April 2, 2026
Before Donald Trump delivered his prime-time address to the American people on April 1, many commentators predicted he would claim victory and signal that the US air campaign against Iran would be wound down – even without a deal with Tehran to open the Strait of Hormuz. As it turned out, Trump said he would double down on the violence, promising to hit Iran “extremely hard” in coming weeks.
The White House simultaneously released a document headlined: President Trump’s Clear and Unchanging Objectives Drive Decisive Success Against Iranian Regime. “From day one,” it stated, “the objectives have been clear: obliterate Iran’s missiles and production, annihilate its navy, sever its support for terrorist proxies, and ensure it never acquires a nuclear weapon.” These objectives, Trump said, were nearly complete and he expected to finish the job “very fast”.
For the US president, the key marker of the success or otherwise of this foreign policy gambit will come in November’s midterm elections. So his strategic decisions are likely to be heavily influenced by the need to be able to claim victory, while also limiting any negative outcomes from the energy price shock engulfing the world. To do this, he must declare victory fairly soon.
But Trump’s partner in the war, Israel’s prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu, has a markedly different set of strategic priorities (although electoral politics will also play a big part in his thinking).
Launching Israel’s air campaign on February 28, Netanyahu said the goal was to “put an end to the threat from the Ayatollah regime in Iran”. He framed this as having been an existential threat to Israel for all of the 47 years that the Islamic Republic had been in existence, insisting that regime change was “not the objective, but … could certainly be the result”.
In the five weeks of the conflict, Israel’s strategic goals have both widened and lengthened. In Iran, while clearly working in partnership with the US, it wants to reserve the right, unilaterally, to “go back and hit Iran every time the nuclear and missile programmes are being rebuilt”.
Meanwhile, Israel has responded to attacks from Hezbollah forces in Lebanon by occupying the southern part of the country up to the Litani river. This area was designated by UN security council resolution 1701 in 2006 as a buffer zone in which only the Lebanese national army and UN peacekeepers were authorised to operate.
The Israeli defence minister, Israel Katz, has warned that Lebanese citizens who had fled would not be allowed to return “until the safety and security of northern Israeli residents is ensured”.
It appears that Israel plans a long-term occupation of the region. It already maintains a buffer zone in southern Syria, which it occupied after the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December 2024. This, it says, is also to deter Hezbollah attacks on northern Israel.
Netanyahu’s war aims
The focus of Netanyahu’s security policy has consistently been directed at Iran and its proxies. My research with Amnon Aran has demonstrated that in perpetuating an “Iran-as-evil” framing, the Israeli prime minister effectively precluded any possibility of engaging with the regime diplomatically.
Netanyahu’s political worldview has been enormously influenced by the founder of Revisionist Zionism, Ze’ev Jabotinsky. Under Jabotinsky’s “Iron Wall doctrine”, reinforcing the might of Israel is the only responsible response to the threat posed by Iran and its proxies. It is a strategy of strength first, diplomacy second.
In the past, Netanyahu has talked of defeating Israel’s enemies as his “supreme objective”. But more recently, analysts are describing what they refer to as the “Netanyahu doctrine”. According to this security stance, Israel must be prepared to launch “pre-emptive” attacks against any perceived threats, maintaining a permanent readiness for war.
theconversation.com
Before Donald Trump delivered his prime-time address to the American people on April 1, many commentators predicted he would claim victory and signal that the US air campaign against Iran would be wound down – even without a deal with Tehran to open the Strait of Hormuz. As it turned out, Trump said he would double down on the violence, promising to hit Iran “extremely hard” in coming weeks.
The White House simultaneously released a document headlined: President Trump’s Clear and Unchanging Objectives Drive Decisive Success Against Iranian Regime. “From day one,” it stated, “the objectives have been clear: obliterate Iran’s missiles and production, annihilate its navy, sever its support for terrorist proxies, and ensure it never acquires a nuclear weapon.” These objectives, Trump said, were nearly complete and he expected to finish the job “very fast”.
For the US president, the key marker of the success or otherwise of this foreign policy gambit will come in November’s midterm elections. So his strategic decisions are likely to be heavily influenced by the need to be able to claim victory, while also limiting any negative outcomes from the energy price shock engulfing the world. To do this, he must declare victory fairly soon.
But Trump’s partner in the war, Israel’s prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu, has a markedly different set of strategic priorities (although electoral politics will also play a big part in his thinking).
Launching Israel’s air campaign on February 28, Netanyahu said the goal was to “put an end to the threat from the Ayatollah regime in Iran”. He framed this as having been an existential threat to Israel for all of the 47 years that the Islamic Republic had been in existence, insisting that regime change was “not the objective, but … could certainly be the result”.
In the five weeks of the conflict, Israel’s strategic goals have both widened and lengthened. In Iran, while clearly working in partnership with the US, it wants to reserve the right, unilaterally, to “go back and hit Iran every time the nuclear and missile programmes are being rebuilt”.
Meanwhile, Israel has responded to attacks from Hezbollah forces in Lebanon by occupying the southern part of the country up to the Litani river. This area was designated by UN security council resolution 1701 in 2006 as a buffer zone in which only the Lebanese national army and UN peacekeepers were authorised to operate.
The Israeli defence minister, Israel Katz, has warned that Lebanese citizens who had fled would not be allowed to return “until the safety and security of northern Israeli residents is ensured”.
It appears that Israel plans a long-term occupation of the region. It already maintains a buffer zone in southern Syria, which it occupied after the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December 2024. This, it says, is also to deter Hezbollah attacks on northern Israel.
Netanyahu’s war aims
The focus of Netanyahu’s security policy has consistently been directed at Iran and its proxies. My research with Amnon Aran has demonstrated that in perpetuating an “Iran-as-evil” framing, the Israeli prime minister effectively precluded any possibility of engaging with the regime diplomatically.
Netanyahu’s political worldview has been enormously influenced by the founder of Revisionist Zionism, Ze’ev Jabotinsky. Under Jabotinsky’s “Iron Wall doctrine”, reinforcing the might of Israel is the only responsible response to the threat posed by Iran and its proxies. It is a strategy of strength first, diplomacy second.
In the past, Netanyahu has talked of defeating Israel’s enemies as his “supreme objective”. But more recently, analysts are describing what they refer to as the “Netanyahu doctrine”. According to this security stance, Israel must be prepared to launch “pre-emptive” attacks against any perceived threats, maintaining a permanent readiness for war.
Why Benjamin Netanyahu needs the Iran conflict to continue
The Israeli prime minister’s chances of re-election are likely to hang on the outcomes of the war against Iran.
theconversation.com

