inflation propaganda exposed

"Proof"

It is proof that some people who lack an education really will get sucked into some crazy ass conspiracy theories. You would have had to failed out of econ 100 to believe this guy. Or worse, never taken econ 100...
 
Some of the problems:

1 - He cherry picks his items, ignoring ones that have gone down in price, and looking primarily at things that have gone up -- which is why his cherry picked "basket" is mostly food items and things which have gone up, while omitting electronics and other things that have gone down

2 - He fails to factor in the increase in value and looks only at headline prices--in the case of cars in particular this is disturbingly fraudulent, as it fails to account for the improvements in quality in what you buy, in other words a new car in 2012 is a significantly better car than in 1972, but his inflation calculation fails to account this

3 - He talks about newspapers, totally ignoring the deflationary effect of people switching to online news sources, which again--is academic fraud, as I am sure he knows better, and again--cherry picks his items

4 - He mixes up the cost of healthcare with insurance premiums, which are not the same thing -- as he probably knows this, more FRAUD

5 - He brings up the big lie that the CPI calculation is what the "government wants", when in fact the methodology is mechanical and transparent and can be re-calculated by anyone who wants to calculate it

I stopped at the 10 minute mark, he is too obviously just lying through his teeth in an effort to mislead uneducated suckers who will believe any conspiracy theory that is spouted off by an angry windbag.

God its' like shooting fish in a barrel spotting the fraud here. msog, you really need to get yourself an education so that you aren't suckered by these charlatans so easily.
 
Some of the problems:

1 - He cherry picks his items, ignoring ones that have gone down in price, and looking primarily at things that have gone up -- which is why his cherry picked "basket" is mostly food items and things which have gone up, while omitting electronics and other things that have gone down

2 - He fails to factor in the increase in value and looks only at headline prices--in the case of cars in particular this is disturbingly fraudulent, as it fails to account for the improvements in quality in what you buy, in other words a new car in 2012 is a significantly better car than in 1972, but his inflation calculation fails to account this

3 - He talks about newspapers, totally ignoring the deflationary effect of people switching to online news sources, which again--is academic fraud, as I am sure he knows better, and again--cherry picks his items

4 - He mixes up the cost of healthcare with insurance premiums, which are not the same thing -- as he probably knows this, more FRAUD

5 - He brings up the big lie that the CPI calculation is what the "government wants", when in fact the methodology is mechanical and transparent and can be re-calculated by anyone who wants to calculate it

I stopped at the 10 minute mark, he is too obviously just lying through his teeth in an effort to mislead uneducated suckers who will believe any conspiracy theory that is spouted off by an angry windbag.

God its' like shooting fish in a barrel spotting the fraud here. msog, you really need to get yourself an education so that you aren't suckered by these charlatans so easily.

#1. Everyone has to buy food and eat. Not everyone needs new electronics. Your perception is warped, as usual.
#4. Healthcare and insurance are inter connected. Since OHIP has cut back on so many services over the last few years, people have had to resort to private insurance which costs a fortune and which many can simply not afford. Therefore they're not getting what they need.
 
#1. Everyone has to buy food and eat. Not everyone needs new electronics. Your perception is warped, as usual.
#4. Healthcare and insurance are inter connected. Since OHIP has cut back on so many services over the last few years, people have had to resort to private insurance which costs a fortune and which many can simply not afford. Therefore they're not getting what they need.

However inflation is calculated on typical spending, not only on the small subset of typical spending that is necessary.

If you spend 30% of your income on food and 70% of your income on all else, if all prices go down 1% but food goes up 2%, you can afford more food than in the past. That is because your biggest expenses for cheaper leaving more for food.

So you must look at total spending not only necessities.

As for health sure they are connected, but he is still wrong about inflation.
 
https://mises.org/daily/6294/Inflation

Inflation


If the supply of caviar were as plentiful as the supply of potatoes, the price of caviar — that is, the exchange ratio between caviar and money or caviar and other commodities — would change considerably. In that case, one could obtain caviar at a much smaller sacrifice than is required today. Likewise, if the quantity of money is increased, the purchasing power of the monetary unit decreases, and the quantity of goods that can be obtained for one unit of this money decreases also.

When, in the 16th century, American resources of gold and silver were discovered and exploited, enormous quantities of the precious metals were transported to Europe. The result of this increase in the quantity of money was a general tendency toward an upward movement of prices in Europe. In the same way, today, when a government increases the quantity of paper money, the result is that the purchasing power of the monetary unit begins to drop, and so prices rise. This is called inflation.

Unfortunately, in the United States, as well as in other countries, some people prefer to attribute the cause of inflation not to an increase in the quantity of money but, rather, to the rise in prices.

However, there has never been any serious argument against the economic interpretation of the relationship between prices and the quantity of money, or the exchange ratio between money and other goods, commodities, and services. Under present-day technological conditions there is nothing easier than to manufacture pieces of paper upon which certain monetary amounts are printed. In the United States, where all the notes are of the same size, it does not cost the government more to print a bill of a thousand dollars than it does to print a bill of one dollar. It is purely a printing procedure that requires the same quantity of paper and ink.

In the 18th century, when the first attempts were made to issue bank notes and to give these bank notes the quality of legal tender — that is, the right to be honored in exchange transactions in the same way that gold and silver pieces were honored — the governments and nations believed that bankers had some secret knowledge enabling them to produce wealth out of nothing. When the governments of the 18th century were in financial difficulties, they thought all they needed was a clever banker at the head of their financial management in order to get rid of all their difficulties.

Some years before the French Revolution, when the royalty of France was in financial trouble, the king of France sought out such a clever banker, and appointed him to a high position. This man was, in every regard, the opposite of the people who, up to that time, had ruled France. First of all he was not a Frenchman, he was a foreigner — a Swiss from Geneva, Jacques Necker. Secondly, he was not a member of the aristocracy, he was a simple commoner. And, what counted even more in 18th-century France, he was not a Catholic but a Protestant. And so Monsieur Necker, the father of the famous Madame de Staël, became the minister of finance, and everyone expected him to solve the financial problems of France. But in spite of the high degree of confidence Monsieur Necker enjoyed, the royal cashbox remained empty — Necker's greatest mistake having been his attempt to finance aid to the American colonists in their war of independence against England without raising taxes. That was certainly the wrong way to go about solving France's financial troubles.

