Afghanistan deja-vu: Lessons from the Soviet experience

[seth gecko]

........Policymakers and the public at large should keep in mind the words of Glenn Carle, a 23 year veteran of the CIA who served as deputy national intelligence officer for transnational threats: "We must see jihadists for the small, lethal, disjointed and miserable opponents that they are." Al Qaeda "has only a handful of individuals capable of planning, organizing and leading a terrorist operation," Carle notes, and "its capabilities are far inferior to its desires."

President Obama has said that there is also a humanitarian element to the Afghanistan mission. A return of the Taliban, he points out, would condemn the Afghan people "to brutal governance, international isolation, a paralyzed economy, and the denial of basic human rights." This concern is legitimate -- the Afghan people appear to be quite strongly opposed to a return of the Taliban, and they are surely entitled to some peace after 30 years of almost continual warfare, much of it imposed on them from outside.

The problem, as Obama is doubtlessly well aware, is that Americans are far less willing to sacrifice lives for missions that are essentially humanitarian than for those that seek to deal with a threat directed at the United States itself. People who embrace the idea of a humanitarian mission will continue to support Obama's policy in Afghanistan -- at least if they think it has a chance of success -- but many Americans (and Europeans) will increasingly start to question how many lives such a mission is worth.

This questioning, in fact, is well under way. Because of its ties to 9/11, the war in Afghanistan has enjoyed considerably greater public support than the war in Iraq did (or, for that matter, the wars in Korea or Vietnam). However, there has been a considerable dropoff in that support of late. If Obama's national security justification for his war in Afghanistan comes to seem as spurious as Bush's national security justification for his war in Iraq, he, like Bush, will increasingly have only the humanitarian argument to fall back on. And that is likely to be a weak reed.


Page 2of 2

 

[seth gecko]

Here's one from the Taliban point-of-view!

BRIEFS
Publication: Terrorism Monitor Volume: 7 Issue: 34November 13, 2009 12:37 PM Age: 3 hrsCategory: Terrorism Monitor, Global Terrorism Analysis, Brief

TALIBAN AIM TO ELIMINATE U.S. BASES IN NURISTAN

In the wake of an attack that nearly overran a U.S. military outpost in Afghanistan’s Nuristan province, the Taliban have released a statement in the name of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan describing the attack as part of a larger campaign to drive the U.S. military out of their bases in Nuristan. The statement appeared in the October-November issue of the Taliban’s Al-Sumud magazine.

An October 3 attack by some 300 Taliban and Hizb-i-Islami fighters on Combat Outpost (COP) Keating (occupied jointly by U.S. and ANA forces) left eight Americans dead and 24 wounded. The attack on COP Keating was similar, in both scale and ferocity, to the Taliban attack on the U.S. outpost at Wanat in July, 2008 that left nine U.S. soldiers dead and 27 wounded.

The isolated outposts in Nuristan were meant to provide some control of the passes through the rugged terrain of the Hindu Kush along the border with Pakistan. In winter these outposts are extremely difficult to supply. COP Keating, surrounded by high ground on three sides, was unable to conduct patrols outside the perimeter.
Nuristan’s Governor, Jamaluddin Badar, told an Afghan daily that the Taliban commander of Kamdesh and Barg-i-Matal districts, Mullah Abdur Rehman Mustaghni, was killed in an American airstrike on October 9. The report was verified by General Muhammad Afzal, commander of the 201st “Selab” (Flood) Corps of the Afghan National Army (ANA), but was denied by a Taliban spokesman (Pajhwok Afghan News, October 10).

As might be expected, the Taliban have exaggerated their success at COP Keating, describing the camp of 90 Afghan policemen and 50 U.S. troopers of the 61st Cavalry Regiment as “one of the most important and biggest U.S. bases.” While the Taliban forces overran part of the outpost, the arrival of air support allowed U.S. forces to retake the post before destroying it in their withdrawal. The Taliban claim “army soldiers are surrendering to the mujahideen [in Kamdesh district] on a daily basis.” They also warned of “more dangerous outcomes, such as an armed mass rebellion, which happened many times in the units of the Soviet army in Afghanistan.”

The Taliban statement also claimed that the expulsion of U.S. forces from Nuristan would deal a blow to Israel, which it alleges to be profiting from a trade in “plundered” diamonds from Nuristan, a known source of gemstones. “As usual, where there is wealth and opportunities, there must be Jews around.” The Taliban see the U.S. occupation of the region as part of the region’s economic exploitation. “From the beginning, the U.S. Army estimated that the blood of its soldiers is cheaper than diamonds, precious stones, interests of Jewish banks, the oil of Afghanistan and middle Asian countries, and 9,000 tons of opium plundered for free from Afghanistan at the beginning of every summer.”

With Wanat already abandoned, U.S. troops pulled out four days after the attack from COPs Keating and Lowell as well as Observation Post Fritsche in Kamdesh in what was described as a preplanned withdrawal (Army Times, November 3). Some U.S. forces remain in the Nuristan capital of Parun to protect the governor and the local administration (Asia Times, October 29). Qari Ziaur Rahman, a Taliban commander closely tied to the Arab militants of al-Qaeda, now has effective control of most of Nuristan. The Taliban described the decision to withdraw as “one of the realistic decisions taken by the U.S. Army, which will certainly be followed by similar ones.”

The U.S. withdrawal from its outposts in Nuristan and fou
r others near the South Waziristan border has not been well received in Pakistan, where Pakistani government forces are in the middle of a major military operation designed to eliminate the Taliban terrorist threat in South Waziristan. With the operation having been long encouraged by Washington, Pakistani observers now wonder why an apparent Taliban escape route has been opened along the border with Afghanistan. Pakistani intelligence intercepts are said to reveal that Qari Ziaur Rehman has invited at least one Pakistani Taliban commander to move his operations to Nuristan (The News [Islamabad], October 18). The American withdrawal during Pakistani operations on the other side of the border is a major change from 2008’s Operation Lion Heart, when U.S. forces in eastern Afghanistan coordinated with the Pakistani military to put pressure on Taliban groups along both sides of the border.

According to the statement, the Taliban of Nuristan now have their sights set on destroying a U.S. military base in Nuristan’s Nurgram district and three other military bases in the Ghaziabad district of bordering Kunar province. The remaining posts of the “local enemy forces” (i.e. the ANA) “are not considered a big obstacle against the operations of the mujahideen.”

Nuristan, with its remote and inaccessible mountain settlements, provided a refuge for the older religions and languages of Afghanistan. The region was known as Kafiristan (Home of the Unbelievers) until its largely pagan population was converted to Islam after being conquered by Amir Abdur Rahman Khan in 1896. The Nuristanis became famous for their resolute resistance to British and Soviet invaders and have shown their intention to add Americans to the list of unsuccessful occupants of the area. According to the Taliban, “The occupiers themselves have repeatedly said that Afghanistan is the graveyard of the empires and the daily events prove the veracity of their review of historic events.”

 

[seth gecko]

Hmmm..Afghanistan sounds screwed! At least Pakistan is still doing great!!

The Hunt for Pakistan’s Most Wanted Terrorists
Terrorism Monitor Volume: 7 Issue: 34November 13, 2009 12:43 PM Age: 3 By: Mukhtar A. Khan

