Bomb Bomb Bomb Iran? John McCain III

[niniveh]

I've been following an ongoing discussion among retired US Intelligence and Military officials all extremely nervous that elements in the Biden admin might take
advantage of their remaining time in office to launch a pre-emptive bombardment of Iran using whatever excuse at hand, and leave DJT's incoming admin with a hot war to deal with. I was initially skeptical, even though these are highly knowledgeable people all of whom without exception had warned us of the folly of Cheney-Bush admin
in illegally invading Iraq in 2003 when these men were in active service of the US. Judge for yourself.


Jan 2, 2025 -World
Scoop: Biden discussed plans to strike Iran nuclear sites if Tehran speeds toward bomb

• Barak Ravid

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President Biden confers with his national security advisor Jake Sullivan during a roundtable in Oct. 2023. Photo: Drew Angerer/Getty Images

White House national security adviser Jake Sullivan presented President Biden with options for a potential U.S. attack on Iran's nuclear facilities if the Iranians move towards a nuclear weapon before Jan. 20, in a meeting several weeks ago that remained secret until now, three sources with knowledge of the issue tell Axios.
Why it matters: A U.S. strike on Iran's nuclear program during the lame duck period would be an enormous gamble from a president who promised he would not allow Iran to develop a nuclear weapon, but who would also risk handing a fresh conflict over to his successor. Biden did not green light a strike during the meeting and has not done so since, the sources said.

• Biden and his national security team discussed various options and scenarios during the meeting, which took place roughly one month ago, but the president did not make any final decision, according to the sources.
• A U.S. official with knowledge of the issue said the White House meeting was not prompted by new intelligence or intended to end in a yes or no decision from Biden. Instead, it was part of a discussion on "prudent scenario planning" of how the U.S. should respond if Iran were to take steps like enriching Uranium to 90% purity before Jan. 20, the official said.
• Another source said there are currently no active discussions inside the White House about possible military action against Iran's nuclear facilities.

Behind the scenes: Some of Biden's top aides have argued internally that two trends —the acceleration of Iran's nuclear program, and the weakening of Iran and its proxies in their war with Israel — together give Biden an imperative and an opportunity to strike.

• The sources said some of Biden's aides, including Sullivan, think that the degrading of Iran's air defenses and missile capabilities, along with the significant weakening of Iran's regional proxies, would improve the odds of a successful strike and decrease the risk of Iranian retaliation and regional escalation.
• The U.S. official said Sullivan did not make any recommendation to Biden on the issue, but only discussed scenario planning. The White House declined to comment.

The intrigue: One source said Biden honed in on the question of urgency, and whether Iran had taken steps that justify a dramatic military strike a few weeks before a new president takes office.
The other side: Iran has long denied it is seeking a nuclear weapon and stressed that its nuclear program is only for civilian purposes.

• But in recent months, several former and current Iranian officials spoke publicly about the possibility of changing Iran's nuclear doctrine.
• "You can look at the public statements of Iranian officials, which have changed in the last few months as they have been dealt these strategic blows, to raise the question: Do we have to change our doctrine at some point? The fact that that's coming out publicly is something that has to be looked at extremely carefully," Sullivan said at a conference in New York two weeks ago.
• At the same event, Sullivan suggested the blows Iran and its proxies had received over the past year could push Tehran to seek a nuclear weapon. "It generates choices for that adversary that can be quite dangerous, and that's something we have to remain extremely vigilant about as we go forward," he said.

State of play: Iran's nuclear program has advanced dramatically during Biden's time in office, bringing Iran to the status of a de-facto "nuclear threshold state."

• Iran increased its Uranium enrichment to 60%, close enough to the 90% level needed to produce a nuclear weapon that Iran's advanced centrifuges could accomplish it in a matter of days.
• According to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Iran has enough 60%-enriched uranium to make four nuclear bombs.

Reality check: Even if Iran decided to build a bomb, it would need to develop a nuclear explosive device or warhead. Israeli intelligence believes that would take at least a year.

• An Israeli strike on Iran's Parchin military complex in late October also destroyed sophisticated equipment — dating back to before Iran ended its military nuclear program in 2003 — that would be needed to design and test a nuclear explosive device.
• Israeli officials believe that could create a crucial bottleneck if Iran does decide to build a bomb.