There can be no secret way to the solution of the financial problems of a government; if it needs money, it has to obtain the money by taxing its citizens (or, under special conditions, by borrowing it from people who have the money). But many governments, we can even say most governments, think there is another method for getting the needed money; simply to print it.

If the government wants to do something beneficial — if, for example, it wants to build a hospital — the way to find the needed money for this project is to tax the citizens and build the hospital out of tax revenues. Then no special "price revolution" will occur, because when the government collects money for the construction of the hospital, the citizens — having paid the taxes — are forced to reduce their spending. The individual taxpayer is forced to restrict either his consumption, his investments, or his savings. The government, appearing on the market as a buyer, replaces the individual citizen: the citizen buys less, but the government buys more. The government, of course, does not always buy the same goods which the citizens would have bought; but on the average there occurs no rise in prices due to the government's construction of a hospital.

I choose this example of a hospital precisely because people sometimes say, "It makes a difference whether the government uses its money for good or for bad purposes." I want to assume that the government always uses the money which it has printed for the best possible purposes — purposes with which we all agree. For it is not the way in which the money is spent, it is the way in which the government obtains this money that brings about those consequences we call inflation and which most people in the world today do not consider as beneficial.

For example, without inflating, the government could use the tax-collected money for hiring new employees or for raising the salaries of those who are already in government service. Then these people, whose salaries have been increased, are in a position to buy more. When the government taxes the citizens and uses this money to increase the salaries of government employees, the taxpayers have less to spend, but the government employees have more. Prices in general will not increase.

But if the government does not use tax money for this purpose, if it uses freshly printed money instead, it means that there will be people who now have more money while all other people still have as much as they had before. So those who received the newly printed money will be competing with those people who were buyers before. And since there are no more commodities than there were previously, but there is more money on the market — and since there are now people who can buy more today than they could have bought yesterday — there will be an additional demand for that same quantity of goods. Therefore prices will tend to go up. This cannot be avoided, no matter what the use of this newly issued money will be.

And more importantly, this tendency for prices to go up will develop step by step; it is not a general upward movement of what has been called the "price level." The metaphorical expression "price level" must never be used.

When people talk of a "price level," they have in mind the image of a level of a liquid which goes up or down according to the increase or decrease in its quantity, but which, like a liquid in a tank, always rises evenly. But with prices, there is no such thing as a "level." Prices do not change to the same extent at the same time. There are always prices that are changing more rapidly, rising or falling more rapidly than other prices. There is a reason for this.

Consider the case of the government employee who received the new money added to the money supply. People do not buy today precisely the same commodities and in the same quantities as they did yesterday. The additional money which the government has printed and introduced into the market is not used for the purchase of all commodities and services. It is used for the purchase of certain commodities, the prices of which will rise, while other commodities will still remain at the prices that prevailed before the new money was put on the market. Therefore, when inflation starts, different groups within the population are affected by this inflation in different ways. Those groups who get the new money first gain a temporary benefit.

When the government inflates in order to wage a war, it has to buy munitions, and the first to get the additional money are the munitions industries and the workers within these industries. These groups are now in a very favorable position. They have higher profits and higher wages; their business is moving. Why? Because they were the first to receive the additional money. And having now more money at their disposal, they are buying. And they are buying from other people who are manufacturing and selling the commodities that these munitions makers want.

These other people form a second group. And this second group considers inflation to be very good for business. Why not? Isn't it wonderful to sell more? For example, the owner of a restaurant in the neighborhood of a munitions factory says, "It is really marvelous! The munitions workers have more money; there are many more of them now than before; they are all patronizing my restaurant; I am very happy about it." He does not see any reason to feel otherwise.

The situation is this: those people to whom the money comes first now have a higher income, and they can still buy many commodities and services at prices which correspond to the previous state of the market, to the condition that existed on the eve of inflation. Therefore, they are in a very favorable position. And thus inflation continues step by step, from one group of the population to another. And all those to whom the additional money comes at the early state of inflation are benefited because they are buying some things at prices still corresponding to the previous stage of the exchange ratio between money and commodities.

But there are other groups in the population to whom this additional money comes much, much later. These people are in an unfavorable position. Before the additional money comes to them they are forced to pay higher prices than they paid before for some — or for practically all — of the commodities they wanted to purchase, while their income has remained the same, or has not increased proportionately with prices.

Consider for instance a country like the United States during the Second World War; on the one hand, inflation at that time favored the munitions workers, the munitions industries, the manufacturers of guns, while on the other hand it worked against other groups of the population. And the ones who suffered the greatest disadvantages from inflation were the teachers and the ministers.

As you know, a minister is a very modest person who serves God and must not talk too much about money. Teachers, likewise, are dedicated persons who are supposed to think more about educating the young than about their salaries. Consequently, the teachers and ministers were among those who were most penalized by inflation, for the various schools and churches were the last to realize that they must raise salaries. When the church elders and the school corporations finally discovered that after all, one should also raise the salaries of those dedicated people, the earlier losses they had suffered still remained.

For a long time, they had to buy less than they did before, to cut down their consumption of better and more expensive foods, and to restrict their purchase of clothing — because prices had already adjusted upward, while their incomes, their salaries, had not yet been raised. (This situation has changed considerably today, at least for teachers.)
 
There is no dispute that the quantity of money is inherently related to inflation. However, what simpletons like Schiff fail to grasp is that "quantity of money" is a complicated thing, that is itself the subject of all sorts of economic forces.

The unwinding of debt is a major cause of deflation, as the process inherently reduces the supply of available money. When banks loan out money, they increase the money supply. ACME Bank loans Joe $100, and records an asset of $100 on its books. Joe now has $100 to spend, and ACME has a debt instrument worth $100 that it can sell or borrow against. If ACME weren't subject to banking controls, that would double the amount of money in the economy--$100 became $200. But in fact ACME is subject to controls, say a 10% capital reserve, and so it has given Joe $100 and now has $90 that it can still lend out, with $10 held back for reserves.