Despite the fact that the Pakistani military has pushed Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters out of 90 percent of their stronghold in the South Waziristan tribal agency bordering Afghanistan, there are no indications as yet of weakness on the part of the Taliban. The Taliban have instead stepped up their suicide attacks on major cities like Peshawar, Islamabad and Lahore, hitting military targets and security checkpoints as well as civilian positions. All of these activities are carried out in a very coordinated and disciplined way which reveals a determined and well-knitted network across the country. It is a fact that Pakistan’s military operations and the fear of increasing drone attacks have collapsed their communication system in the tribal areas, but this deficiency has been covered by the Taliban and their “sleeper cells” in southern Punjab (Dawn [Karachi], October 24). So far, the military operation has been successful in reclaiming territory from the Taliban but has failed to put an end to the increasing wave of suicide blasts that have crippled the socio-economic, educational and political spheres in Pakistan.
The Pakistani government has come to the realization that unless the senior leadership of the Taliban is nabbed, there can be no end to terrorist activities in the country. For this purpose, it has announced rewards for the capture or killing of top Taliban leaders (Dawn, November 2). The following is a brief description of the top Taliban leaders who are sought by Pakistani authorities for their involvement in terrorist activities.
Hakimullah Mahsud:
The Taliban’s 28-year old commander, Hakimullah Mahsud, is a tough and ruthless militant who became the new Taliban chief after his predecessor Baitullah Mahsud was killed in a U.S. drone attack in South Waziristan. Hakimullah was a close confidant of Baitullah, serving as his driver, spokesman and then commander of strategically important tribal areas like Khyber, Kurram and Orakzai agencies. It was in these tribal agencies that his strong military skills and ambitions came to the fore. In 2007, Hakimullah established his military strength when he took some 250 Pakistani soldiers hostage for more than two months in South Waziristan. However, it was in Khyber, Kurram and Orakzai that he took an independent role and used the power of the media to get himself recognized as the new top leader of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). It was Hakimullah who disrupted the NATO fuel supply lines in Khyber and Peshawar and took responsibility for destroying more than 600 NATO vehicles and containers (The News [Islamabad], September 1).
Hakimullah Mahsud is believed to be behind all the major suicide attacks in Pakistan. He has accepted responsibility for the majority of attacks against the military and other security forces. Hakimullah is also blamed for killing Shi’a Muslims in Orakzai and Kurram agencies. He has close links with the banned anti-Shi’a sectarian group Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) and its militant wing Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ).
The Government of Pakistan considers Hakimullah Mahsud its enemy No. 1, and has put a bounty of 50 million rupees ($600,000) on his head for his death or capture (Daily Mashriq [Peshawar], November 2).
Qari Hussain Mahsud:
Known in Pakistan as Ustad-e-Fidayeen (Trainer of Suicide Bombers), Qari Hussain Mahsud is regarded as the most dangerous and ruthless Taliban militant in South Waziristan. He is notorious for his innovations in training child suicide bombers. Qari Hussain is the cousin of TTP Chief Hakimullah Mahsud and was an LeJ operative before joining the TTP. He is considered to be the right hand of Hakimullah, who supported him in reaching the top echelons of the TTP.
Qari Hussain carries a bounty of 50 million rupees ($600,000) from the Government of Pakistan (Daily Jang, November 2). He is one of the most sought-after militants, having taken responsibility for suicide attacks on sensitive government offices, including two attacks on the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) in Lahore and another on the Manawan Police Training Center in the same city. Early this year, the government claimed that Qari Hussain had been killed by security forces but he appeared alive before the media to refute these reports. In the aftermath of Baitullah Mahsud’s death in a drone attack in August, Qari Hussain has been wreaking havoc with a series of suicide attacks on the four main cities of Peshawar, Rawalpindi, Lahore and Islamabad (Geo TV, November 3).
Maulana Waliur Rahman:
The 35-year-old Maulana Waliur Rahman is considered to be the only politically mature person in the TTP ranks in Waziristan. He used to be the most trusted advisor of Baitullah Mahsud, supervising the financial affairs of the widening Taliban movement (The News, September 1). Maulana Waliur is believed to be a good manager and ideologue but not a skilled fighter. He never fought in Afghanistan against the USSR nor against U.S.-led coalition troops. He joined the ranks of the Pakistani Taliban only five years ago when Baitullah emerged as Taliban leader after the death of former leader Nek Mohammad Wazir in a U.S. drone attack.
Waliur Rahman is not as aggressive as Hakimullah. He has a religio-political background associated with the Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam (JUI)’s Fazlur Rahman group. Unlike the majority of TTP leaders, he completed his religious education, doing so in a well-known seminary in Faisalabad known as Jamia Islamia before teaching in a madrassa for several years in South Waziristan. Waliur Rahman follows the Deobandi school of thought unlike Hakimullah Mahsud and Qari Hussain Mahsud, who follow the Salafist interpretation of Islam. This is believed to be one of the main reasons that al-Qaeda’s leadership did not prefer him as the new TTP Chief despite the fact that the emissaries of Taliban Supreme Leader Mullah Muhammad Omar had opted to declare him the chief of the TTP after Baitullah’s death. Al-Qaeda wanted an aggressive leader like Hakimullah who could advance their ideology in the region and capitalize on his strong links with LeJ in the mainland of Pakistan (AKI, September 10). Waliur Rahman’s head also carries a bounty of 50 million rupees ($600,000). Currently, he is the TTP chief for South Waziristan.
Maulvi Faqir Mohammad:
Maulvi Faqir Mohammad is the strongest TTP commander based outside Waziristan. He is regarded as a skilled guerilla fighter who has been active in the region since the late 1980s. The 39-year old Maulvi Faqir belongs to the Mohmand tribe and was born and raised in the Mamond region of Bajaur – a strategically important tribal agency bordering Afghanistan’s Kunar province in the west, and Pakistan’s Malakand and Swat region in the east.
Known locally as “Commander Faqir,” he is suspected to have close ties with al-Qaeda’s deputy leader, Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri. He is believed to have hosted a dinner for al-Zawahiri in January 2006 in Damadola (Bajaur). The home was blown up by a U.S. drone strike but al-Zawahiri had left just minutes before (Daily Mashriq, January 23).
Maulvi Faqir belongs to a religious family that fought in Afghanistan against the Soviets and later alongside the Taliban. He went to Afghanistan along with his two sons to wage jihad in the wake of the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. At that time he was an active leader in the Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM). TNSM chief Maulana Sufi Mohammad is considered to be his mentor in jihad. Before joining the TNSM, Maulvi Faqir was a local leader of Jama’at-e-Islami – a religio-political party.
Maulvi Faqir is wanted by the government of Pakistan for his alleged ties with al-Qaeda and sabotage activities under the umbrella of the TTP. The reward for his head is 15 million rupees ($180,000) (Dawn, June 29). Maulvi Faqir was a strong contender for the top post in the TTP after the death of Baitullah, but the Taliban Shura (council) was determined to keep the top leadership post in Waziristan.
Maulana Fazlullah:
Once the most dreaded person in the scenic valley of Swat, Maulana Fazlullah has been in hiding since April when the Pakistani military launched a heavy offensive against his banned militant outfit, TNSM. The 34-year-old Fazlullah has led TNSM since 2002 when his father-in-law and TNSM founder Maulana Sufi Mohammad was jailed upon return from Afghanistan, which he had crossed into illegally with several thousands of armed volunteers (including Fazlullah) to wage jihad against U.S.-led Coalition troops. Fazlullah re-organized the TNSM and made the movement more radical by launching a pirate FM radio station from his madrassa in Imam Dheri, Swat. He soon became popular and earned nicknames like “FM Mullah” and “Radio Mullah” (see Terrorism Monitor, May 26).
Fazlullah mobilized the people in Malakand through his FM radio and recruited an army of volunteers numbering around 12,000. He preached against women’s education and torched some 300 girls’ schools in the area. His men put a ban on polio vaccinations, NGOs, and playing music. He challenged the writ of the government and declared his own brand of Shari’a in Malakand before expanding from Swat into Buner district. At this point Fazlullah went too far, sparking a serious reaction from the government, which dismantled the TNSM movement in Malakand. Several TNSM leaders were killed or arrested while others went into hiding, including Fazlullah, who is believed to have been injured in the military offensive (Daily Times [Lahore], July 9).
Fazlullah received his religious education from Sufi Mohammad’s madrassa, Jamia Mazahir-ul-Uloom, in the Maidan village of Lower Dir. It was here where he came under the influence of the Wahhabi school of thought. He is now wanted with a bounty of 5 million rupees ($60,000) on his head.

 

[WoodPeckr]

The options facing the US are pretty bleak

It sounds like a tune I recall hearing back in the 60s by,
Pete Seeger called 'Waist Deep in the Big Muddy'.

Funny how history repeats....

 

[seth gecko]

Those Talibans sound like jerks! Who is responsible for this?

The Father of the Taliban: An Interview with Maulana Sami ul-Haq
May 23, 2007 11:23 AM
By: Imtiaz Ali

Maulana Sami ul-Haq
Maulana Sami ul-Haq is the director and chancellor of Pakistan's famous madrassa, Darul uloom Haqqania, Akora Khattak. He has served in this post since the death of his father, Maulana Abdul ul-Haq, the founder of the madrassa, in 1988. Darul uloom Haqqania is where many of the top Taliban leaders, including its fugitive chief, Mullah Omar, attended. It is widely believed that the madrassa was the launching pad for the Taliban movement in the early 1990s, which is why Sami ul-Haq is also called the "Father of the Taliban." Besides running his madrassa, Maulana Sami has a long political history as a religious politician. He was among the founders of Pakistan's Muttahida Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) coalition of six Islamic religious parties. He recently spoke with analyst Imtiaz Ali.



Imtiaz Ali: During the Russian invasion, the students from your madrassa were traveling to Afghanistan to fight, after which most of them were eventually inducted as governors and administrators in the Taliban government. Is the same thing continuing today? Are you still sending people to Afghanistan for jihad?