But U.S. and Israeli officials say that over the last year, Iranian scientists have conducted suspicious research related to nuclear weaponization — including computer modeling and metallurgy — that appears to be aimed at decreasing the time needed to develop a nuclear device in the event Iran's leaders elect to do so.

• The Biden administration sent a private warning to Iran last spring expressing serious concerns about Iranian nuclear research and development activities, U.S. and Israeli officials told Axios.
• The U.S. and Israel have both detected suspicious nuclear activities by Iranian scientists in the past few months that some officials fear could be part of a covert Iranian effort to use the period around the U.S. presidential transition to make progress toward nuclear weaponization.

What's next: Sullivan said last month that the Biden administration had briefed President-elect Trump's team on the intelligence picture regarding Iran's nuclear program.

• "They may choose a different course, a different strategy, but I want to make sure we are starting from a common base of what we are facing with respect to the threat posed by Iran's nuclear program," he said.

 

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And this from the News Agency of the Islamic Republic:


By Sergei Melkonian*
After Syria: Could South Caucasus be next Front against Iran?

The fall of the Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s government in Syria and recent radical changes in the Middle East have resulted in an apparent weakening of Iran's position and its allies in the region. The “Axis of Resistance”- Hamas, Hezbollah, and Syria - has been targeted separately with substantial damage to their infrastructure and leadership.

To further change the geopolitical dynamics of the region and to impact the position of the Islamic Republic, the next logical geographical target could be pro-Iranian forces in Iraq. Such a large-scale operation would require significant resources, and Tehran is well-prepared to counter with massive force and its robust Shia base in Iraq, where its readiness surpasses any other regional stronghold. Consequently, the next confrontation with Iran may not unfold in the Middle East but in an unexpected theater: the South Caucasus.

Why the South Caucasus?
Iran is less likely to anticipate an attack from this direction. Tehran’s current priorities include safeguarding the Axis of Resistance from collapse, strengthening its foothold in Iraq, and advancing its nuclear program as a cornerstone of its security strategy. In contrast, the South Caucasus is less prominent in Iran’s strategic calculations. The 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War is a notable example of how unexpected developments in this region can shift the balance of power, compelling Iran to react defensively. A similar unanticipated conflict could arise in the future.
Second, one consequence of recent developments in the Middle East is Iran’s separation from its partners. The fall of Syria would limit Tehran’s ability to maintain connections with Hezbollah and reach the Mediterranean Sea. Turkey would likely dominate communication networks, creating a web of dependency for regional and global actors. Ankara and Baku are pursuing a similar strategy in the South Caucasus - cutting Iran’s access to the Black Sea and Russia by undermining or collapsing Armenia. This would leave Iran’s connections to Europe and Russia entirely dependent on Baku and Ankara.
Third, the South Caucasus represents a critical intersection of interests for Turkey, Israel, and the United States. These three external actors, all of whom stand to benefit from the fall of Assad in Syria, share an interest in weakening Iran. While bilateral disagreements over local issues persist, they are overshadowed by broader regional objectives.
It is worth noting that Iran has often acted indirectly in Syria and other regions, using supportive forces as “battering rams” on the ground. In Syria, similarforces include armed opposition groups and terrorist organizations are supported by Turkey, Israel, and other nations. In the South Caucasus, Baku plays a comparable role.

What could happen?
The most plausible scenario for a strike against Iran involves opening the so-called “Zangezur corridor” through Armenia’s Syunik or a direct strike on Armenia. This scenario is significant for two reasons. First, such an operation would avoid a confrontation with Iran, reducing the likelihood of an immediate response from Tehran. As in Syria, Iran’s ability to act would be constrained by the fact that the events are unfolding in another country outside its immediate territory.
Second, the opening of the corridor could be executed as a rapid military operation, similar to past actions in Syria. The primary objective would be to inflict maximum damage on Armenia while preventing it from mounting prolonged resistance. Such an operation would likely involve concentrated forces and resources to ensure its completion within a matter of days, minimizing the time available for external actors to respond. Precedents already exist: in September 2023, an offensive against Nagorno-Karabakh was completed in less than a day, while a similar operation in Syria in November 2024 further emboldened Ankara.
This strategy could involve two key objectives. The minimum goal would be to open the “Zangezur corridor,” while the maximum goal would be to establish “Western Azerbaijan” on Armenian territory. President Ilham Aliyev’s ultimatum underscores this ambition, demanding that Armenia enter negotiations with the so-called “Western Azerbaijan Community.” From Armenia's perspective, such statements amount to territorial claims against the entire country, presenting its sovereign territory under the contrived label of “Western Azerbaijan.”