That lending process is inflationary, the more loans that are made, the larger the supply of money because those dollars start counting two, three, four times as part of the money supply.

When you have a financial crisis that causes a great unwinding of debt, when people begin to save, paying off their mortgages--or when their mortgages are forcibly paid off by foreclosure--then you have deflationary pressure in the economy. As debt is cancelled, the exact same inflationary process that created money uncreates it.

This is the main mechanism by which you get deflation in an economy. The D words all typically run together: Disinvestment causes deflation in a depression. So is printing money inflationary? Sure it is. But when you are confronted by large deflationary forces in the economy, as we are now, what is actually accomplished by that inflation is a staving off of deflation.

This is why Japan spent its "lost decade" with extremely inflationary monetary policy, but an interest rate that sat effectively at zero for year after year, and in fact, had a real return on government bonds that was negative all the while having a currency that actually deflated rather than inflated. It was caused by the great unwinding of debt that went along with the collapse of real estate prices in Tokyo--assets that people had borrowed heavily against ceased to exist, and people were forced to pay down and unwind debt positions, a process which took years, and which pumped a ton of deflation into the Japanese economy.

Idiots like Schiff try to sell advertising and make money by foisting these stupid conspiracy theories on people like msog, who lap it up due to their lack of formal economics education. In reality it's just a lot more complicated than hucksters like Schiff are willing to admit.
 
There are therefore always different groups in the population being affected differently by inflation. For some of them, inflation is not so bad; they even ask for a continuation of it because they are the first to profit from it. We will see, in the next lecture, how this unevenness in the consequences of inflation vitally affects the politics that lead toward inflation.

Under these changes brought about by inflation, we have groups who are favored and groups who are directly profiteering. I do not use the term "profiteering" as a reproach to these people, for if there is someone to blame, it is the government that established the inflation. And there are always people who favor inflation, because they realize what is going on sooner than other people do. Their special profits are due to the fact that there will necessarily be unevenness in the process of inflation.

The government may think that inflation — as a method of raising funds — is better than taxation, which is always unpopular and difficult. In many rich and great nations, legislators have often discussed, for months and months, the various forms of new taxes that were necessary because the parliament had decided to increase expenditures. Having discussed various methods of getting the money by taxation, they finally decided that perhaps it was better to do it by inflation.

But of course, the word "inflation" was not used. The politician in power who proceeds toward inflation does not announce, I am proceeding toward inflation." The technical methods employed to achieve the inflation are so complicated that the average citizen does not realize inflation has begun.

One of the biggest inflations in history was in the German Reich after the First World War. The inflation was not so momentous during the war; it was the inflation after the war that brought about the catastrophe. The government did not say, "We are proceeding toward inflation." The government simply borrowed money very indirectly from the central bank. The government did not have to ask how the central bank would find and deliver the money. The central bank simply printed it.

Today the techniques for inflation are complicated by the fact that there is checkbook money. It involves another technique, but the result is the same. With the stroke of a pen, the government creates fiat money, thus increasing the quantity of money and credit. The government simply issues the order, and the fiat money is there.

The government does not care, at first, that some people will be losers, it does not care that prices will go up. The legislators say, "This is a wonderful system!" But this wonderful system has one fundamental weakness: it cannot last. If inflation could go on forever, there would be no point in telling governments they should not inflate. But the certain fact about inflation is that, sooner or later, it must come to an end. It is a policy that cannot last.

In the long run, inflation comes to an end with the breakdown of the currency; it comes to a catastrophe, to a situation like the one in Germany in 1923. On August 1, 1914, the value of the dollar was four marks and twenty pfennigs. Nine years and three months later, in November 1923, the dollar was pegged at 4.2 trillion marks. In other words, the mark was worth nothing. It no longer had any value.

Some years ago, a famous author, John Maynard Keynes, wrote, "In the long run we are all dead." This is certainly true, I am sorry to say. But the question is, how short or long will the short run be? In the 18th century there was a famous lady, Madame de Pompadour, who is credited with the dictum "Après nous le déluge" ("After us will come the flood"). Madame de Pompadour was happy enough to die in the short run. But her successor in office, Madame du Barry, outlived the short run and was beheaded in the long run. For many people the "long run" quickly becomes the "short run" — and the longer inflation goes on the sooner the "short run."

How long can the short run last? How long can a central bank continue an inflation? Probably as long as people are convinced that the government, sooner or later, but certainly not too late, will stop printing money and thereby stop decreasing the value of each unit of money.

When people no longer believe this, when they realize that the government will go on and on without any intention of stopping, then they begin to understand that prices tomorrow will be higher than they are today. Then they begin buying at any price, causing prices to go up to such heights that the monetary system breaks down.

I refer to the case of Germany, which the whole world was watching. Many books have described the events of that time. (Although I am not a German, but an Austrian, I saw everything from the inside: in Austria, conditions were not very different from those in Germany; nor were they much different in many other European countries.) For several years, the German people believed that their inflation was just a temporary affair, that it would soon come to an end. They believed it for almost nine years, until the summer of 1923. Then, finally, they began to doubt. As the inflation continued, people thought it wiser to buy anything available, instead of keeping money in their pockets. Furthermore, they reasoned that one should not give loans of money, but on the contrary, that it was a very good idea to be a debtor. Thus inflation continued feeding on itself.

And it went on in Germany until exactly November 20, 1923. The masses had believed inflation money to be real money, but then they found out that conditions had changed. At the end of the German inflation, in the fall of 1923, the German factories paid their workers every morning in advance for the day. And the workingman who came to the factory with his wife, handed his wages — all the millions he got — over to her immediately. And the lady immediately went to a shop to buy something, no matter what. She realized what most people knew at that time — that overnight, from one day to another, the mark lost 50% of its purchasing power. Money, like chocolate in a hot oven, was melting in the pockets of the people. This last phase of German inflation did not last long; after a few days, the whole nightmare was over: the mark was valueless and a new currency had to be established.