Maulana Sami ul-Haq: No, there were not only Taliban who took part in jihad. This is an incorrect assumption, which needs correction. After the Russian invasion of Afghanistan, people from all walks of life went to Afghanistan for jihad. Students from colleges and universities went more than madrassa students.



IA: But it is an undeniable fact that students who graduated from your madrassa played a significant role in the establishment of the Taliban regime.



SH: Well, the Taliban were busy in their studies when the factional wars in Afghanistan reached their climax. Naturally, when the leaders could not make it, the students had to come to the rescue of the war-torn country. Thus, the Taliban rushed back to rescue their country from the factional fighting. Similarly, when America attacked Afghanistan in late 2001, the same event happened—it is understandable that when infidels attack a Muslim country, then it is the duty of every Muslim to defend it. Maulana Sufi Muhammad of Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat- e-Mohammadi (TNSM) also took thousands of people for jihad, which was a commendable action. The U.S. attack on Afghanistan was a clear act of aggression and terrorism. But when someone rises up against U.S. aggression, then he is called a terrorist. It is a strange and illogical philosophy.



IA: There were reports that the Taliban leadership had called for fresh reinforcements in connection with its spring offensive in Afghanistan. Is this true?



SH: These are just baseless reports. Had they called upon the madrassa students, they would have called us for the reinforcements or at least we would know. The Taliban are not that organized. They are living in caves. They lack proper communication and logistics systems, and that is why they do not want new recruits. The Afghans themselves have risen up and they are fighting against American and NATO forces.



IA: If they would ask you for help, what would be your reaction?



SH: They would never ask us. We ourselves have not sent students before nor will we send them now. It is not our madrassa policy to do so.



IA: What would you call the situation in Afghanistan? Is that jihad?



SH: When the red forces of the Soviet Union entered Afghanistan, it was a war of independence and we all agreed that it was jihad. Even the United States had said that the Russians must be ousted from Afghanistan. When Russia left, the United States committed the same aggression. So, the situation is the same. One infidel force replaced another. No difference at all. Whether it is Russia or America, it is a jihad.



IA: Some analysts call it a Pashtun uprising. What do you think?



SH: It is neither a Pashtun uprising or a Persian one, or a Sunni uprising or a Shiite. In fact, the Afghan nation has risen up against the invaders—the United States and its allies. It is a war of independence. After the fall of the Taliban regime, the Afghan people remained quiescent for two years to see if any positive change would come into their lives. But they did not see anything that was promised to them at the time of the collapsing Taliban regime and that is why they started this revolt against the occupied forces. It is now a war of independence for all Afghans. They want to get rid of the U.S.-led occupation forces. Terming it only a Pashtun uprising is a completely incorrect assumption.



IA: Do you not consider the Karzai-led government in Afghanistan a Muslim government?



SH: We have nothing to do with the Islam of Karzai. It is not our business to issue a decree about him being Muslim or non-Muslim. We just want an end to the suffering of the Afghan people. We ask the current Afghan rulers to start negotiations with the Taliban and other jihadi forces to pave the way for a durable peace in the war-torn country.



IA: It does not matter to you, then, if there is a Karzai-led government or the Taliban, just as long as it is an Afghan government?



SH: We say that there should be no foreign interference in Afghanistan, and the Afghans themselves should come up with a solution. All the factions—the leaders, the Taliban, the jihadi forces—should come forward and work together for peace. They should decide their fate in the absence of foreign interference. But I firmly believe that there is no chance for peace and stability in Afghanistan until the presence of foreign troops is removed.



IA: What are your thoughts on the flow of fighters between Afghanistan and Pakistan over the Durand Line?



SH: Like I said earlier, it is an Afghan uprising against foreign invaders and it has nothing to do with cross-border terrorism and the flow of fighters from Pakistan.



IA: Why, then, has the government decided to fence and plant mines on the Pakistani side of the border? Do you approve of that?



SH: I oppose this plan because the Pashtun nation on both sides of the border shares cultural, racial and religious values. Their lives are intertwined. They are all Muslims. They are one nation. Fencing the border will not solve the problem. The main reason behind the tension on the Pakistan-Afghan border is the presence of U.S.-led foreign troops in Afghanistan. The day they leave Afghanistan, there will be no tension at all.


WAIT! THERE'S MORE.........
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

 

[seth gecko]

I TOLD YOU THERE'S MORE!

IA: With the ban on foreign students' admission in the religious seminaries in 2003 by the government, has enrollment of the students changed in your madrassa?

SH: That ban is a total violation of our fundamental rights. People from here go to the United States and the United Kingdom for studies. Similarly, students from other countries come to Pakistan for education. That was a kind of service we were providing to the Muslim students from other countries. But this ban is an unconstitutional, inhumane and unlawful act. The government has taken this step only to appease the United States and its other Western masters. It is a shame for us because India is a secular country, but has been issuing visas to students from all Muslim countries who want to come to India for education.

IA: But there have been accusations that terrorists are being trained here in the madrassas.

SH: This is nothing more than an example of the perpetual propaganda against the madrassa system. This is what we have been hearing, but so far no one has produced any solid evidence.


IA: The mystery has always been shrouded by the lack of an audit of the money being received by madrassas, correct?


SH: We are not bound by the government to audit our funding system because they do not give us any money. First, let them give us funds for running our madrassas and then we will let them have their audit. Why are they taking pains when they are not giving us a penny? Only those who give us financial support have the right to audit our funds. We have our system of donations and we do not accept any donations from the government. I also want to make it clear that we keep a record of all our donations and funding. The funding is being registered and we prepare annual reports and then those reports are printed along with the names of the donors.


IA: Who gives you the donations for running this big madrassa?

SH: Common Muslims. And the majority of the funding comes from the poorer classes of society. They know that madrassas are the forts of Islam and the students in madrassas are the real guardians of Islam. God's religion is flourishing in the madrassas. These people cut their meager domestic budget and give us donations. This is how they express their love of Allah almighty and save the integrity of these madrassas.


IA: Is Musharraf validated in meddling with religious issues considering he is supposed to be the leader of a secular government?


SH: He has been doing all this just to appease the United States and his other Western masters.

IA: To what extent could a nuclear Iran pose a potential threat to the strength of Pakistan?

SH: Iran is not a threat to Pakistan at all. Iran is giving the United States a tough time in the region and seems quite determined to acquire nuclear power status. Muslims all over the world are happy about this move because there should be someone who has the courage to demonstrate the religious strength to look into the eyes of the United States. We support Iran. Besides, we would not allow the Pakistani leadership to toe the U.S. line in dealing with Iran, as they have done in the case of Afghanistan.


IA: There has been speculation that Iran has ambitions for a "Shiite Crescent" in the Middle East. What is your opinion of this?


SH: This is U.S. propaganda aimed at dividing the strength of Muslims. The Shiite-Sunni issue has been created by the United States just to hide its failure in Iraq and to achieve its goals in the Middle East. Besides, the United States is also creating poisonous propaganda against Iran for intervening in Iraq's affairs just to malign its position in the world community. It is baseless. I was in Iran two months ago where I held meetings with the top Iranian leadership. I urged them to counter U.S. propaganda and try to satisfy Kurds, Arabs and Sunnis. I clearly told them that if you [Iran] need the support of the whole Muslim ummah, then you have to garner support against the United States, not only from Shiites but also from Sunnis.



IA: What do you think of Lashkar-e-Jangvi, TNSM and other jihadi outfits in Pakistan?



SH: Lashkar-e-Jangvi and similar organizations are the continuity of the Kashmir problem. These jihadi forces were patronized by the Pakistani intelligence agency, the ISI, with full state support for their activities in Kashmir. But when Pakistan came under immense pressure, then this whole drama was wrapped up and that is why a ban was put on these jihadi organizations. It is all a dictated policy from the West.



IA: What do you think about the latest spate of suicide bombings in Pakistan?



SH: This is not a surprise. This new suicide phenomenon in Pakistan is the direct outcome of the government's policies, particularly the unjust military operations in the tribal belt along the Afghan border. Today, Pakistani forces are at the highest level of danger and risk due to the flawed policies of General Musharraf in the name of fighting the so-called war on terror. This is what I had forewarned about in the past, that if the government did not stop these unjust military operations, then attacks on military posts and violence would not be confined to the tribal areas, but will spread to the rest of the country. Today, you see that this is happening.



IA: Do you think that suicide attacks are fair?



