Why is it that the US has its most fortified and unwelcome
embassy in the world in a country it liberated? Well at least
its construction was completed on time and within budget
unlike the war of liberation.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michael-brenner/imperial-inertia_b_969594.html
Michael Brenner
9/19/11
The United States' audacious bid to dominate the greater Middle East
by military force is going at close to full throttle. This is despite
the talk in Washington about over-extension, budgetary constraints,
and war fatigue. Three stories this week reveal this dismaying truth
while conveying the flavor of the prevailing mindset in the White House
and the security agencies.
First is the revelation that the imperial-scale American embassy complex
in Baghdad already needs expansion to accommodate the 6,000 mercenaries
there to ride shotgun for the 9,000 civilian employees whenever they
clamber out of their bomb-proof offices. That number includes roughly
1,200 U.S. officials and 7,800 hired help from places like Bangladesh
and Sri Lanka to do the laundry, clean the rooms and serve the food. The
mercenaries also will guard the citadel and its satellite fortresses in
Basra, Mosul and Erbil. These Blackwater types have the additional duty
of escorting salesmen and agents for American businesses selling and
servicing weapons for the Iraqi military. The forces commander-in-chief
will be Hillary Clinton. They are in addition to the 10,000 troops that
Washington is trying to impose on the reluctant Iraqi government and
thousands more on call next door in Kuwait.
We are not withdrawing from Iraq; we are redeploying our various levers
of power so as better to control the country. What is the strategic
justification? We have yet to hear one. Understandably. Since there was
no credible reason to go into Iraq in the first place, it is hard to come
up with an excuse for staying. In truth, we are trying to stay on because
we already have sunk so much in the futile attempt to turn Iraq into an
American satellite that the administration and its allies remain ashamed
to admit what a pointless fiasco the past eight and a half years have
been. So they mouth catch phrases like "we need to counteract Iranian
designs on the country," or "we must counteract the growing presence of
al-Qaida," or even "we have to maintain Iraq as an island of stability
in an unstable Middle East." Take your pick of illogical excuses.
The second story recounts the Obama administration's plans to escalate
further the drone campaigns in Yemen and Somalia. There is a mild debate
between those who want to restrict assassinations to (supposedly)
identified leaders of al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula and al-Qaida
in East Africa. Others are keen to expand the target list to include
(suspected) foot soldiers; other radical Islamist groups who use violence
against people on our side, i.e. remnants of the Saleh regime in Yemen
or those who currently reside in the presidential palace in Mogadishu
(with an American-sponsored African Union force having taken the baton
from the Christian Ethiopians whom we earlier inflicted on the Muslim
Somalis in a foregone bloody failure to hold at bay the Islamists); and
even radical fundamentalist organizations only potentially hostile to
the United States. In this latter perspective, a manifest threat to the
United States is unnecessary for targeted killings and Special Forces
operations. Again, there is no public statement of exactly why it is
imperative to do these things that not only violate international law and
national sovereignty but are counter-productive by their provoking bitter
doing us harm directly.
Finally, there is the mounting military campaign to eliminate all
anti-American groups in Northwest Pakistan -- be they local al-Qaida
residue, some variety of Taliban, the Haqqani network, their Kashmiri and
Punjabi based allies and whomever else gets in the way. These operations
are being conducted with minimal Pakistani approval or cooperation. We
in effect have declared political war on the Pakistani leadership, in
particular the Army, since the Abottabad affair. Here too we hear nothing
as to what our objectives are, how reasonable they are in terms of our
national interests, how realistic they are, and the risks associated with
sowing instability while fostering hostility toward the United States in
a nuclear armed Pakistan. All we know for sure is that the blueprints
are completed for monumental embassies in Kabul and Islamabad and that
we are dedicated to retaining control over massive air bases scattered
throughout Afghanistan. Silk Road commerce looks better protected than
at any time since the Mongols imposed order on Central Asia during the
thirteenth century. Protected from whom? Ask Barack Obama, David Petraeus
or Leon Panetta -- not necessarily in that order.
America is becoming an impulsive power that relentlessly pursues
audacious ventures out of the momentum to prevent any and all risk by
preventive liquidation of whomever may harbor ill-will toward us, and
by controlling all those places where any such persons may crop up. This
behavior may rightly be called 'imperial' in the sense that it embraces
actions directed at taking charge of others without their permission.
A strong sense of superiority is the bedrock of the imperial mindset. It
enables and it justifies imposing oneself on others. The ingredients
of superiority are physical, political and moral. Psychologically,
they reinforce each other. They also are fungible -- to varying
degrees. Military prowess, in making the practical tasks easier, feeds the
'we are better" syndrome while emboldening the nation to pursue audacious
ambition. Being able to do something shifts the balance in judging
whether we ought to do it. For it promises to confer success. Political
superiority manifests itself in two ways: as the factor that makes
possible the projection of military power, and in the conviction that
"we" can actually improve the life of the natives by providing them
with the order and 'enlightened' institutions of which they themselves
are incapable.