Lord Keynes, the same man who said that in the long run we are all dead, was one of a long line of inflationist authors of the 20th century. They all wrote against the gold standard. When Keynes attacked the gold standard, he called it a "barbarous relic." And most people today consider it ridiculous to speak of a return to the gold standard. In the United States, for instance, you are considered to be more or less a dreamer if you say, "Sooner or later, the United States will have to return to the gold standard."

Yet the gold standard has one tremendous virtue: the quantity of money under the gold standard is independent of the policies of governments and political parties. This is its advantage. It is a form of protection against spendthrift governments. If, under the gold standard, a government is asked to spend money for something new, the minister of finance can say, "And where do I get the money? Tell me, first, how I will find the money for this additional expenditure."

Under an inflationary system, nothing is simpler for the politicians to do than to order the government printing office to provide as much money as they need for their projects. Under a gold standard, sound government has a much better chance; its leaders can say to the people and to the politicians, "We can't do it unless we increase taxes."

But under inflationary conditions, people acquire the habit of looking upon the government as an institution with limitless means at its disposal: the state, the government, can do anything. If, for instance, the nation wants a new highway system, the government is expected to build it. But where will the government get the money?

One could say that in the United States today — and even in the past, under McKinley — the Republican Party was more or less in favor of sound money and of the gold standard, and the Democratic Party was in favor of inflation, of course not a paper inflation, but a silver inflation.

It was, however, a Democratic president of the United States, President Cleveland, who at the end of the 1880s vetoed a decision of Congress, to give a small sum — about $10,000 — to help a community that had suffered some disaster. And President Cleveland justified his veto by writing: "While it is the duty of the citizens to support the government, it is not the duty of the government to support the citizens." This is something which every statesman should write on the wall of his office to show to people who come asking for money.

I am rather embarrassed by the necessity to simplify these problems. There are so many complex problems in the monetary system, and I would not have written volumes about them if they were as simple as I am describing them here. But the fundamentals are precisely these: if you increase the quantity of money, you bring about the lowering of the purchasing power of the monetary unit. This is what people whose private affairs are unfavorably affected do not like. People who do not benefit from inflation are the ones who complain.
 
If inflation is bad and if people realize it, why has it become almost a way of life in all countries? Even some of the richest countries suffer from this disease. The United States today is certainly the richest country in the world, with the highest standard of living. But when you travel in the United States, you will discover that there is constant talk about inflation and about the necessity to stop it. But they only talk; they do not act.

To give you some facts: after the First World War, Great Britain returned to the prewar gold parity of the pound. That is, it revalued the pound upward. This increased the purchasing power of every worker's wages. In an unhampered market the nominal money wage would have fallen to compensate for this and the workers' real wage would not have suffered. We do not have time here to discuss the reasons for this. But the unions in Great Britain were unwilling to accept an adjustment of money wage rates downward as the purchasing power of the monetary unit rose. Therefore real wages were raised considerably by this monetary measure. This was a serious catastrophe for England, because Great Britain is a predominantly industrial country that has to import its raw materials, half-finished goods, and food stuffs in order to live, and has to export manufactured goods to pay for these imports. With the rise in the international value of the pound, the price of British goods rose on foreign markets and sales and exports declined. Great Britain had, in effect, priced itself out of the world market.

The unions could not be defeated. You know the power of a union today. It has the right, practically the privilege, to resort to violence. And a union order is, therefore, let us say, not less important than a government decree. The government decree is an order for the enforcement of which the enforcement apparatus of the government — the police — is ready. You must obey the government decree, otherwise you will have difficulties with the police.

Unfortunately, we have now, in almost all countries all over the world, a second power that is in a position to exercise force: the labor unions. The labor unions determine wages and then strike to enforce them in the same way in which the government might decree a minimum wage rate. I will not discuss the union question now; I shall deal with it later. I only want to establish that it is the union policy to raise wage rates above the level they would have on an unhampered market. As a result a considerable part of the potential labor force can be employed only by people or industries that are prepared to suffer losses. And, since businesses are not able to keep on suffering losses, they close their doors and people become unemployed. The setting of wage rates above the level they would have on the unhampered market always results in the unemployment of a considerable part of the potential labor force.

In Great Britain, the result of high wage rates enforced by the labor unions was lasting unemployment, prolonged year after year. Millions of workers were unemployed, production figures dropped. Even experts were perplexed. In this situation the British government made a move which it considered an indispensable, emergency measure: it devalued its currency.

The result was that the purchasing power of the money wages, upon which the unions had insisted, was no longer the same. The real wages, the commodity wages, were reduced. Now the worker could not buy as much as he had been able to buy before, even though the nominal wage rates remained the same. In this way, it was thought, real wage rates would return to free market levels and unemployment would disappear.

This measure — devaluation — was adopted by various other countries, by France, the Netherlands, and Belgium. One country even resorted twice to this measure within a period of one year and a half. That country was Czechoslovakia. It was a surreptitious method, let us say, to thwart the power of the unions. You could not call it a real success, however.

After a few years, the people, the workers, even the unions, began to understand what was going on. They came to realize that currency devaluation had reduced their real wages. The unions had the power to oppose this. In many countries they inserted a clause into wage contracts providing that money wages must go up automatically with an increase in prices. This is called indexing. The unions became index conscious. So, this method of reducing unemployment that the government of Great Britain started in 1931 — which was later adopted by almost all important governments — this method of "solving unemployment" no longer works today.

In 1936, in his General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, Lord Keynes unfortunately elevated this method — the emergency measures of the period between 1929 and 1933 — to a principle, to a fundamental system of policy. And he justified it by saying, in effect, "Unemployment is bad. If you want unemployment to disappear you must inflate the currency."

He realized very well that wage rates can be too high for the market, that is, too high to make it profitable for an employer to increase his work force, thus too high from the point of view of the total working population, for with wage rates imposed by unions above the market only a part of those anxious to earn wages can obtain jobs.

And Keynes said, in effect, "Certainly mass unemployment prolonged year after year, is a very unsatisfactory condition." But instead of suggesting that wage rates could and should be adjusted to market conditions, he said, in effect, "If one devalues the currency and the workers are not clever enough to realize it, they will not offer resistance against a drop in real wage rates, as long as nominal wage rates remain the same." In other words, Lord Keynes was saying that if a man gets the same amount of sterling today as he got before the currency was devalued, he will not realize that he is, in fact, now getting less.