SH: The bombers would not ask us to confirm whether it is fair or unfair. It is better you ask this question to the suicide bombers, whose family members have been killed and houses have been bombed. They themselves decided what they had to do. They would not ask any mullah. But they do think that they will go straight to paradise.



IA: Who do you think these bombers are?



SH: They are young and emotional Muslims. When they see that their leaders have surrendered to the United States and its allies, then they do not see any other way out except for the option of suicide bombing. Among them are students of modern universities who see how the Western powers are destroying Muslims around the world. Suicide bombing is an international phenomenon now. These young people do not receive any suicide training or motivation in a madrassa or a mosque. They watch it on their TVs—the dead bodies of Muslim brothers. They see that Muslims are being killed in various part of the world. When they see these atrocities, they go their own way. If the international community wants to put an end to this kind of activity, it is high time for them to ponder solutions to issues like Palestine, Iraq and Kashmir.



IA: Besides your madrassa role, how do you see your role as a politician in the political field?



SH: My role is very clear as a madrassa teacher as it is as a politician. I want a true Islamic system in Pakistan. That is my simple goal. The current Pakistani system of governance was introduced by the British Raj, which means we are still enslaved by that colonial legacy. Our economy, education and judicial system stem from the same exploitative British rule. I want to introduce real Sharia, which was implemented by the four caliphs of Islam.



BUT....WHAT DOES HE THINK OF MUSHARRIF (remember, this is an old document)

 

[seth gecko]

IA: Will you support Musharraf in the upcoming presidential elections?



SH: We have not yet decided about the upcoming elections. But I think they will be a fraud and a futile exercise in the name of democracy. Elections are part of democracy, but here they have become a fraud. In my 37-year career as a politician, I have seen a particular group of politicians from a particular group of families ruling this country. They have made their own dynasties. Since the creation of Pakistan, they have just been replacing one another, with no big change in policies. I am in favor of a bloodless revolution, which would completely overhaul the existing system. I just wonder, how can a democracy flourish in the shadow of a military uniform? The present one is a shame of a democracy.



IA: Do you think that with his support for the war on terror, Musharraf's popularity has increased or decreased at home?



SH: Absolutely decreased. First, look at the declining popularity of President Bush in his own country. So, how can Musharraf be popular for his role in the so-called war on terror? The reports about his increasing popularity are just rubbish.



IA: Will Musharraf be able to maintain control over Pakistan?



SH: Well, people are not happy with what he is doing here in Pakistan. The overwhelming majority of the masses are opposing his policies, particularly the much talked about "enlightened moderation." After bringing changes to the Hudood laws, now his government might soon amend the blasphemy laws. But he does not understand that the Pakistani people will sacrifice their lives on the issue of blasphemy. All these actions demonstrate his unpopularity among the masses.



IA: Is an Islamic revolution a possibility in Pakistan's future?



SH: Anything is possible. But the most important thing to keep in mind is that the motive behind the creation of Pakistan was the establishment of an Islamic state for the Muslims of India. Establishment of Sharia is the logical conclusion of Pakistan's creation.



IA: How do see yourself and your role in the next 10 years, and how can you contribute to the peaceful revolution you mentioned earlier?



SH: I'll see how events unfold in the future. However, I'm optimistic that after 10 years, the whole Muslim ummah will have awakened from its deep slumber; Pakistan is no exception. I think that the vast majority of Pakistanis will not tolerate what is going on here as silent spectators. Here is also a lesson for the United States: to learn from what happened to the former superpower the USSR. It should address the problems of the world in a positive way and address the sense of deprivation being created in the people of this region and especially in the Muslim ummah. Things have drastically changed. With the way they [the United States and its Western allies] inflict cruelties and damages on the Muslim ummah, there will be a strong response. Now, the Muslims have awakened. It is time for the United States to act responsibly. Otherwise, there will be tit-for-tat attacks.



IA: Do you think that the suicide bombing phenomenon is a kind of awakening?



SH: Look, if you kick a sleeping man, he will not only wake but will also resist. So, yes, suicide bombing is an awakening. Tell me, where did the concept of suicide bombing in Pakistan come? We had not heard about any suicide bombings in the more than two decades of the Afghan conflict. But this is a new and unbeatable discovery which some Muslim youth have found as an answer to the cruelties and damages being inflicted on the Muslim ummah.



IA: Can Western governments have a healthy relationship with Pakistan through foreign aid or development work?



SH: The first step is sovereignty and respect, and only then can foreign aid work. Until the United States and the West respect the sovereignty of Muslim countries and stop their aggression and atrocities, nothing will work.

 

[seth gecko]

Internet chatter? User nicknames? Seems they're not that different from us

Jihadis Speculate on Secret Cooperation between Iran and al-Qaeda
6February 25, 2009 03:18 PM
By: Abdul Hameed Bakier

A discussion in jihadi internet forums triggered by a posting entitled "Is there a secret cooperation between Iran and al-Qaeda?" raised suspicions over possible clandestine connections between Shiite Iran and al-Qaeda, the self-declared enemy of Shi'ism (muslm.net, February 18, 2008).

A jihadi forum chatter nicknamed al-Natiq bil-Shahada posted a message in the jihad forum that raised the issue of al-Qaeda's possible secret relations with Iran. Even though Iran's Islamic creed is in stark contrast with al-Qaeda's Salafi-Jihadi ideology, Shahada wonders why al-Qaeda never targeted Iranian interests inside or outside Iran. "Much skepticism revolves around al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda has been active in Morocco, Algeria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Yemen, Egypt, Europe and the U.S. but never in Iran," says Shahada, who goes on to cite new Western reports of a letter allegedly sent from al-Qaeda to Iran's leadership, thanking them for the support of the Revolutionary Guards in carrying out the September 2008 attack on the U.S. embassy in Yemen (Daily Telegraph, November 24, 2008).

Justifying the absence of al-Qaeda attacks on Iran, some forum members responded to Shahada's suspicions by noting that there is a big ideological gap between Iran and al-Qaeda, but the latter had to refrain from attacking Iran because many members of al-Qaeda are in Iran, either as prisoners or as fugitives sought by Iranian authorities. Also, Iran's porous border with Afghanistan and Pakistan allows al-Qaeda members to exit the region whenever necessary.

On the other hand, some forum participants pointed out al-Qaeda serves Iranian goals by exhausting and weakening Sunni Muslims. If al-Qaeda was not serving Iranian strategic objectives in the region, Iran would have cracked down on al-Qaeda in Iraq and tightened its borders with Afghanistan and Pakistan, given Iran's influence in Iraq. "Al-Qaeda only attacks soft targets. If al-Qaeda harasses Iran in Iraq, Iran would finish off al-Qaeda in a few days," says a forum chatter nicknamed Ali al-Hashimi.

According to another forum member nicknamed Abu Issa, there are other reasons that prevent al-Qaeda from attacking Iran. Public opinion in the Islamic world supports Iran on the false belief that Iran is the only Islamic country confronting U.S. expansion in the region by backing Hezbollah against Israel. Also, Iran began to demonstrate animosity towards Sunni Muslims only in the last few years. Retribution attacks by al-Qaeda against Iran will take some time, especially with the lack of Iranian members of al-Qaeda. The current members of al-Qaeda in Iran are either in prison or under house arrest. Even though al-Qaeda has not struck in Iran, many Iranian-backed militiamen were killed by al-Qaeda in Iraq.

Responding to the claim that al-Qaeda has no presence in Iran, Abu Issa said that the Iranian Sunni group Jondallah is a Salafi-Jihadi group affiliated with al-Qaeda and is already waging jihad operations in Iran (see Terrorism Monitor, February 9). Jondallah is an Iranian Sunni insurgent group based in Balochistan, but many regard it as being inspired by nationalism rather than Salafi-Jihadism. The group's amir, Abdul Malik Baluchi, has denied any association with al-Qaeda (al-Arabiya.net, February 22). In the same context, a member of another forum corroborated Abu Issa's claim by saying that al-Qaeda is responsible for bombing a mosque in the Iranian city of Shiraz five month ago (nationalkuwait.com, February 21, 2009).