Moral superiority is integral to the mix, especially for those who prize
their self-designated virtue -- and see themselves as having a selfless
interest in promoting it in other lands. These days that is a critical
element. A keen sense of being a 'good' people concerned about uplifting
others salves consciences, erases doubts and permits using dubious means
to accomplish virtuous ends. This self-serving perspective paves the
way of course for the routinization of hypocrisy.
The imperial mindset is comfortable with taking charge of other
peoples. Doing so is not felt as odd or improper. Controlling and
giving direction to the natives is, in fact, praiseworthy insofar as
it carries the promise of improving things for them, as well as for
oneself. Imperialist thinking arrogates to itself the right to make that
judgment according to its own lights. The decision to intervene is that
nation's alone. It requires no higher authority since none is recognized
or deemed qualified. Good intentions create their own legitimacy. These
days, there is some sensitivity to legitimacy. So it is desirable to have
partners who serve as auxiliaries to the enterprise. Their presence masks
the truth of it being in essence a unilateral action. The formal laying on
of hands by a collective security organization has practical advantages,
too, even if it comes after the fact. But the 'world community' in any
guise has no rightful place in making key determinations. Our imperialists
know best, and know that they know best.
Similarly, it is unnecessary to get the prior approval of the people
being subjugated. After all, if they both knew what their own enlightened
interests were and were free to express them, the occasion for the
intervention would not have arisen. Dictatorships, especially hostile
ones, lower the threshold for intervention since they are seen as
preventing the latter condition from being met. Post hoc approval by
the natives is inferred from their participation in whatever governing
mechanisms are put in place; even passive acquiescence is interpreted
as confirming the occupier's righteousness and as bestowing legitimacy.
An absence of empathy for the locals and a consonant dulling of
sensibilities about the duress they experience is integral to the imperial
personality. Cultural knowledge is sought only on instrumental terms. It
is extracted and processed as just another kind of information. To develop
an understanding of the natives sufficient to allow for identification
with them is to threaten the innate feelings of superiority and perhaps to
heighten the awareness of being an alien intruder. That is why, nowadays,
there is a preference for using native interpreters and home-grown experts
as tag-ons in performing occupation missions. Lack of cultural preparation
may also can be represented as a sign that there is no intention of
being a long-term occupier. A sign to the locals, to outside parties
and to whomever looks askance at avowals of no imperial purpose.
In addition, containing empathy is a way of avoiding inhibition about the
use of violence. For it allows for a degree of depersonalization of the
civilian casualties that are an inescapable accompaniment to military
action. Guilt and inhibition about committing unsavory acts are muted
when dealing with a depersonalized 'them' rather than persons whose
character and individuality emerges from a known socio-cultural setting.
The imperial state of mind is strengthened by being a collective
phenomenon. Emotions play a bigger role than does deliberate thought. This
is particularly important in countries where invasion and occupation
go against the grain of national self-image. A threshold of initial
intensity must be crossed to fuel passions that can override habit and
inhibition. 9/11 did exactly that. By providing both motivation and a
blanket justification for whatever is done, the imperial mindset can
grow and sustain itself whatever happens 'out there.' Emotions of this
kind have the further effect of silencing and/or ignoring critics who
may bring to the fore uncomfortable facts. In other words, group think
and implicit group censorship go hand-in-hand. Selective perception
thereby becomes a constant in the imperial mind set.
'Imperial' behavior generates momentum that is as much mental and
emotional as it is political or organizational. One gets accustomed to
doing certain things that may have seemed disagreeable if not unnatural at
the outset. The second and third times become instinctively easier. This
holds even where the first intervention/occupation has been anything but
an unalloyed success. The accommodating attitudes become routinized as
inertia of all kinds carries the process forward. The imperial mentality
feeds on itself just as one intervention creates a military cum political
dynamic that impels a nation towards subsequent interventions.
A companion feature of the imperial mentality is its susceptibility
to becoming prisoner of expectations. To set down the path of imposing
oneself on others is to make a bet on success. For the stake is not only
the stated objective but all that has been invested in the project. Beyond
resources -- human, financial, diplomatic -- there is collective self
esteem. There is the collectivity's sense of moral worth. This last
figures prominently in the mentality of a liberal democratic society that
cultivates the idea of its intrinsic virtue. To come up short (much less
fail outright) is bad enough. To make hostage to that failure something
that one supposedly cherishes is to court a crisis of self doubt and
plunging morale. Paradoxically, plowing ahead can put off that day of
reckoning by keeping regrets at bay -- for a time. This is so even where
the ultimate consequences are more painful.
embassy in the world in a country it liberated? Well at least
its construction was completed on time and within budget
unlike the war of liberation.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michael-brenner/imperial-inertia_b_969594.html
Michael Brenner
9/19/11
The United States' audacious bid to dominate the greater Middle East
by military force is going at close to full throttle. This is despite
the talk in Washington about over-extension, budgetary constraints,
and war fatigue. Three stories this week reveal this dismaying truth
while conveying the flavor of the prevailing mindset in the White House
and the security agencies.