In old fashioned language, Keynes proposed cheating the workers. Instead of declaring openly that wage rates must be adjusted to the conditions of the market — because, if they are not, a part of the labor force will inevitably remain unemployed — he said, in effect, "Full employment can be reached only if you have inflation. Cheat the workers." The most interesting fact, however, is that when his General Theory was published, it was no longer possible to cheat, because people had already become index conscious. But the goal of full employment remained.

What does "full employment" mean? It has to do with the unhampered labor market, which is not manipulated by the unions or by the government. On this market, wage rates for every type of labor tend to reach a point at which everybody who wants a job can get one and every employer can hire as many workers as he needs. If there is an increase in the demand for labor, the wage rate will tend to be greater, and if fewer workers are needed, the wage rate will tend to fall.

The only method by which a "full employment" situation can be brought about is by the maintenance of an unhampered labor market. This is valid for every kind of labor and for every kind of commodity.

What does a businessman do who wants to sell a commodity for five dollars a unit? When he cannot sell it at that price, the technical business expression in the United States is, "the inventory does not move." But it must move. He cannot retain things because he must buy something new; fashions are changing. So he sells at a lower price. If he cannot sell the merchandise at five dollars, he must sell it at four. If he cannot sell it at four, he must sell it at three. There is no other choice as long as he stays in business. He may suffer losses, but these losses are due to the fact that his anticipation of the market for his product was wrong.

It is the same with the thousands and thousands of young people who come every day from the agricultural districts into the city trying to earn money. It happens so in every industrial nation. In the United States they come to town with the idea that they should get, say, $100 a week. This may be impossible. So if a man cannot get a job for $100 a week, he must try to get a job for $90 or $80, and perhaps even less. But if he were to say — as the unions do — "$100 a week or nothing," then he might have to remain unemployed. (Many do not mind being unemployed, because the government pays unemployment benefits — out of special taxes levied on the employers — which are sometimes nearly as high as the wages the man would receive if he were employed.)

Because a certain group of people believes that full employment can be attained only by inflation, inflation is accepted in the United States. But people are discussing the question, Should we have a sound currency with unemployment, or inflation with full employment? This is in fact a very vicious analysis.

To deal with this problem we must raise the question, How can one improve the condition of the workers and of all other groups of the population? The answer is, by maintaining an unhampered labor market and thus achieving full employment. Our dilemma is, shall the market determine wage rates or shall they be determined by union pressure and compulsion? The dilemma is not "shall we have inflation or unemployment?"

This mistaken analysis of the problem is argued in England, in European industrial countries and even in the United States. And some people say, "Now look, even the United States is inflating. Why should we not do it also."

To these people one should answer first of all, "One of the privileges of a rich man is that he can afford to be foolish much longer than a poor man." And this is the situation of the United States. The financial policy of the United States is very bad and is getting worse. Perhaps the United States can afford to be foolish a bit longer than some other countries.


The most important thing to remember is that inflation is not an act of God; inflation is not a catastrophe of the elements or a disease that comes like the plague. Inflation is a policy — a deliberate policy of people who resort to inflation because they consider it to be a lesser evil than unemployment. But the fact is that, in the not very long run, inflation does not cure unemployment.

Inflation is a policy. And a policy can be changed. Therefore, there is no reason to give in to inflation. If one regards inflation as an evil, then one has to stop inflating. One has to balance the budget of the government. Of course, public opinion must support this; the intellectuals must help the people to understand. Given the support of public opinion, it is certainly possible for the people's elected representatives to abandon the policy of inflation.

We must remember that, in the long run, we may all be dead and certainly will be dead. But we should arrange our earthly affairs, for the short run in which we have to live, in the best possible way. And one of the measures necessary for this purpose is to abandon inflationary policies.

Ludwig von Mises was the acknowledged leader of the Austrian School of economic thought, a prodigious originator in economic theory, and a prolific author. Mises's writings and lectures encompassed economic theory, history, epistemology, government, and political philosophy. His contributions to economic theory include important clarifications on the quantity theory of money, the theory of the trade cycle, the integration of monetary theory with economic theory in general, and a demonstration that socialism must fail because it cannot solve the problem of economic calculation. Mises was the first scholar to recognize that economics is part of a larger science in human action, a science that Mises called "praxeology." See Ludwig von Mises's article archives.
 
https://mises.org/daily/6294/Inflation

Inflation


If the supply of caviar were as plentiful as the supply of potatoes, the price of caviar — that is, the exchange ratio between caviar and money or caviar and other commodities — would change considerably. In that case, one could obtain caviar at a much smaller sacrifice than is required today. Likewise, if the quantity of money is increased, the purchasing power of the monetary unit decreases, and the quantity of goods that can be obtained for one unit of this money decreases also.

When, in the 16th century, American resources of gold and silver were discovered and exploited, enormous quantities of the precious metals were transported to Europe. The result of this increase in the quantity of money was a general tendency toward an upward movement of prices in Europe. In the same way, today, when a government increases the quantity of paper money, the result is that the purchasing power of the monetary unit begins to drop, and so prices rise. This is called inflation............


.........
For a long time, they had to buy less than they did before, to cut down their consumption of better and more expensive foods, and to restrict their purchase of clothing — because prices had already adjusted upward, while their incomes, their salaries, had not yet been raised. (This situation has changed considerably today, at least for teachers.)

Most stuff coming out of that "Austrian Economics institute is fanciful. Could you save some of us a little time and actually summarize this 3 page C&P.
 
Sorry, I posted the whole article. I'll try to simplify and summarize future posts (so Fuji might have a chance to understand) lol

Your article isn't very relevant to the modern environment as it fails to deal with the deflationary impact of debt unwinding, which is typically what happens in the aftermath of a real estate bubble collapse.

See post #7.
 