Some jihadi forum members referred to press reports released by Arab news agencies confirming some kind of connection between al-Qaeda and Iran. These reports suggest that 35 wanted Saudi al-Qaeda members are in Iran or in the Pakistan-Afghanistan-Iran triangle. Al-Qaeda members in Iran led by Salah al-Qar'awi (a.k.a. Nijm-he uses another 14 pseudonyms) are reported to be planning terrorist attacks in Saudi Arabia or Jordan, and others are planning to join al-Qaeda in Yemen (moheet.com, February 5). Al-Qar'awi received intensive training on electronic detonators in Iran and uses Iranian territories as a launching pad for terrorist activities that extend to Iraq and Lebanon (moheet.com, February 5). Other reports referred to by forum members indicated that Iranian Mullahs previously hosted prominent al-Qaeda members in Iran, such as Muhammad Ibrahim Makkawi (a.k.a. Saif al-Adel), Sa'ad bin Laden (Osama bin Laden's son), and Ayman al-Zawahiri (Al-Sharq al-Awsat, July 1, 2003). According to the forum members, al-Zawahiri has close relations with Iranian Revolutionary Guard Brigadier Mohammad Baqir al-Qadir. Finally, some forum members highlighted Iran's refusal to hand over to their countries of origin al-Qaeda members who fled from Afghanistan into Iran.

Regardless of the ideological differences between Iran and al-Qaeda, they share a mutual enemy, the United States. The temporary mutual objective of al-Qaeda and Iran is to rid the Arab and Islamic countries of U.S. influence and exploitation. Once this provisional common objective elapses, Shiite-Sunni ideological differences will likely hinder any further cooperation between the two sides

 

[seth gecko]

No witty comments. Interesting peice, old analysis though still relevant

Strategic Insights, Volume III, Issue 7 (July 2004)

by Thomas H. Johnson

Strategic Insights is a quarterly electronic journal produced by the Center for Contemporary Conflict at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. The views expressed here are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of NPS, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

Introduction: The "Amir" of Western Afghanistan
The planned September national elections in Afghanistan are viewed by the United States as critical in broadening the legitimacy of Kabul and strengthening its authority to address the persisting problems of violent extremism, factionalism, drugs, and human rights. In addition, the elections may represent an expansion of Kabul's authority in the regional provinces. Recent violence in Afghanistan, however, has again raised questions about whether the country can successfully hold its first post-Taliban elections.

Important considerations for the ultimate success of the elections are how the elections are viewed and supported by Afghan regional power brokers and commanders as well as by Afghan's regional neighbors. The purpose of this essay is to assess Ismail Khan, one such power broker, and his relationship with Iran. There is little doubt that Ismail Khan, self-proclaimed Amir of Western Afghanistan, has important ties and relationships with Iran.

Ismail Khan is a Persian speaking Sunni Tajik who in March 1979, as a Major in Afghan army, led the original mutiny/insurrection against the Taraki regime's Sawr (or April) Revolution (Taraki's inspired Afghan societal liberalization and land reform). Khan's revolt resulted in the slaughter of Soviet Afghan advisors and their families. This insurrection was met by a brutal Afghan and Soviet response that killed an estimated 24,000 Heratis in a single week and destroyed much of the famous Central Asian crossroad city. Khan's insurrection was a significant impetus for the December 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. For the next decade Khan waged a bitter guerrilla war against Soviet occupation[1] . Despite the devastation around him, eventually Khan disarmed the population and established an effective administration with functioning health care and schools in three western Afghan provinces. In 1992, two years after the Soviets left Afghanistan, Khan's militia took back Herat and Khan declared himself Amir of the West.

In March 1995, the Taliban captured the provinces of Nimruz and Farah. The Taliban marched on Shindand (a large former Soviet-build air base) but Khan, with help from Massoud, repelled them. Khan later maneuvered south and launched an offensive against the Taliban in Kandahar, but the Taliban regrouped with help from Pakistan's ISI and new recruits from Pakistani madrassas. Simultaneously, Uzbek General Rashid Dostum switched sides to the Taliban and his air force started to bomb Herat; Khan retreated and the Taliban overran his forces.[2]

In September 1995, Khan and some 8,000 men fled to Mashhad, Iran, after the fall of Herat. Khan returned in October 1996 and joined forces with Dostum in Badghis province. The Taliban eventually captured Khan in May 1997 after being betrayed by General Abdul Malik, one of Dostum's Deputies. Khan had gone to Mazar to meet with Dostum who by this time had rejoined the Taliban. After his arrest, Khan was put in a Kandahari prison. In March 1999, Khan escaped to Iran with the help of two Taliban guards who were former mujahideen. After September 11th and the start of United States' war against the Taliban, Khan returned and took Herat back after the Taliban fled.

Ismail Khan rules Herat like a duke and is regarded with suspicion and resentment in Kabul. Yet Khan is a popular and independent leader of Herat, a large province in western Afghanistan, adjacent to Iran. Khan was and is a bitter enemy of the Taliban who was clearly considered one of the most prominent and effective commanders against the Soviets during the Afghan jihad. Since the defeat of the Taliban he has defied Hamid Karzai and the central government, refusing to hand over to Kabul most of the tax and customs revenue he has collected. This has caused considerable consternation towards Khan in Kabul.

Although he was one of the least tainted of the mujahideen commanders, Human Rights Watch has recently cited him and his militia leaders for alleged arbitrary arrests, illegal detentions and Taliban-like intrusions on people who do not conform to rigid Islamic behavior. Though Khan could be ruthless, he tended to seek reconciliation rather than revenge during the war with the Soviets. Moreover, Khan has not been linked to the kinds of massacres and atrocities regularly attributed to other commanders. Nor is there evidence of Khan's involvement in opium production or trafficking, unlike many of the Afghan warlords. Do these facts make Ismail Khan a proponent of Western-style democracy? Certainly not, but the lack of combat atrocities and the absence of involvement in narcotics production or trade is relatively rare for Afghan leaders.

Herat and Iran

Herat, for centuries the crossroad for competing Turkic and Persian empires, is a cradle of Afghanistan's history and civilization and has had historic ties to Persia and the Silk Road trade routes. Herat is frequently cited as both the best and the worst example of postwar Afghanistan. Herat's advantageous geographical position and accompanied wealth is complemented by the fact that Khan is a legendary commander and much venerated and revered by the majority of Heratis. Khan has repaved roads, is upgrading parks, building schools, cleaning streets and erecting monuments, thanks to the substantial influx of customs revenue he collects from the busy border crossing with Iran - money that Karzai's government says belongs to the central government[3]. The BBC has reported that millions of dollars in tax revenues are collected every month -- little, if any, of which is sent to Kabul[4].

Much of Khan's success is clearly attributable to the fact that Herat is now the most prosperous city in Afghanistan, which reflects its location as a crossroads between the Gulf and Central Asia, bordering both Iran and Turkmenistan. Khan and his administration have remarkably rebuilt a city that was nearly totally devastated during the wars with the Soviets and the Taliban[5]. "Khan has provided a degree of security, education, and food supplied unrivaled in the rest of the country"[6].

Iran has traditionally had close relationships with Herat and probably will continue to have close relationships, regardless of the position of Ismail Khan. Iran shares a 400-mile border with Western Afghanistan and Tehran has always felt a sense of possession towards Herat. Khan has used this dynamic to his advantage over the years during which Iran has supplied him with significant resources in his campaigns against both the Soviets and Taliban[7]. For decades Khan has had a clear quid pro quo with Iran. During the jihad against the Soviets, Iran supplied Khan with fuel, ammunition, and arms in exchange for use of Shindand as an air bridge to Shi'a communities in Hazarajat. Likewise during his battles with the Taliban whom were particularly disdained by the Iranians, Khan received considerable Iranian material support.

Khan is by no means the only Afghan leader to receive considerable Iranian support and resources. Iran has played all sides of the Afghan conflict. Iran, for example, played a significant role in arming the Northern Alliance. General Mohammed Fahim[8], Afghan Defense Minister and Deputy President, as well as other Tajiks now controlling key central government ministries have depended heavily on Iranian support during their decade long struggle against the Taliban. Many of these ministers have been persistently courted by Iran, which was the first country to reopen its embassy in Kabul[9].

Since the Karzai Government was installed in Kabul, Iran's foreign ministry has organized a series of private trips to Tehran for key members of the Karzai government, including Defense Minister Fahim, Foreign Minister Abdullah Abdullah, Interior Minister Yunis Qanuni, and National Security Chief Aref Sarwari. "Without Iran, most Northern Alliance commanders couldn't have operated in Afghanistan at a time when they had no other source of international support," says a senior Afghan government source. "Almost every important Afghan commander has family living in Iran and most of them were educated in fundamentalist religious schools, or madrassas[10]."

After the defeat of the Taliban when many of Afghanistan's interloping neighbors vied for advantage - almost mimicking the geopolitics of the 19th Century "Great Game" - it was reported that Iran had supplied Khan with at least twenty truck loads of cash between November and December 2001 to secure loyalty of his forces in Herat[11].