First is the revelation that the imperial-scale American embassy complex
in Baghdad already needs expansion to accommodate the 6,000 mercenaries
there to ride shotgun for the 9,000 civilian employees whenever they
clamber out of their bomb-proof offices. That number includes roughly
1,200 U.S. officials and 7,800 hired help from places like Bangladesh
and Sri Lanka to do the laundry, clean the rooms and serve the food. The
mercenaries also will guard the citadel and its satellite fortresses in
Basra, Mosul and Erbil. These Blackwater types have the additional duty
of escorting salesmen and agents for American businesses selling and
servicing weapons for the Iraqi military. The forces commander-in-chief
will be Hillary Clinton. They are in addition to the 10,000 troops that
Washington is trying to impose on the reluctant Iraqi government and
thousands more on call next door in Kuwait.
We are not withdrawing from Iraq; we are redeploying our various levers
of power so as better to control the country. What is the strategic
justification? We have yet to hear one. Understandably. Since there was
no credible reason to go into Iraq in the first place, it is hard to come
up with an excuse for staying. In truth, we are trying to stay on because
we already have sunk so much in the futile attempt to turn Iraq into an
American satellite that the administration and its allies remain ashamed
to admit what a pointless fiasco the past eight and a half years have
been. So they mouth catch phrases like "we need to counteract Iranian
designs on the country," or "we must counteract the growing presence of
al-Qaida," or even "we have to maintain Iraq as an island of stability
in an unstable Middle East." Take your pick of illogical excuses.
The second story recounts the Obama administration's plans to escalate
further the drone campaigns in Yemen and Somalia. There is a mild debate
between those who want to restrict assassinations to (supposedly)
identified leaders of al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula and al-Qaida
in East Africa. Others are keen to expand the target list to include
(suspected) foot soldiers; other radical Islamist groups who use violence
against people on our side, i.e. remnants of the Saleh regime in Yemen
or those who currently reside in the presidential palace in Mogadishu
(with an American-sponsored African Union force having taken the baton
from the Christian Ethiopians whom we earlier inflicted on the Muslim
Somalis in a foregone bloody failure to hold at bay the Islamists); and
even radical fundamentalist organizations only potentially hostile to
the United States. In this latter perspective, a manifest threat to the
United States is unnecessary for targeted killings and Special Forces
operations. Again, there is no public statement of exactly why it is
imperative to do these things that not only violate international law and
national sovereignty but are counter-productive by their provoking bitter
doing us harm directly.
Finally, there is the mounting military campaign to eliminate all
anti-American groups in Northwest Pakistan -- be they local al-Qaida
residue, some variety of Taliban, the Haqqani network, their Kashmiri and
Punjabi based allies and whomever else gets in the way. These operations
are being conducted with minimal Pakistani approval or cooperation. We
in effect have declared political war on the Pakistani leadership, in
particular the Army, since the Abottabad affair. Here too we hear nothing
as to what our objectives are, how reasonable they are in terms of our
national interests, how realistic they are, and the risks associated with
sowing instability while fostering hostility toward the United States in
a nuclear armed Pakistan. All we know for sure is that the blueprints
are completed for monumental embassies in Kabul and Islamabad and that
we are dedicated to retaining control over massive air bases scattered
throughout Afghanistan. Silk Road commerce looks better protected than
at any time since the Mongols imposed order on Central Asia during the
thirteenth century. Protected from whom? Ask Barack Obama, David Petraeus
or Leon Panetta -- not necessarily in that order.
America is becoming an impulsive power that relentlessly pursues
audacious ventures out of the momentum to prevent any and all risk by
preventive liquidation of whomever may harbor ill-will toward us, and
by controlling all those places where any such persons may crop up. This
behavior may rightly be called 'imperial' in the sense that it embraces
actions directed at taking charge of others without their permission.
A strong sense of superiority is the bedrock of the imperial mindset. It
enables and it justifies imposing oneself on others. The ingredients
of superiority are physical, political and moral. Psychologically,
they reinforce each other. They also are fungible -- to varying
degrees. Military prowess, in making the practical tasks easier, feeds the
'we are better" syndrome while emboldening the nation to pursue audacious
ambition. Being able to do something shifts the balance in judging
whether we ought to do it. For it promises to confer success. Political
superiority manifests itself in two ways: as the factor that makes
possible the projection of military power, and in the conviction that
"we" can actually improve the life of the natives by providing them
with the order and 'enlightened' institutions of which they themselves
are incapable.