Sorry, I posted the whole article. I'll try to simplify and summarize future posts (so Fuji might have a chance to understand) lol

Here is a good starting point for anyone interested in learning about economics, liberty and individual freedom.

http://library.mises.org/books/Henry Hazlitt/Economics in One Lesson.pdf

83 pages from the Mises Instutite is not much of a summary.

As said earlier the minions who support the Mises are very few, certainly not mainstream, and have often have their weak theories exposed when put under the microscope, even in past threads.
 
Your article isn't very relevant to the modern environment as it fails to deal with the deflationary impact of debt unwinding, which is typically what happens in the aftermath of a real estate bubble collapse.

See post #7.

Nonsense, if you have read any Mises, you certainly don't understand his analysis.

How Deflationary Forces Will Be Turned into Inflation


I.

The ongoing financial and economic crisis has not only stoked fears that it will end in inflation — as central banks will print up ever-greater amounts of money — but it has also given rise to a diametrically opposed concern: namely, that of deflation.

For instance, in December 2011 Christine Lagarde, head of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), warned that the world might risk sliding into a 1930s-style slump, such as the Great Depression.

This episode was characterized by worldwide defaulting banks, a shrinking of the money supply (or, deflation), which in turn led to falling prices across the board, sharply falling production and drastically rising unemployment.

In today's fiat-money regime — which contrasts with the gold-exchange-standard that was in place in many countries at that time — the possibility of deflation appears fairly small indeed.[1]

This becomes obvious if one takes a look at the workings of today's fiat-money system, a system in which the money supply can actually be increased at any point in time in any amount deemed politically desirable.

II.

Commercial banks need two ingredients to produce additional bank-circulation credit, through which the fiat-money supply is increased, namely, central-bank money and equity capital.

Central-bank money is a "monopoly product," produced by the central bank, typically through loaning to commercial banks.

Equity capital comes from investors who are willing to invest their money in commercial banks, thereby becoming owners of the banks.

Banks need central-bank money for three reasons. First, they have to hold a certain percentage of their liability vis-à-vis nonbanks in central-bank money; these are the so-called minimum reserves.

Second, banks need central-bank money for making payments in the interbank market. And third, banks keep central-bank money for meeting the cash drain, caused by clients demanding a cash payout of their deposits.

If, for instance, the minimum reserve rate for demand deposits is 2 percent, the banking sector as a whole can produce $50 of credit and fiat money with each $1 of central-bank money (that is 1 divided by 0.02).

Government regulation requires commercial banks to back up their "risky assets" (such as loans and securities) by a "minimum" equity capital. If, for instance, the minimum capital requirement is 8 percent, a bank can produce $12.50 of credit and money (that is 1 divided by 0.08) with a given $1 of equity capital.

If the risky weighting of risky assets is, say, 25 percent rather than 100 percent, a bank can produce credit and fiat money in the amount of $50 (that is $12.5 times 1 divided by 0.25). That said, a loss of $1 requires a bank to reduce its credit and money supply by $50.

Against this backdrop we find that the lower the minimum reserve ratio is, the more credit and fiat money the banking sector can produce with a given unit of central-bank money. And further, the lower the capital requirement and the risk weightings are, the higher will be the leverage banks can build up with a given amount of equity capital.

III.

From early 1960 up to the end of 2007, US banks' credit and money multipliers (which denote the amount of credit and money banks can produce with $1 in central-bank money) increased drastically — thanks to a continual rise in central-bank money, ever-lower reserve requirements, and readily available bank-equity capital.

For instance, with a central-bank money supply of $1, banks produced around $211 of bank credit in August 2008. This compares with less than $20 seen in the early 1960s.


In "fighting" the credit crisis, the US Federal Reserve increased US banks' (excess) reserves drastically as from late summer 2008. As banks did not use these funds (in full) to produce additional credit and fiat-money balances, however, the credit and money multipliers really collapsed.

The collapse of the multipliers conveys an important message: commercial banks are no longer willing or in a position to produce additional credit and fiat money in a way they did in the precrisis period.

This finding can be explained by three factors. First, banks' equity capital has become scarce due to losses (such as, for instance, write-offs and creditor defaults) incurred in the crisis.

Second, banks are no longer willing to keep high credit risks on their balance sheets. And third, banks' stock valuations have become fairly depressed, making raising additional equity a costly undertaking for the owners of the banks (in terms of the dilution effect).

For instance, in the euro area, bank stock prices fell by around 76 percent from the beginning of 2007 to the beginning of 2012 — unmistakably signaling investors' lack of confidence in the viability of many banks' business models. In the United States, bank stock price declines amounted to slightly more than 50 percent.


The latest developments suggest that banks are about (at least for now) to start scaling back their risky assets in relation to their prevailing capital base. In other words, banks are adopting a strategy of "deleveraging" and "derisking."

Such a strategy can be put into practice by, for instance, refraining from rolling-over maturing loans granted to, say, corporate, consumers, and public-sector entities — something that will in a fiat-money system result in a decline in the outstanding credit and fiat-money supply.

Alternatively, banks can reduce their risks by selling off assets so far recorded on their balance sheet. This would also reduce the outstanding money supply — as the buyers of bank assets would pay with existing demand deposits, which are thereby literally "destroyed."

Given that investors in bank capital become unwilling to expose their money to credit risks, let alone want to assume new credit risks, the fiat-money system, which has been highly inflationary in the last decades, would turn deflationary.

IV.

The chances for a full-fledged deflation (that is a decline in the money stock) are fairly small in a fiat-money system, however, first and foremost because deflation runs counter to vital interests of government and its close associates.

This group includes, for instance, those who are directly employed by government, receive business from government, and invest their lifetime savings in government bonds.

What is more, mainstream economists, who undeniably exert an important influence on public opinion, keep saying that deflation, because of its allegedly devastating economic and political costs, has to be avoided by all means.

The political incentive structure, combined with the antideflation economic mindset, really pave the way for implementing a policy of counteracting any shrinking of the fiat-money supply with all instruments available.

And the shrinking of the fiat-money supply can be prevented, by all means. For in a fiat-money regime the central bank can increase the money supply at any one time in any amount deemed politically desirable.

Even in the case in which the commercial banking sector keeps refraining from lending to the private sector and government, the central bank can increase the money supply through various measures.