During this time Iran also sent large stocks of weapons to Herat and Khan, which culminated in the United States firing a cruise missile at Khan's Headquarters, killing eighteen of his men in January 2002[12]. The Bush Administration is obviously extremely concerned about Iranian influence in Afghanistan.




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[seth gecko]

OK, 1 witty comment. He tells his friends...."Call me Ishmail"

.....CONTINUED
Ismail Khan: Iranian Lackey or Independent, Nationalist Regional Leader?

The understandable United States concern of Iranian influence on Ismail Khan depends upon the assumption that Khan has been co-opted by the Iranians. Is there any validity to this concern?

Politics in Afghanistan have always been local and Afghan leaders like Khan have traditionally used whoever is exploitable for their best advantage. Indeed, Afghans are famous for shifting and changing alliances. This phenomenon is illustrated by Pakistan's ISI Afghan Section's motto: "you cannot buy an Afghan, but you can rent one."

Regardless of motivations, Iran has genuinely helped the people of Herat and Western Afghanistan, as well as the Northern Alliance as a whole in their battles against the Soviets and the Taliban. Moreover, Iran not only served as a place of exile for Khan[13], but it also accepted over two million Afghans during the war with the Soviets and, unlike Pakistan, integrated these refugees into Iranian society. This has all occurred in the context where Iranians have traditionally looked down on Afghans as impoverished cousins while Afghans have regarded their powerful neighbor with suspicion.

Ismail Khan has demonstrated that he is a pragmatic Afghan nationalist who abhors foreign influence. Khan himself downplays his relationship with Iran and states that it is a "disgrace to be dependent on outside help…after the experiences the Russians and the Pakistanis had with us, every neighbor should know that it does not pay to meddle in our affairs[14]."

Indeed Khan has been extremely reluctant to be co-opted by outside influence. For example, in the summer of 1986 Khan disbanded Sunni (but not Shi'a) Hezbollah groups operating near Herat who were supported by Iran[15]. He also expelled Arab volunteers in the West during the jihad against Soviets because of their fanaticism and scorning of Afghan traditions[16], unlike other commanders. And, of course, during the long war with Soviets, Khan abhorred Pakistani influence and mujahideen leaders who accepted it. After the liberation of Herat from the Taliban, a Shi'a Muslim and Iranian-supported group, Hezb-e-Wahdat, was furious with Khan because they were not given any positions of power despite their joint effort in ousting the Taliban. Khan's refusal to share any power with Hezb-e-Wahdat would appear to be powerful inferential evidence of Khan's reluctance to give an Iranian-supported group explicit political influence in Herat.

Journalists have reported that not a single dollar of promised aid by the international community has reached Herat and, regardless of the influx into Herat of Iranian aid, "nobody in his town, Khan believes, would want to give Iran a role in Afghan politics[17]."

Khan plays down his relationship with Iran. "The Iranians are good neighbors, nothing else," and points out that the two countries share a four-hundred-mile-long border, which is crossed by traders every day. Khan has conceded, "Iran supported the struggle of the mujahideen, as did other countries," but dismisses the charges that he received arms from Iran as late as 2002[18].

When asked by EurasiaNet if he was "Iran's man in Afghanistan," Khan replied:

I have to say very unambiguously that for the last 23 years of civil and foreign war in Afghanistan, it was only Iran and China that were consistent in their support of us.

Now, about relations between us and Iran, there are a lot of malicious lies and distortion. Yes, it is true that we have a lot of respect for Iran. First, we have no alternative- we are neighbors and we have a long border with them. Second, during the jihad and resistance years, Iran gave us critical support. They never wavered in this. You must know something, we Afghans never forget it when a stranger offers us help. Third, we have an important business relationship through Islam Ghalleh and Dougharoun [between Mashhad and Herat]. Fourth, Iran hosted more than 3 million Afghan refugees and they were taken care of reasonably well.

We are rebuilding the country and we need friends. We need Iran's friendship. That doesn't mean we lose our independence or they have undue influence on us. I'm sure the Iranians have no plan to attack our country or anything like that- and if they did it would be a mistake.[19]

Khan has always been independent, even from his Afghan brethren. While he accepted arms and resources from Jamiat-i-Islami and Rabbani, he refused their authority. Many of his current problems apparently stem from the fact that he openly disdains Karzai and makes no secrets about it. Yet he was pragmatic enough to recognize Kabul's eventual role in the future Afghanistan and consented when his son -- Mirwais Sadiq -- was appointed Karzai's Minister of Labor and Social Affairs.

Despite Khan's pragmatism and pronouncements of independence from foreign influence, the United States is extremely nervous concerning Iranian influence in Afghanistan. This concern is highlighted by reports such as the one published in Insight on the News Website stating that:

According to intelligence reports, three Iranian Revolutionary Guard officers were killed during 2001 in U.S. air strikes against the Taliban army's 17th Detachment in the western Afghan province of Herat, which now is ruled by Iran's close ally, Ismail Khan. Advised by as many as 10 Iranian generals who are operating undercover as Afghans, Khan is believed to be planning the creation of a 'Western Federation' that eventually might challenge Kabul's rule[20].

Should one find it unusual at all that Khan was being advised by Iranian Generals during the height of the United States and the Northern Alliance's campaign against the Taliban? Khan had just returned from his exile in Iran to rejoin the Northern Alliance and recognizing his long-standing relationship with the Iranians, it seems reasonable to expect such council. While Khan considers his role as "Amir" of Western Afghanistan seriously and openly challenges Kabul's leadership, there has been no evidence that he plans to create a formal, break-away "Western Federation," much less become a pawn of the Iranians.


The Legacy of Afghan Regional Politics
Afghanistan has always been a tribal, segmented country with Kabul exerting little influence on the provinces. "Fiefdoms" have clearly been established by Khan and others such as Uzbek General Dostum[21], who repeatedly has challenged Kabul's control over the northern city of Mazar-i-Sharif; Ismailis (in alliance with Dostam) in Pul-i-Khumri; the Tajiks in the Northeast, and multiple Pashtun powerbrokers in the Eastern provinces. Such regional spheres of influence have long dominated Afghan politics and reflected in provincial leadership. They are an established fact of Afghan political life.

Afghanistan has no history of secular democracy. The characterization of Afghanistan by the 19th Century British diplomat Sir Henry Rawlinson as "consist[ing] of a mere collection of tribes, of unequal power and divergent habits, which are held together more or less closely, according to the personal character of the chief who rules them. The feeling of patriotism, as it is known in Europe, cannot exist among Afghans, for there is no common country" is still true today and suggests critical nuances for any realistic Afghanistan reconstruction and future political agenda.

The fragmentation and complexity of Afghanistan presents particular challenges to reconstruction as well as to peaceful, stable post-Taliban country free of terrorists. To understand Afghanistan, one must recognize and be sensitive to the fact that group identities and power relationships as well as coalitions are based on ethno-linguistic affinities. Pashtuns have traditionally been the dominant ethnic group and the Afghan state has in the past been a tool for Pashtun domination. The second most prominent ethnic-linguistic group is the Tajiks who represent the Afghan Persian-speaking, nontribal population such as that found in Khan's Herat and Western Provinces. Other prominent Afghan ethno-linguistic groups include the Uzbeks, Hazaras, Nuristani, Baluch and Brahaui. The peaceful coexistence of the different groups has been destroyed by 25 years of war that witnessed scores of atrocities committed by one group against another. Each of these groups continue to dominate the lives of Afghans in particular regions and locales.

One must be sensitive to this ethno-linguistic fragmentation. It is probably unrealistic to expect that the post-Taliban government in Kabul over the short term will have much significant control over regional and local power relationships that have long dominated. Kabul can serve a useful mediating role in conflicts at the regional level, but over the short to medium term that is about all that can realistically be expected.

It is instructive to recognize that during the Sawr (or April) Revolution in the late 1970s, Soviet-supported Afghan Communists attempted to institute certain development policies, including land reforms, that disregarded local and regional ethnic realities and relationships. These policies failed miserably and led to civil upheaval and Ismail Khan's original revolt. Any future Afghan reconstruction plan formulated in Kabul and imposed on the regions in disregard to local realities will most certainly meet the same fate. Reconstruction must have as a goal the restoration of basic economic and social infrastructures not the rebuilding of the entire state or country from the top down. A regional reconstruction strategy has the added benefit of minimizing competition of control of the central government and giving a vested interest to local leaders such as Ismail Khan for the maintenance of peace. It must be remember that people's allegiance is primarily with ethnic and tribal groups and local authorities[22].

