Could you post the link to R vs. Dehaney? I googled and found nothing relevant. many thanks.
R. v. Dehaney, 2005 ONCJ 468 (CanLII)
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Date: 2005-11-02
URL:
http://www.canlii.org/en/on/oncj/doc/2005/2005oncj468/2005oncj468.html
Noteup: Search for decisions citing this decision
Citation: R. v. Dehaney,
November 2, 2005
2005 ONCJ 468
Adrian Dehaney, the applicant before this court, seeks a stay of these proceedings as a result of the delay in getting his matter to trial. He claims that this delay is a violation of his rights under section 11b of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
The prosecution opposes the defendant’s application, indicating that the Applicant’s rights have not been violated, that there has been no evidence led during the hearing and that staying the charge would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.
In reviewing the facts, the court notes that Mr. Dehaney was charged on December 8,2004 with speeding, contrary to Section 128 of the Highway Traffic Act of Ontario. He retained an agent to represent him immediately, filing his Notice of Intention to Appear the following day. He requested through his agent the earliest possible trial date.
The trial notice indicating a trial date of October 11th,2005 was sent to the appropriate address on January 20th,2005. This administrative process or intake period was approximately 42 days which seems excessive considering that the officer filed his certificate with the court the day after serving the defendant his offence notice.
The total time from the issuing of the Part One Certificate of Offence to the trial date is ten months and three days. There is no outstanding disclosure and no adjournment was requested by the defendant that would result in waiver issues. There is no dispute between the parties as to the length of the delay and that the delay is systemic, resting at the feet of the prosecution.
In considering the defendant’s application, the court must consider a number
of issues, including the length of the delay, the inherent time requirements which include the time it takes for the defendant to retain counsel or agent, for the police and administrative paperwork and for disclosure. In this instance, as indicated above, the defendant acted in a responsible manner and was ready within a day to set his trial date. Disclosure was provided in a
timely fashion by the officer.
In the Supreme Court of Canada decision, Regina vs. Morin, guidelines of eight to ten months to bring a matter to trial were established while the Ontario Court of Appeal case, Regina vs. Askov suggested guidelines of six
to eight months as did Justice Sheppard in another Ontario Court of Appeal
matter, Regina vs. Mastroianni.
R.vs.Morin also addresses the inherent requirements including those of the intake period that are common to most cases. Although Justice Sopinka acknowledges the necessity of this requirement, he does not suggest a specific time period. Rather, the length of time necessary will be influenced by local practices and conditions. Also, the more complex a case, the more time will be required for this purpose.
In the case, R. v. Hussain, a Jan.,2005 case from the Ontario Court of Appeal, a suggested intake period of slightly less than two months is considered to be appropriate. Although R. v. Hussain and the matter before this court are both Highway Traffic Act matters, the matter of Adrian Delaney is, in the court’s view, an uncomplicated Part One matter that should require less intake time.
Because this is a straight forward highway traffic matter, the court is of the view that it should be brought to trial earlier than some other matters which require more investigation and disclosure. Thus the lower end of the suggested range to bring the matter to trial is appropriate. In fairness to the prosecution, it is not due to any action, or lack thereof, that this matter has taken more than ten months to come to trial. The delay is strictly systemic as
a result of limited judicial resources provided to the City of Mississauga
Although the ten month delay in bringing this matter to trial is borderline when considering the parameters set out in R. vs. Morin, the court believes each case should be assessed on its own merits based on the facts before thecourt.The court finds that the higher end of the scale in R. vs. Morin , that is, ten months, to bring this speeding charge to trial is excessive. Rather, the lower end of the scale, that being eight months, is more appropriate. The intake requirement of more than forty days to obtain a trial date and send out
a trial notice is also excessive considering that the Applicant had his request completed the day following his charge. Both the Officer and the Applicant were dillgent in taking the proper steps to bring the matter to trial quickly.
The court is satisfied that a prima facie case for unreasonable delay has been
made out and the Applicant’s rights to a trial within a reasonable time period
have been violated.
The court must now determine the appropriate remedy and whether there is prejudice to the defendant. If so , does that prejudice outweigh society’s interest in bringing him to trial ?
The prosecution argues that there is no actual prejudice to the Applicant. He led no evidence on that point. If anything, the delay could actually, if convicted, benefit the Applicant in terms of demerit points and insurance implications. Therefore, no inherent or implied prejudice exists. The prosecutor further argued that the Applicant, it appears, was satisfied with his trial date.
The court disagrees with the prosecution’s arguments The defendant is not required to lead evidence to prejudice. As Justice Sheppard in R.vs. Mastroianni, indicates, the fact that someone has been charged with an offence that requires an appearance before the court causes some level of anxiety, possible time off work and cost. In this case, although the prejudice may be slight, it can be inferred nonetheless.
The argument that the delay might actually benefit the defendant, if convicted, is based on an assumption of guilt . Our justice system is based on the assumption of innocence. As such, the court cannot consider that argument.
Finally, does the inferred prejudice outweigh society’s interest in bringing Mr. Dehaney to trial ? Ms Mariusz argues that staying the charge will bring the administration of justice into disrepute
Mr. Walpole, arguing for the Applicant , maintains that society’s interest in this matter is minimal and that the interests of the defendant are greater.
Speeding is a serious matter with regards to safety on our streets. The courts deal with hundreds of speeding charges every month, some of which are withdrawn by the prosecution due to lack of evidence.
Comparing this charge of speeding, at twenty nine kilometers per hour over the speed limit, to highway traffic act charges that lead to accidents resulting in personal and property injuries, the court is of the view that this matter is relatively minor.
The Applicant has brought this motion in a proper and timely fashion.
Based on the totality of the evidence before this court , the court finds that there is inferred prejudice as a result of the delay in bringing this charge of speeding to trial. As such, the lower end of the guidelines recommended by R. vs. Morin of eight months is exceeded.
A stay of proceedings is granted by this court.
Hilda Weiss