Moral superiority is integral to the mix, especially for those who prize
their self-designated virtue -- and see themselves as having a selfless
interest in promoting it in other lands. These days that is a critical
element. A keen sense of being a 'good' people concerned about uplifting
others salves consciences, erases doubts and permits using dubious means
to accomplish virtuous ends. This self-serving perspective paves the
way of course for the routinization of hypocrisy.
The imperial mindset is comfortable with taking charge of other
peoples. Doing so is not felt as odd or improper. Controlling and
giving direction to the natives is, in fact, praiseworthy insofar as
it carries the promise of improving things for them, as well as for
oneself. Imperialist thinking arrogates to itself the right to make that
judgment according to its own lights. The decision to intervene is that
nation's alone. It requires no higher authority since none is recognized
or deemed qualified. Good intentions create their own legitimacy. These
days, there is some sensitivity to legitimacy. So it is desirable to have
partners who serve as auxiliaries to the enterprise. Their presence masks
the truth of it being in essence a unilateral action. The formal laying on
of hands by a collective security organization has practical advantages,
too, even if it comes after the fact. But the 'world community' in any
guise has no rightful place in making key determinations. Our imperialists
know best, and know that they know best.
Similarly, it is unnecessary to get the prior approval of the people
being subjugated. After all, if they both knew what their own enlightened
interests were and were free to express them, the occasion for the
intervention would not have arisen. Dictatorships, especially hostile
ones, lower the threshold for intervention since they are seen as
preventing the latter condition from being met. Post hoc approval by
the natives is inferred from their participation in whatever governing
mechanisms are put in place; even passive acquiescence is interpreted
as confirming the occupier's righteousness and as bestowing legitimacy.
An absence of empathy for the locals and a consonant dulling of
sensibilities about the duress they experience is integral to the imperial
personality. Cultural knowledge is sought only on instrumental terms. It
is extracted and processed as just another kind of information. To develop
an understanding of the natives sufficient to allow for identification
with them is to threaten the innate feelings of superiority and perhaps to
heighten the awareness of being an alien intruder. That is why, nowadays,
there is a preference for using native interpreters and home-grown experts
as tag-ons in performing occupation missions. Lack of cultural preparation
may also can be represented as a sign that there is no intention of
being a long-term occupier. A sign to the locals, to outside parties
and to whomever looks askance at avowals of no imperial purpose.
In addition, containing empathy is a way of avoiding inhibition about the
use of violence. For it allows for a degree of depersonalization of the
civilian casualties that are an inescapable accompaniment to military
action. Guilt and inhibition about committing unsavory acts are muted
when dealing with a depersonalized 'them' rather than persons whose
character and individuality emerges from a known socio-cultural setting.
The imperial state of mind is strengthened by being a collective
phenomenon. Emotions play a bigger role than does deliberate thought. This
is particularly important in countries where invasion and occupation
go against the grain of national self-image. A threshold of initial
intensity must be crossed to fuel passions that can override habit and
inhibition. 9/11 did exactly that. By providing both motivation and a
blanket justification for whatever is done, the imperial mindset can
grow and sustain itself whatever happens 'out there.' Emotions of this
kind have the further effect of silencing and/or ignoring critics who
may bring to the fore uncomfortable facts. In other words, group think
and implicit group censorship go hand-in-hand. Selective perception
thereby becomes a constant in the imperial mind set.
'Imperial' behavior generates momentum that is as much mental and
emotional as it is political or organizational. One gets accustomed to
doing certain things that may have seemed disagreeable if not unnatural at
the outset. The second and third times become instinctively easier. This
holds even where the first intervention/occupation has been anything but
an unalloyed success. The accommodating attitudes become routinized as
inertia of all kinds carries the process forward. The imperial mentality
feeds on itself just as one intervention creates a military cum political
dynamic that impels a nation towards subsequent interventions.
A companion feature of the imperial mentality is its susceptibility
to becoming prisoner of expectations. To set down the path of imposing
oneself on others is to make a bet on success. For the stake is not only
the stated objective but all that has been invested in the project. Beyond
resources -- human, financial, diplomatic -- there is collective self
esteem. There is the collectivity's sense of moral worth. This last
figures prominently in the mentality of a liberal democratic society that
cultivates the idea of its intrinsic virtue. To come up short (much less
fail outright) is bad enough. To make hostage to that failure something
that one supposedly cherishes is to court a crisis of self doubt and
plunging morale. Paradoxically, plowing ahead can put off that day of
reckoning by keeping regrets at bay -- for a time. This is so even where
the ultimate consequences are more painful.