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[seth gecko]

....CONTINUED
Recent Events

The relationship between Khan and Karzai is an excellent near-term indicator of the success of the future Afghan state. Khan is viewed by many as one of the main obstacles to Karzai's efforts to extend his authority outside Kabul. If this is a valid assumption then the past months have seen some extremely troubling indicators.

On March 21, 2004, bloody conflict erupted in Herat between Khan's forces and those loyal to the central government after a reported failed assassination attempt on the life of Khan and the killing of Khan's son, Aviation Minister Mirwais Sadiq[23]. This fighting, which represents some of the worst seen Herat since the fall of the Taliban in late 2001, erupted after Sadiq was killed as he went to investigate the earlier assassination attempt of his father.

While accounts of exactly what happened vary widely, according to an account by U.N. workers in Afghanistan as reported in the New Yorker,

Tensions had been mounting between Khan and one of his bitter rivals, General Abdul Zaher Naibzadah, who had been appointed by the central government to head the Afghan 17th division, over control of the Afghan military's Herat garrison. Khan's son heard reports that there had been an assassination attempt on his father, and drove to the General's house, where Naibzadah's bodyguards gunned him down, along with others. According to the U.N. dispatch, Ismail Khan took violent revenge on his attackers, burning down the local headquarters of the Afghan militia and killing scores. Some press accounts put the death toll of the subsequent daylong battle at a hundred or more; other accounts, emanating from Kabul, said that fewer than two-dozen were killed. The U.N. account included reports that a personal phone call from Karzai to Khan was necessary to defuse the situation." During the next days, a division of the Afghan National Army consisting of fifteen hundred soldiers was sent to Herat to restore order[24].

The U.N. Report cited by the New Yorker suggested, that Khan "may become even more intractable in his dealing with the central government[25]."

According to the BBC , during a visit to Herat, Karzai demanded that Khan disarm his forces as part of a nationwide plan to disarm 40,000 fighters by June[26]. Karzai also suggested that Khan would not be allowed to keep his private militia. Do not expect this disarmament or the voluntary dismantlement of Khan's militia to happen any time soon!

Three times this year Hamid Karzai has dispatched troops from the newly formed Afghan national army to combat factional fighting and disarm regional militias. Most recently, in late June, Afghan troops with "embedded" U.S. military trainers were sent to the province of Ghor to assert central government control. These actions to impose authority in the provinces and disarm militias have had limited success.

Conclusion

Ismail Kahn personifies how difficult it is for the U.S. to separate its enemies from its allies in Afghanistan. "If Mohammed Fahim is a government minister and Ismail Khan is a warlord," one American official [has suggested], "you're abusing the language." The official's point was that Khan has provided better security and more stability for the local population than is found in other Afghan provinces, and international observers believe that he would probably win a provincial election. But he treats Herat as a private fiefdom, and has alarmed many in the United States with his vocal support of Iran; last fall, he was quoted as calling it "the best model of an Islamic country in the world[27]."

Khan is a legendary Afghan commander and has been a fixture in Western Afghanistan for decades. He is extremely popular with the forces he has led since his original mutiny against the Taraki regime's Sawr (or April) Revolution. As Ahmed Rashid has written, "few mujahideen commanders have the prestige of Ismail Khan and few have sacrificed more than the people of Herat during the war against the Soviets[28]." While it is not without its blemishes, Khan has established an effective administration and has won the respect of the people. It is a fact that Herat under Khan's leadership is thriving relative to the rest of Afghanistan.

Ismail Khan has and probably will continue to have significant relationships with his powerful neighbor, Iran - a fact that should not be viewed as surprising considering Afghan history or his personal history. But evidence suggesting that he is controlled by or acts as an Iranian lackey is far from convincing. Khan time and time again has demonstrated his independence and disdain of foreign influence.

It is instructive to review Khan's passionate desire for greater unity from foreign influence of mujahideen field commanders when he organized the first meeting for field commanders in the Ghor province in July 1987. "Over one thousand commanders from across Afghanistan attended the conference. They adopted twenty resolutions of which the most important was the demand that they, rather than the Peshawar leaders, dictate the political movement. 'The right of determining the future destiny of Afghanistan lies with the heirs of the martyrs and with the Muslims of the trenches, who are struggling in bloody fronts and are ready to be martyred. Nobody else is allowed to make decisions determining the fate of the nation[29].'"

Ismail Khan will use the Iranian resources to benefit Herat; it is extremely unlikely that he will allow Iran or anybody else -- including the leadership in Kabul -- to replace him as "Amir" of Western Afghanistan.

 

[seth gecko]

Screw Khan! Karzai's the man!!!

Summary -- With the cancellation of Afghanistan's runoff election, Washington is left with Hamid Karzai as its partner in Kabul. How did Karzai come to power in the first place, and what might that say about his ability to rule?

JAMES DOBBINS is Director of the International Security and Defense Policy Center at the RAND Corporation and the author of After the Taliban: Nation-Building in Afghanistan. He was the Bush administration’s first envoy to Afghanistan.

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Abdullah Abdullah was the first Afghan to suggest Hamid Karzai should become president of Afghanistan. It was one day in mid-November 2001, and we were in the cockpit of a CIA transport plane heading from Tashkent, Uzbekistan, to Afghanistan's Bagram airfield -- just liberated by Northern Alliance fighters -- where Abdullah and I were to meet with the rest of the Northern Alliance leadership.

Although Abdullah cautioned that his view was not shared by all his comrades in the alliance, it did have the support of the three most powerful: Muhammad Qasim Fahim, the minister of defense, Younis Qanooni, the minister of the interior, and Abdullah himself, then the alliance's foreign minister. All three were protégés of Ahmed Shah Massoud, the revered and influential military leader of the Northern Alliance who had been assassinated by al Qaeda operatives on the eve of 9/11.

Abdullah explained that he and his colleagues recognized that the other elements of the Afghan opposition could never unite around a non-Pashtun leader or one identified with the Northern Alliance. Karzai, in contrast, had good connections across the non-Taliban spectrum and a better prospect of forming and holding a broad coalition.

Over the next several weeks, diplomats from India, Iran, Russia, and several European governments echoed Abdullah's suggestion as they gathered in Bonn, Germany, for a United Nations conference that would establish the new Afghan government. Such consensus seemed remarkable at the time, though I later learned that Abdullah had planted the seed during his earlier travels to these countries.

As Karzai consolidated his power, he reduced his dependence on those who had brought him to power. As the senior U.S. representative to the conference, I found myself in an unlikely alliance with representatives from Iran, Russia, and India, all of us seeking to persuade disparate groups to agree on an interim constitution and a provisional leadership. Four anti-Taliban Afghan factions were represented in Bonn: in addition to the Northern Alliance, which by late November had secured control of every major city in the country except Kandahar, there was a group loosely aligned with Iran, another based in Pakistan, and a large number of supporters of Mohammad Zahir Shah, the 87-year-old former king of Afghanistan who had been living for several decades in exile in Rome.

There were two main obstacles: first, the rest of the Northern Alliance leadership, including Burhanuddin Rabbani, the alliance's president, had been driven out of Kabul by the Taliban in 1996 and were reluctant to surrender the positions, ministries, and in Rabbani's case, the palace, which they had just reoccupied after five years in the hills. And second, at the other end of the spectrum, the large royalist faction favored the restoration of Zahir or a member of his family -- or at least a more senior courtier than Karzai.

Karzai was a member of the royalist faction but was still in Afghanistan, where he was leading a Pashtun militia in an ultimately successful effort to capture Kandahar, the country's last Taliban stronghold. Eventually, all four Afghan factions coalesced around the idea of Karzai leading the next Afghan government.

The selection of Karzai is often attributed to the United States. But, in fact, Washington provided me no guidance on the subject, and I had never met Karzai. It was clear to me, however, that he had much broader international and Afghan support than any other candidate and was the only person on whom this gathering was likely to agree.

Qanooni headed the Northern Alliance delegation. Abdullah remained back in Kabul, where he worked to secure agreement from Rabbani and his colleagues in the Northern Alliance to cede their positions to the new regime being set up in Bonn. Russia, Iran, and India -- all longstanding supporters of the Northern Alliance -- lent their weight to Abdullah's ultimately successful effort.

Not surprisingly, Abdullah, Fahim, and Qanooni retained their positions in the new government. But once Karzai took office, he began to come under pressure from his Pashtun constituency to diminish a perceived ethnic Tajik stranglehold on the government's power ministries. Pakistan -- a historical patron of the Taliban -- was similarly unhappy, as these three figures were close to India, Iran, and Russia, all of which had supported the alliance's long insurrection against the Taliban.