By monetizing outstanding or newly issued debt, or by purchasing foreign currency, the outstanding money stock can be prevented from shrinking — "or by 'printing' money and somehow distributing it to the public as a transfer payment."[2]

In an effort to "fight" government and bank defaults, major central banks around the world have already started expanding their balance sheet. They purchase government bonds against issuing new central-bank money and provide commercial banks with any amount of central-bank money required to keep them afloat.


The fiat-money supply can presumably be increased most conveniently through a policy of monetizing outstanding as well as newly issued government debt — as there will be strong public support for keeping governments liquid.

Governments would then be the very apparatus through which the bulk of the new money trickles into the economy — which also means a drastic expansion of government's share in the economy at the expense of individual liberty.


However, in such an environment the money supply will most likely not only be prevented from shrinking but expanded even further — as increasing the money supply will most likely be seen as appropriate for lowering borrowers' real debt burden.

The growing influence of government over the money supply therefore runs the risk of causing even bigger misuse of the printing press going forward, a finding that has all too often been confirmed by government's meddling in monetary affairs.

However, any deflationary forces in the ongoing demise of the fiat-money system will most likely prove to be temporary in nature. In fact, the real threat is and remains high, even very high inflation.

Thorsten Polleit is chief economist of the precious-metals firm Degussa Goldhandel GmbH. He is also an honorary professor at the Frankfurt School of Finance & Management. He is an adjunct scholar of the Ludwig von Mises Institute and was awarded the 2012 O.P. Alford III Prize in Libertarian Scholarship. His website is www.Thorsten-Polleit.com. Send him mail. See Thorsten Polleit's article archives.

You can subscribe to future articles by Thorsten Polleit via this RSS feed.

Notes

[1] See in this context, for instance, Kemmerer, E. W. (1944), Gold and the Gold Standard, The Story of Gold Money, Past, Present and Future, 1st ed., McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., New York and London, esp. pp. 118; also Rothbard, M. N. (2008 [1963]), What Has Government Done To Our Money?, Ludwig von Mises Institute, Auburn, Alabama, esp. pp. 90.

[2] Johnson, K., Small, D. Tryon, R. (1999), "Monetary Policy and Price Stability," Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, International Finance Discussion Papers, Number 641, July, p. 29.
 
83 pages from the Mises Instutite is not much of a summary.

As said earlier the minions who support the Mises are very few, certainly not mainstream, and have often have their weak theories exposed when put under the microscope, even in past threads.

Actually, it is a book from Henry Hazzlit. If you had anything specific you would like to discuss, please feel free to bring it forward. The vast majority of the population is fundamentally ignorant with regards to economics or financial literacy in general, so I'm not sure what being part of being in the "mainstream" is attractive to you?
 
Did you even read your own post username999? It said that fiat currency regimes can fight deflation by printing money, in short. Which is what they are doing. Which is why we don't see inflation. He argues that it is hard to control exactly--sure--but there is no reason to think the CPI is wrong. There is some risk that we might see inflation in the future if they're too aggressive in fighting deflation and miss the target, for some of the reasons given.

At any rate it's clear it's a hell of a lot more complex than that simpleton Schiff makes out.
 
Actually, it is a book from Henry Hazzlit. If you had anything specific you would like to discuss, please feel free to bring it forward. The vast majority of the population is fundamentally ignorant with regards to economics or financial literacy in general, so I'm not sure what being part of being in the "mainstream" is attractive to you?

and Henry Hazzlit is an Austrian Economist, so my points still stands.

I'll let the full time economist on TERB discuss the fine points. Where's SOMEONE these days? Oh forgot, isn't he's in Japan these days?
 
Did you even read your own post username999? It said that fiat currency regimes can fight deflation by printing money, in short. Which is what they are doing. Which is why we don't see inflation. He argues that it is hard to control exactly--sure--but there is no reason to think the CPI is wrong. There is some risk that we might see inflation in the future if they're too aggressive in fighting deflation and miss the target, for some of the reasons given.

At any rate it's clear it's a hell of a lot more complex than that simpleton Schiff makes out.

I did not watch the video from the original post and am not familiar with Schiff but based on his wiki profile he does not appear to be an academic.

You seem to be in the camp of those that are fearful of deflation. That helps to understand your thought process.

In Defense of Deflation


The Obama stimulus and bailouts haven't decreased unemployment rates or bankruptcy filings while home prices and home sales have fallen and can't get up. PIMCO's Bill Gross told Bloomberg this can all be fixed with nearly zero interest rates and additional debt to stimulate the animal spirits of investors and entrepreneurs. The federal-funds rate has been pegged at 0 to .25% since December 16, 2008, and Uncle Sam's debt is $13.3 trillion and counting. If this hasn't goosed the animal spirits, what will?

The failure of central bankers to make things all better again by creating some money and lowering some interest rates has the financial press fretting about deflation and thinking the US economy is turning Japanese. James Bullard, who heads the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, came out with a paper entitled "Seven Faces of 'The Peril'." He concludes that the Federal Open Market Committee's (FOMC's) "extended period language may be increasing the probability of a Japanese-style outcome for the U.S." To avoid that outcome, Bullard argues that the Fed's most important tool is quantitative easing — printing money to buy government debt.

The Wall Street Journal's James B. Stewart claims deflation is bad because "deflation erodes profits and asset values," in his "Smartmoney" column.

People wait to buy expecting lower prices, reducing demand. Lower profits cause companies to cut expenses, including employees. It is a downward spiral that, if Japan's experience is any indication, is difficult to arrest.


Mr. Stewart is wrong on all counts. Profits are the difference between the price we sell a good for and the price it costs to produce that good. As Jörg Guido Hülsmann makes clear in his book Deflation & Liberty, "In a deflation, both sets of prices drop, and as a consequence for-profit production can go on."

And while asset values may drop, the assets don't go away. The real wealth of the nation — assets used for production — are still available to produce. However, it may be that because the debt is liquidated on those assets as prices fall, new owners will own and operate the assets, but commerce and production will certainly carry on.

