the surge.
The United States is not ready to abandon Afghanistan yet, nor is it satisfied with the status quo. The best option is to let our highly touted field commander fight the war with the resources and strategy he has recommended.
Summary -- In Afghanistan, legitimacy comes more from the just use of power than it does from transparent elections. With that in mind, the United States should move beyond the country's disputed election and send the soldiers and resources that the war's U.S. generals are asking for.
MARK MOYAR is Professor of National Security Affairs at the U.S. Marine Corps University.
One would be hard-pressed to find a news article or editorial on the Afghan election that did not mention the word "legitimacy." Success in Afghanistan, it has been repeated ad nauseam, hinges on winning popular support through governmental legitimacy, with elections crucial to that process. Yet if that were true, why has the Taliban been so effective at gaining supporters? Mullah Muhammad Omar has not organized elections, nor has he enacted the "reforms" Westerners demand of the regime in Kabul, such as the inclusion of diverse groups in the government.
The short answer is that in Afghanistan how power is acquired matters less than how it is used. Two factors determine the political allegiance of the elites who dominate Afghanistan's rural politics: security and basic governance. And on both counts the Taliban often score higher than the government in Kabul. The key to improving the government's fortunes lies not in better election monitors but in maintaining order and providing governance.
From decades of bitter experience, Afghans know that those who support the stronger side in a military conflict are less likely to suffer bodily harm, now and in the future. Accordingly, popular assistance to the Taliban and other Afghan insurgents has risen sharply in areas where those insurgents have increased their military presence and inflicted casualties on NATO or Afghan government personnel. Calculations about future military power, meanwhile, have been affected by growing fears that the United States will eventually abandon Hamid Karzai to the Taliban wolves. "At the beginning everyone supported the Americans," according to Hanif Shah Hosseini, a member of the Afghan parliament interviewed recently by The Wall Street Journal's Yochi Dreazen and Anand Gopal. "But now a lot of locals don't believe in a U.S. or government victory anymore. They expect the Americans to leave, so they are casting their support to the Taliban."
Afghans want a government, meanwhile, that performs traditional administrative functions, such as resolving disputes, in a just fashion. If someone violates their irrigation rights, they want the authorities to exact the standard fine of 31 pounds of wheat. If a thief takes one of their goats, they expect that the culprit will be found and compelled to transfer five of his goats to the victim. In such administrative matters, the Taliban's shadow governments have generally proven more energetic and impartial than Karzai's government.
The key to improving the government's fortunes lies not in better election monitors but in maintaining order and providing governance. Good governance also includes preventing officials from abusing their power. In many places, the Afghan National Police have acquired a reputation for thievery and sexually abusing girls and boys. Civil servants have routinely demanded bribes in return for construction permits, medical care, and most everything else they control. In terms of preventing corruption, once again, the Taliban has outperformed the Afghan government with regrettable frequency.
If Washington is to help Kabul turn its fortunes around, it is going to have to address both security and governance with equal fervor. In the short term, reversing the deterioration requires more American troops. Events over the past year have shown that existing NATO and competent Afghan forces together cannot meet the challenges at hand. Gaining the military dominance required to build popular support requires a persistent presence, not 30 minutes in a village every few days, as is often the case today. By increasing its troop levels, the United States will also beef up the number of capable Afghan forces, because when American and Afghan units partner together (as General Stanley McChrystal is advocating), the Americans can get hitherto passive Afghan policemen and soldiers to patrol and fight.
Placing American combat advisers and troops alongside the Afghans will help address the governance problem as well. In provinces where U.S. troops go everywhere with the Afghan National Police, the American presence deters the police from setting up the roadside checkpoints they have customarily used to shake down passers-by. The Americans do not allow the Afghan policemen to beat civilians over the head with rocks or burn detainees with hot oil, which they have been known to do elsewhere.
Ultimately, Afghanistan's own elites will have to provide the leadership necessary for adequate security and governance. While Western development experts tend to focus on building national institutions, such institutions are worthless if their leaders are dolts or thieves, as is true in many Afghan institutions today. American tutelage has helped troubled nations, from South Korea to El Salvador, produce new leaders that privilege national well-being over personal welfare. Historically, however, such results have taken at least a decade to achieve. This process has started only recently in most Afghan ministries, so one should not expect a self-sufficient Afghanistan anytime soon.
The American public and its politicians may be unwilling to keep American troops in Afghanistan for another decade if casualties continue at present levels. But if McChrystal receives the troops he has requested and forges fruitful partnerships with Afghan forces, the infusion of American troops may succeed in sharply bringing the violence down within the next one to two years, as occurred in Iraq during the surge.