As Karzai consolidated his power -- first as the interim president chosen by the loya jirga in 2002, and then after being popularly elected to the presidency in 2004 -- he reduced his dependence on those who had brought him to power. Karzai first let go of Qanooni, who, in 2002, was demoted to minister of education and then left government to run against Karzai in the 2004 presidential election. Qanooni is now chairman of the lower house of parliament. Fahim served as Karzai's vice president and defense minister but was disappointed not to be chosen as Karzai's running mate in 2004. He lost his ministry shortly after Karzai's victory. Then, in 2006, Karzai unceremoniously dropped Abdullah from the cabinet. (Abdullah learned of his replacement during an official visit to Washington.)

Earlier this year, shaken by mounting criticism from the new Obama administration and preparing to face Abdullah in his campaign for another presidential term, Karzai sought to repair his links with Afghanistan's large Tajik constituency. He rehabilitated Fahim by selecting him as his running mate.

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[seth gecko]

....continued
In the first round of the recent election, Abdullah received more than 30 percent of the vote -- almost twice what Qanooni, the runner-up in 2004, had received. But Abdullah chose not to contest the second round, most likely because he recognized the difficulty in closing Karzai's substantial lead of 17 percentage points, even after nearly a third of Karzai's original vote count had been disallowed for fraud.

Now that Karzai has been declared the election's winner, the breach with Abdullah -- the man most responsible for his original rise to power -- could have very dangerous consequences. The last thing Karzai, NATO, and the United States can afford is the emergence of a renewed northern alliance of disaffected Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras. Together, these ethnic blocs represent at least half the Afghan population.

The last thing Karzai, NATO, and the United States can afford is the emergence of a renewed northern alliance. Karzai has brought at least two of the former northern warlords to his side -- Fahim and Abdul Rashid Dostum -- but the strength and geographic distribution of Abdullah's first round vote suggests that he, not Karzai and Fahim, received the majority of the country's northern vote. The United States and the rest of the international community will consequently be pressing Karzai in the coming weeks either to bring Abdullah into government or at least provide him a respectable role among the leadership of a loyal opposition. This means affording him and his supporters some share in the spoils of government. Patronage is important to the functioning of political systems -- including those in the United States -- but is particularly so in impoverished states such as Afghanistan, where there are few other opportunities for advancement.

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[seth gecko]

Is he on TERB? He sure should be!!

http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/319-khan.pdf

 

[seth gecko]

This document entirely overlooks the reality of the Soviet war in Afghanistan, which was the reality that it was in fact a war with the United States.

The post is a link to translated transcripts of Politburo sessions and conversations between Soviet leadership and their generals. Soviets originally entered Afghanistan to aid their Marxist allies in an existing civil conflict. America saw an opportunity to draw the USSR into their version of VietNam. By the mid-to late 1980's (around the time of these meetings), the Soviets were looking for a way out of the war, and that's what they were discussing. Soviets were quite aware that the US was among several parties arming/training the 1980's era mujahhaden.

 

[seth gecko]

There must be less costly and more efficient ways of curtailing the Taliban and Al Qaeda than to try and turn a 12th century country into a modern democracy. The SAS and/or Delta Force could probably have killed or captured OBL by now. Also, the Taliban are only interested in subjugating their own people, they had no quarrels with the West.

Delta Force had a good chance to take out Bin Laden at Tora Bora but their plans were thwarted by higher ups.

The Hunt For Bin Laden-60 Minutes
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mmtPBTybQ9k

I don't think the Taliban were directly involved with 9/11 but they provided a safe haven for Al-Qaeda and harboured Bin Laden.
They had the choice of handing over Bin Laden or face the consequences.

If the US stayed out of Iraq and focused on Afghanistan, the mission would have been much more successful and the World would be a much better place.
It would have been nice to have some real support from more NATO countries too.

Nearly every contributing nation to the NATO mission has supplied their top-tier SOF towards capturing/killing top Taliban/AQ. Within the first 6 months, about 90% of the original targets were in the bag....a few notable exceptions were missed (OBL and MO, among others). General Franks said it himself back in the day "we weren't too sure if he (OBL) was actually there or not" (I paraphrase). As old targets are removed, new ones come up. Frankly, there's substantially more able recruits for the "insurgency" than there ever will be for SOF. Add to that many guys are leaving the military for the much more lucrative pastures of "private contractors" like Blackwater or whatever the hell they call themselves these days...Xi??? Roughly 4x the pay to do an easier version of the work you used to do!
The following is my opinion - Joe Biden should press the eject button on his VCR as he's apparently watched the Chuck Norris stinker "Delta Force" too many times. His "plan" is pretty whacked-out and will waste a lot of lives uselessly (or more lives more uselessly, depending on your politics. I'm non-political, BTW).
Rockslinger....I PM'ed you something you might find interesting & informative. If not received I'll resend.

Speaking of deja vu, I sense that I've already said all of this before in the past few weeks....(though not as eloquently as most of youse guys dos)

AND....I'm saddened that Papasmerf and Woody didn't make a nice gesture towards each other on Rememberance/Veterans Day. If we can bring peace between these two old(?) warhorses, resolving the Afghan shitheap will be a breeze. I say...END THE SMERFPECKR WAR NOW!!!!

 

[mandrill]

Seth G, thanks for that informative series of posts. My limited understanding of the Agfh situ has been much improved.

 

[Rockslinger]

Rockslinger....I PM'ed you something you might find interesting & informative. If not received I'll resend.

Yup, received. Too much material to read in its entirety but did read certain sections.

Maybe we should "outsource" the capture of OBL to Blackwater or H. Ross Perot. Is the reward still $25million? How much is that compare to the money we are pissing away on the "reconstruction" of Afghanistan?

 

[seth gecko]

But, what about Afghan womens' rights?

US Is Doing No Good in Afghanistan
by Malalai Joya


Global Research, November 15, 2009

As an Afghan woman who was elected to Parliament, I am in the United States to ask President Barack Obama to immediately end the occupation of my country.

Eight years ago, women's rights were used as one of the excuses to start this war. But today, Afghanistan is still facing a women's rights catastrophe. Life for most Afghan women resembles a type of hell that is never reflected in the Western mainstream media.

In 2001, the U.S. helped return to power the worst misogynist criminals, such as the Northern Alliance warlords and druglords. These men ought to be considered a photocopy of the Taliban. The only difference is that the Northern Alliance warlords wear suits and ties and cover their faces with the mask of democracy while they occupy government positions. But they are responsible for much of the disaster today in Afghanistan, thanks to the U.S. support they enjoy.

The U.S. and its allies are getting ready to offer power to the medieval Taliban by creating an imaginary category called the "moderate Taliban" and inviting them to join the government. A man who was near the top of the list of most-wanted terrorists eight years ago, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, has been invited to join the government.

Over the past eight years the U.S. has helped turn my country into the drug capital of the world through its support of drug lords. Today, 93 percent of all opium in the world is produced in Afghanistan. Many members of Parliament and high ranking officials openly benefit from the drug trade. President Karzai's own brother is a well known drug trafficker.

Meanwhile, ordinary Afghans are living in destitution. The latest United Nations Human Development Index ranked Afghanistan 181 out of 182 countries. Eighteen million Afghans live on less than $2 a day. Mothers in many parts of Afghanistan are ready to sell their children because they cannot feed them.

Afghanistan has received $36 billion of aid in the past eight years, and the U.S. alone spends $165 million a day on its war. Yet my country remains in the grip of terrorists and criminals. My people have no interest in the current drama of the presidential election since it will change nothing in Afghanistan. Both Karzai and Dr. Abdullah are hated by Afghans for being U.S. puppets.

The worst casualty of this war is truth. Those who stand up and raise their voice against injustice, insecurity and occupation have their lives threatened and are forced to leave Afghanistan, or simply get killed.

We are sandwiched between three powerful enemies: the occupation forces of the U.S. and NATO, the Taliban and the corrupt government of Hamid Karzai.

Now President Obama is considering increasing troops to Afghanistan and simply extending former President Bush's wrong policies. In fact, the worst massacres since 9/11 were during Obama's tenure. My native province of Farah was bombed by the U.S. this past May. A hundred and fifty people were killed, most of them women and children. On Sept. 9, the U.S. bombed Kunduz Province, killing 200 civilians.

My people are fed up. That is why we want an immediate end to the U.S. occupation.

 

[danmand]

Whenever I have used the word "occupation" to describe the presence
of the US and Nato forces in Afghanistan, I have been met with cries
of outrage.

Seems like at least some Afghans consider it an accurate description.