The Israeli government also made clear its disdain for Hamas. Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu
ripped up Hamas’s revised charter in front of the camera,
advocated for the defunding of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA), and
gave a platform to far-right ideologues such as Bezalel Smotrich. This lack of incentives for moderation probably increased the attraction of a large-scale attack. This reality was reflected in Hamas official Basem Naim’s
interview after the October 7 attack, where he stated “We knew there was going to be a violent reaction. . . . But we didn’t choose this road while having other options. We have no options.”
Hamas leaders may have believed they were losing popular support in Gaza. Since the implementation of a semipermanent siege on Gaza in 2007, Israel has controlled much of the electricity, food, and water to the enclave. Gaza has
spent half of its day without power since 2019, with a sustained gap in electricity supply. Gaza has also
suffered from chronic water shortages, with its outdated or destroyed water infrastructure, 97 percent of the water in Gazan homes is unfit to drink. The economic situation is equally dire, with over 70 percent of families in Gaza
dependent on NGO and international aid for their basic needs. Unable to guarantee basic necessities for its citizens, let alone
dent the consistent 45 percent unemployment rate in Gaza, Hamas lacks ability to maintain its popular support through government services and improved quality of life.
On the other side of Hamas’s claims to legitimacy, the presence of groups like the Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Gaza, which continue the fight, raised the question Hamas’s credibility as an Islamist resistance organization. With
dropping public support, and without a path to improve or maintain their image in Gaza through governance, Hamas instead attempted to amplify its revolutionary credentials, both among Palestinians and globally, by carrying out a large-scale attack.
Hamas probably hoped to exploit Israel’s response to increase its popularity. Khaled Mashal, one of its political leaders,
noted, “We know very well the consequences of our operation on October 7 . . . No nation is liberated without sacrifices.” Another Hamas leader
noted two weeks after the attacks, “We are called a nation of martyrs, and we are proud to sacrifice martyrs.”
Using a state’s heavy-handed response against it is a classic insurgent tactic:
many Gazans might not like Hamas, but when confronted with a choice between supporting the group or endorsing Israeli military operations, they will rally to its cause. Hamas in the past has shown its willingness to have Gazans suffer to advance its interests, and it colocates its military assets next to hospitals, schools, and mosques, including placing a command node under one of Gaza’s biggest hospitals,
according to a U.S. official. When civilian infrastructure is destroyed and thousands of Gazans killed, Hamas’s resulting message is one of Israeli barbarity, not its own culpability.
If Hamas increased its own credibility, it also undermined that of its rival, the Palestinian Authority (PA), which rules on the West Bank. The PA leader, Mahmoud Abbas, has long favored negotiation and cooperation with Israel, a
position already strained before October 7 but now even more discredited as Palestinians view the devastating Israeli response. This bolsters Hamas’s claim to be the leader of the Palestinian national movement not just in Gaza but also in the West Bank and among the Palestinian diaspora. Indeed, Abbas is an 88-year old chain smoker in
poor health, and
his succession may be contested: there is no clear replacement. Hamas is bolstering its credentials at a time when rival leaders are in disarray.
Hamas also seeks to change the regional environment, as does its sponsor Iran.
Tehran funds, arms, and trains Hamas, although Iran’s responsibility for the specifics of October 7 are unclear. Before the attacks, the region was abuzz with the possibility of an Israeli-Saudi normalization, and Iran’s support for the Syrian regime’s brutalization of its own people had discredited it among many Arabs. Now normalization is off the table, perhaps for good, and the region is focusing on Israel, not on the Syrian civil war. Instead of Iran being isolated in the Arab world, Arab publics at least admire its firm stance against Israel and support for Palestinian resistance. For both Hamas and Iran, having the focus be on Israeli attacks on Palestinians, not on the Syrian civil war or Israeli normalization, is a win for their cause.
Will Hamas achieve its objectives? The regional discourse has already changed in the group’s favor, and for now its credibility is restored among many Palestinians. Hamas, however, has rolled the dice. Israeli operations, both present and future, are a threat to the group’s leadership and control of Gaza. And even if Hamas proves successful, the Palestinian people are paying a massive price.
Daniel Byman is a senior fellow with the Transnational Threats Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C., and a professor at Georgetown University. Mackenzie Holtz is a former intern with the International Security Program at CSIS.