The United States is not ready to abandon Afghanistan yet, nor is it satisfied with the status quo. The best option is to let our highly touted field commander fight the war with the resources and strategy he has recommended.
A new U.S. Senate report says troops were within reach of capturing Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan's Tora Bora mountains, but the American military did not deploy thousands of troops to find him, instead choosing to keep specialized soldiers on the sidelines.
The 50-page report, called "How we failed to get bin Laden," says the failure to capture him when he was most vulnerable in December 2001 laid the foundation for today's Afghan insurgents and aggravated the internal strife afflicting Pakistan.
It says that in December 2001, bin Laden and bodyguards "walked unmolested out of Tora Bora and disappeared into Pakistan's unregulated tribal area."
But instead of deploying an attack with thousands of soldiers, which was within the means of the American military, the report found fewer than 100 U.S. commandos were assigned to work with Afghan militias to find him.
"The vast array of American military power, from sniper teams to the most mobile divisions of the Marine Corps and the Army, was kept on the sidelines," the report said.
At the time, Bush's defence secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, expressed concern that a large U.S. troop presence might fuel a backlash. He and others said the evidence was not conclusive about bin Laden's location.
But after looking at unclassified government documents and conducting interviews with officials, the report said it was "clear that Osama bin Laden was within our grasp at Tora Bora."
The report looks back at the last eight years of military operations and seeks to point the blame specifically at Rumsfeld and top military commander Tommy Franks.
It goes on to say that failing to find bin Laden "forever altered the course of conflict in Afghanistan and the future of international terrorism."
The report says that capturing the Al Qaeda leader eight years ago would not have eliminated the worldwide threat of terrorism that exists today. But failing to capture him allowed bin Laden to "emerge as a potent symbolic figure who continues to attract a steady flow of money and inspire fanatics worldwide."
The report was prepared for Sen. John Kerry, chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, and comes out ahead of U.S. President Barack Obama's plans to send more troops to Afghanistan.
Kerry, who lost a race for U.S. President to George W. Bush in 2004, has long said Bush missed chances to get bin Laden since the September 11 attacks.
http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNe...29/bin_laden_091129/20091129?hub=TopStoriesV2
This is actually old news. It has been known for years that the U.S. wanted the Afghans to do the dirty work because they feared American casaulties. Another example of the "soft" West unable and unwilling to get down and dirty.
An American Predator drone also had Mullah Omar in its gunsight but permission to fire was denied because he was in a truck with other civilians. (Are they ever not surrounded by civilians?) Another example of why the West is too soft to engaged in warfare. Why do we even bother getting into a shootout with anybody?
This senate report is new news and it shines a light on what is clearly more Rumsfeld bullshit.
At the time, Bush's defence secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, expressed concern that a large U.S. troop presence might fuel a backlash. He and others said the evidence was not conclusive about bin Laden's location.
But after looking at unclassified government documents and conducting interviews with officials, the report said it was "clear that Osama bin Laden was within our grasp at Tora Bora."
The report looks back at the last eight years of military operations and seeks to point the blame specifically at Rumsfeld and top military commander Tommy Franks.
The invasion of Afghanistan was already under way.
It doesn't make sense that Rummy was worried about backlash from a US troop presence.
It also doesn't make sense that the reason was to avoid US casualties.
US casualties likely would not have been massive and those casualties would have been as worthwhile and justifiable as any could possibly be.
I'm sure all of the US troops would love to be the ones to take out Bin Laden.
We are talking about either extreme incompetence or devious treachery.
I suspect that a quick capture or kill of Bin Laden and a quick end to the 9/11 military response is not what some people wanted to see.
Either way, further investigation is highly warranted.
Another conspiracy theory. This is could be as interesting as the assassination of JFK.
Of several hundred NATO troops at the Battle of Tora Bora, and these were top-tier operators, only 3 or 4 guys claim with certainty that OBL was there at that time? And they all have books to sell about their experiences. And of several hundred AQ/Taliban killed, and not 1 coalition casuality, the main prize was able to escape with a minor wound by walking out an unguarded backdoor?
OBL and his associates knew they were being hunted; its unlikely they sat around waiting to escape at the last second. They MAY have been at Tora Bora, but I still say our info was out-dated or even worse, fabricated, and he wasn't there at the time we were. It quickly became a blame-game......locals blame NATO troops; troops blame command; command blames politicians, etc. Now Rumsfield is falling on his sword (again) based on a Senate report...
Lie the JFK assassination, who will ever really know what happened?