Lower prices increase demand; they do not reduce or delay it. That's why more and more people own flat-screen TVs, cellular telephones, and laptop computers: the prices of these goods have fallen, and people with lower incomes can afford them. And there are more low-income people than high-income people.

Lower prices don't mean lower profits; nor do they mean that employees will be laid off. More demand for a good or service means more employees needed to produce those goods and services. "There is no reason why inflation should ever reduce rather than increase unemployment," Hülsmann writes.

People become unemployed or remain unemployed when they do not wish to work, or if they are forcibly prevented from working for the wage rate an employer is willing to pay. Inflation does not change this fact.

Hülsmann goes on to point out that only if workers underestimate the amount of money created by the central bank and therefore reduce their real wage-rate demands will unemployment be reduced. "All plans to reduce unemployment through inflation therefore boil down to fooling the workers — a childish strategy, to say the least."

Of course, Mr. Bullard over at the St. Louis Fed doesn't mention anything in his paper about individuals attaining their goals through subjective knowledge and pricing decisions. Instead he draws lots of lines on graphs and talks about Taylor-type policy rule, zero bound, the Fisher relation, "targeted" steady states, and lots of stuff that has nothing to do with economics.

So while the bond-buying Mr. Gross says zero rates will arouse the animal spirits in all of us, Mr. Bullard worries that "promising to remain at zero for a long time is a double-edged sword." Bullard writes that zero rates are "consistent with the idea that inflation and inflation expectations should rise in response to [that] promise." But in the same paragraph he continues,

But the policy is also consistent with the idea that inflation and inflation expectations will instead fall, and that the economy will settle in the neighborhood of the unintended steady state, as Japan has in recent years.

Wow, no wonder Keynesian central banking is so hard. You're damned if you cut rates and damned if you don't. "I moved the line on the graph. Let's see some animal spirits for crying out loud!"


In the real world, banks aren't lending because, as Murray Rothbard points out in America's Great Depression, if rates are too low, bankers have no incentive to lend, especially in a risky economic environment. Also, as Professor Jeffrey Herbener wrote in the Asian Wall Street Journal, "with distressed banks, reflation fails to induce another bank credit expansion."

Keynesians have mistaken the impotency of the Bank of Japan to restart credit expansion in the 1990s as a liquidity trap. But the problem is not that interest rates are so low everyone expects them to rise and therefore hoards cash. Banks refuse to lend because of the overhang of bad debt. Any cash infusion is held as reserve against it. Businesses refuse to borrow because of their debt burden, built up to expand capacity during the boom, and their over-capacity resulting from their malinvestments.

Japan has tried every stimulus trick in the book — in addition to holding rates at zero — and still its economy has been in a funk for two decades. But firing a worker in Japan is virtually forbidden and don't get the idea that consumer prices have fallen through the floor. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), last year saw the biggest drop in consumer prices at 1.13%, after prices rose 1.4% the year before. The chart of Japan's inflation rate is essentially flat. Not exactly the deadly deflationary spiral it's made out to be.

Hülsmann explains that the Japanese government hasn't allowed deflation to heal their economy, with "the only result of this policy [being] to give a zombie life to the hopelessly bureaucratic and bankrupt conglomerates that control Japanese industry, banking and politics."

As for Bullard's quantitative-easing (QE) idea, the Bank of Japan has done plenty of it, buying not only government bonds but corporate debt and stocks as well. Bullard's colleagues over at the San Francisco Fed have studied whether it worked. In a 2006 report, Vice President Mark M. Spiegel wrote that QE lowered long-term interest rates and "there appears to be evidence that the program aided weaker Japanese banks and generally encouraged greater risk-tolerance in the Japanese financial system."

Spiegel concluded, "In strengthening the performance of the weakest Japanese banks, quantitative easing may have had the undesired impact of delaying structural reform."


"Deflation is one of the great scarecrows of present day economic policy and monetary policy in particular," Hülsmann told his Economics of Deflation class at this year's Mises University. It seems a nation will destroy its finances battling the nonthreat. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) says the Bank of Japan "needs to keep interest rates close to zero and continue its asset-purchase program until there is a 'definitive' end to deflation," Bloomberg reports. But in the same report the OECD worried that the Bank of Japan's ability to stimulate would be curtailed by Japan's public-debt-to-GDP ratio approaching 200%.

Sounds like the folks at the OECD, like Mr. Bullard, can't make up their minds. What Austrians know for sure is that, as Professor Hülsmann makes clear, "the dangers of deflation are chimerical, but its charms are very real." Inflation, on the other hand, only helps those who are massively indebted and inefficient — governments.

Douglas French is president of the Mises Institute and author of Early Speculative Bubbles & Increases in the Money Supply and Walk Away: The Rise and Fall of the Home-Ownership Myth. He received his master's degree in economics from the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, under Murray Rothbard with Professor Hans-Hermann Hoppe serving on his thesis committee. French teaches in the Mises Academy. See his tribute to Murray Rothbard. Send him mail. See Doug French's article archives.

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"Proof"

It is proof that some people who lack an education really will get sucked into some crazy ass conspiracy theories. You would have had to failed out of econ 100 to believe this guy. Or worse, never taken econ 100...

lol

you're alone on this one

and yet you pretend to be oh so educated hahahahaa
 
I did not watch the video from the original post and am not familiar with Schiff but based on his wiki profile he does not appear to be an academic.

Schiff makes money flogging ludicrous conspiracy theories relating to inflation, in this particular video, that the CPI is a hoax, and that there is secret inflation that nobody knows about except for blowhards like Schiff. It is junk economics.

You seem to be in the camp of those that are fearful of deflation.

My comment about deflation on this thread is simply that Schiff's simpleton claims in the video in post #1 are ludicrously wrong, and that the reason why we aren't seeing massive inflation despite inflationary monetary policy is that it is being offset by deflationary forces arising from the fall in real asset prices and the corresponding unwinding of debt.

The articles you posted basically argue that the government has a hard time setting policy exactly right and in combatting deflation may go too far and wind up causing inflation--maybe--but we haven't seen that happen yet. As of now we have low inflation with the deflationary forces at work in the economy to date having been more or less offset by the inflationary monetary policy.