Here's an interesting piece from 2004:
Where has he been? How did we ever let him get away? Our correspondent—one of the few Western journalists ever to have met Osama bin Laden—traces the al-Qaeda leader's footsteps in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and describes the sometimes hapless American pursuit
by Peter Bergen
The Long Hunt for Osama
When you fly over the icy peaks of the Hindu Kush, which march in serried ranks toward the Himalayas, dividing Central Asia from the Indian subcontinent, you get a sense of the scale of the problem: Osama bin Laden may be hiding somewhere out there. Wherever he is, bin Laden continues to give substantial ideological direction to jihadist movements around the globe—and so American forces are scouring the Hindu Kush to find him.
The conventional wisdom now, of course, is that tracking bin Laden down won't make much of a difference to the larger war on terrorism anyway. At a March 2002 press conference President Bush referred to bin Laden as "a person who's now been marginalized." Although it is certainly the case that the global jihadist movement will carry on whatever bin Laden's fate, it would be dangerously wrong to assume that it doesn't really matter whether he is apprehended.
Finding bin Laden remains of utmost importance for three reasons. First, there is the matter of justice for the 3,000 people who died in the 9/11 attacks, and for the hundreds of other victims of al-Qaeda attacks around the world. Second, every day that bin Laden remains at liberty is a propaganda victory for al-Qaeda. Third, although bin Laden and his deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri don't exert day-to-day control over al-Qaeda, according to Roger Cressey, a former senior U.S. counterterrorism official, they do continue to supply "broad strategic guidance" for the group's actions, and for those of its affiliates. Statements from bin Laden and, to some degree, al-Zawahiri have always been the most reliable guide to the future actions of jihadist movements around the world—and this has remained the case even while both men have been on the run. Shortly after bin Laden called for assaults against Western economic interests in October of 2002, an Indonesian disco was bombed, killing 200 Western tourists, and a suicide attack was launched at a French oil tanker steaming off the coast of Yemen. In December of 2003, after al-Zawahiri condemned Pakistan's President Pervez Musharraf for supporting the campaign against al-Qaeda, Musharraf narrowly survived two assassination attempts. Around the same time, bin Laden called for attacks against members of the coalition in Iraq; subsequently terrorists bombed a British consulate and a bank in Turkey, and commuters on their way to work in Madrid. According to U.S. intelligence officials, a plot to carry out a large-scale terror attack against the United States in the near future, possibly tied to the presidential election in November, is being directed personally by bin Laden and al-Zawahiri.
In the past year I traveled twice to Afghanistan and Pakistan to find out how the hunt for bin Laden was progressing. While in Kabul I stayed at a comfortable guesthouse owned by a British combat cameraman—a spacious villa that is reportedly the former residence of one of Osama bin Laden's four wives. After the fall of the Taliban the villa was converted to its present use. For a hundred dollars and change it's now possible to have the ambiguous pleasure of sleeping in what may once have been the marital chamber of the world's most wanted man; for me, it was an appropriate place to begin an investigation into what became of bin Laden after 9/11. My investigation included more than two dozen interviews with American, Afghan, and Pakistani officials, and discussions with several people who have met with bin Laden over the years.
Only three people outside al-Qaeda and the Taliban are known to have spent any time with bin Laden after 9/11. Two are journalists and the third is a doctor. One of the journalists, Taysir Alouni, of al-Jazeera television, interviewed bin Laden in late October of 2001. (Alouni was later indicted in Spain for allegedly providing money to al-Qaeda.) During the al-Jazeera interview bin Laden for the first time linked himself publicly to the 9/11 attacks, after Alouni asked him, "America claims that it has proof that you are behind what happened in New York and Washington. What's your answer?" Bin Laden said, "If inciting people to do that is terrorism, and if killing those who are killing our sons is terrorism, then let history be witness that we are terrorists." At one point he said, "We practice the good terrorism."
....continued.........
OBL and his associates knew they were being hunted; its unlikely they sat around waiting to escape at the last second. They MAY have been at Tora Bora, but I still say our info was out-dated or even worse, fabricated, and he wasn't there at the time we were. It quickly became a blame-game......locals blame NATO troops; troops blame command; command blames politicians, etc. Now Rumsfield is falling on his sword (again) based on a Senate report...
Lie the JFK assassination, who will ever really know what happened?
Here's an interesting piece from 2004:
Where has he been? How did we ever let him get away? Our correspondent—one of the few Western journalists ever to have met Osama bin Laden—traces the al-Qaeda leader's footsteps in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and describes the sometimes hapless American pursuit
by Peter Bergen
The Long Hunt for Osama
When you fly over the icy peaks of the Hindu Kush, which march in serried ranks toward the Himalayas, dividing Central Asia from the Indian subcontinent, you get a sense of the scale of the problem: Osama bin Laden may be hiding somewhere out there. Wherever he is, bin Laden continues to give substantial ideological direction to jihadist movements around the globe—and so American forces are scouring the Hindu Kush to find him.
The conventional wisdom now, of course, is that tracking bin Laden down won't make much of a difference to the larger war on terrorism anyway. At a March 2002 press conference President Bush referred to bin Laden as "a person who's now been marginalized." Although it is certainly the case that the global jihadist movement will carry on whatever bin Laden's fate, it would be dangerously wrong to assume that it doesn't really matter whether he is apprehended.
Finding bin Laden remains of utmost importance for three reasons. First, there is the matter of justice for the 3,000 people who died in the 9/11 attacks, and for the hundreds of other victims of al-Qaeda attacks around the world. Second, every day that bin Laden remains at liberty is a propaganda victory for al-Qaeda. Third, although bin Laden and his deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri don't exert day-to-day control over al-Qaeda, according to Roger Cressey, a former senior U.S. counterterrorism official, they do continue to supply "broad strategic guidance" for the group's actions, and for those of its affiliates. Statements from bin Laden and, to some degree, al-Zawahiri have always been the most reliable guide to the future actions of jihadist movements around the world—and this has remained the case even while both men have been on the run. Shortly after bin Laden called for assaults against Western economic interests in October of 2002, an Indonesian disco was bombed, killing 200 Western tourists, and a suicide attack was launched at a French oil tanker steaming off the coast of Yemen. In December of 2003, after al-Zawahiri condemned Pakistan's President Pervez Musharraf for supporting the campaign against al-Qaeda, Musharraf narrowly survived two assassination attempts. Around the same time, bin Laden called for attacks against members of the coalition in Iraq; subsequently terrorists bombed a British consulate and a bank in Turkey, and commuters on their way to work in Madrid. According to U.S. intelligence officials, a plot to carry out a large-scale terror attack against the United States in the near future, possibly tied to the presidential election in November, is being directed personally by bin Laden and al-Zawahiri.
In the past year I traveled twice to Afghanistan and Pakistan to find out how the hunt for bin Laden was progressing. While in Kabul I stayed at a comfortable guesthouse owned by a British combat cameraman—a spacious villa that is reportedly the former residence of one of Osama bin Laden's four wives. After the fall of the Taliban the villa was converted to its present use. For a hundred dollars and change it's now possible to have the ambiguous pleasure of sleeping in what may once have been the marital chamber of the world's most wanted man; for me, it was an appropriate place to begin an investigation into what became of bin Laden after 9/11. My investigation included more than two dozen interviews with American, Afghan, and Pakistani officials, and discussions with several people who have met with bin Laden over the years.
Only three people outside al-Qaeda and the Taliban are known to have spent any time with bin Laden after 9/11. Two are journalists and the third is a doctor. One of the journalists, Taysir Alouni, of al-Jazeera television, interviewed bin Laden in late October of 2001. (Alouni was later indicted in Spain for allegedly providing money to al-Qaeda.) During the al-Jazeera interview bin Laden for the first time linked himself publicly to the 9/11 attacks, after Alouni asked him, "America claims that it has proof that you are behind what happened in New York and Washington. What's your answer?" Bin Laden said, "If inciting people to do that is terrorism, and if killing those who are killing our sons is terrorism, then let history be witness that we are terrorists." At one point he said, "We practice the good terrorism."
....continued.........
Did a bit of a Google search. The incident occurred on October 7, 2001. Seymour Hersh wrote about it in the New Yorker and Thomas Ricks wrote about it in the Washington Post. Apparently, there were at least 10 incidents where top Taliban and Al Qaeda leaders were targetted but permission to fire was denied or permission came so late that the targets had long left the barn.
Hats off to you Rockslinger. Good find!
As with anything in life, there are some inconsistancies, but not worth arguing about. And besides, the Internet is not the place to hold petty debates.
So, despite Hersh's record, credibility and credentials, I will respectfully choose to disbelieve this, as well as the OBL at Tora Bora in Dec2001 claims, on the basis of it being even 10% factual and accurate, it goes so far beyond Political Correctness or incompetence and enters into conspiracy (IMO). Treachery of that magnitude, frankly, could be a little too much for me to handle properly. I started my tirade of posts on Afghanistan in response to the suicide of a friend, a Canadian veteran of the Afghan mission. I might go pashtunwali over this news!!
Maybe Woodpeckr was right all along.......
Good find nonetheless.