How are Baku and Ankara preparing?
Active preparations are underway to create the conditions necessary for a potential offensive. These efforts are focused on several critical tasks, without which any military escalation risks ineffectiveness or unintended consequences.
First, de-escalating Iran’s concerns: Baku is working to lower Tehran’s alertness. President Ilham Aliyev has sought to demonstrate a neutral or positive stance toward Iran. His meeting with the late Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi was a notable gesture. Joint military exercises between Iran and Azerbaijan, including those involving the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC), have been conducted in the past year. These actions will likely signal that any future activity by Azerbaijan is not directed against Iranian interests.
Second, shaping public opinion: Azerbaijan’s state-controlled media has been preparing the public for the possibility of a new military confrontation. Discussions of a potential “military operation in Zangezur” are increasingly prominent, with reports outlining its purported rationale, objectives, and scenarios. Following the capture of Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023, Baku appears to justify a potential new conflict with its population by framing it as a defensive measure. Propaganda claims that Armenia is preparing for war, although there is little evidence to support this assertion. Armenia, in reality, is not equipped for such a conflict.
Third, reinforcing military readiness: Azerbaijan is intensively training its armed forces. This includes joint exercises with Turkey and Pakistan and independent tactical drills. Recent commando exercises, designed with Turkish assistance, focused on offensive maneuvers such as launching sudden attacks on enemy positions. Simultaneously, Baku has accelerated its arms acquisitions from Israel, with recent shipments reaching record levels. Some of these weapons have been transferred to Nakhchivan, further enhancing strategic capabilities.
Fourth, strengthening alliances: Strengthening diplomatic and military alliances remains a key component of Baku’s strategy. The main role in Baku's military power is played by Turkey. In recent months, we can observe a high activity of meetings at the military level. For example, recently Azerbaijani delegation headed by the commander of the army in Nakhchivan met with the commander of the Ground Forces of the Turkish Armed Forces. In addition to its close ties with Turkey, Azerbaijan views Israel as a strategic partner. Following the fall of Assad, Azerbaijan’s presidential assistant Hikmet Hajiyev met with Israeli President Isaac Herzog and Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar to align regional interests between Israel and Turkey. President Aliyev has also hosted leaders of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), Israel’s leading lobbying group in the United States. Concurrently, Azerbaijan has intensified its political dialogue with NATO, with regional security prominently featured in discussions.
Baku’s opportunity to launch an attack is unlikely to close soon, and it may even expand if the next US president adopts a more aggressive approach toward Iran and Russia. In such a scenario, Ankara’s strategic importance to Washington as a lever against Tehran and Moscow would grow.
Turkey, facing increased geopolitical opportunities, has two potential directions for expanding its influence: Iraq and the South Caucasus. However, while Ankara may prioritize Iraq, Baku is poised to take the lead in advancing Turkish interests in the South Caucasus.

Possible options for Iran
Iran can take preventive steps to mitigate the possibility of a potential escalation in the South Caucasus. Three main steps can be outlined.
First, conducting military exercises on the northern border. Iran's military activity on its territory in September 2022: Azerbaijan was preparing larger attacks when it struck Armenia, and Iranian actions helped prevent further escalation. This tool can once again demonstrate Iran's determination and readiness to defend its interests along the borders, despite the changing situation in the Middle East.
Second, Tehran may initiate an urgent meeting in the 3+3 format to discuss the situation in the South Caucasus, taking into account possible negative trends. This would localize the problem within the region, mitigating the risk of spillover of instability.
Third, to limit the use of force by Baku and its allies, Iran may increase its diplomatic activity in Syunik and other regions of Armenia that may be under attack. This activity could be multilateral, involving other states interested in preserving Armenia's territorial integrity and the status quo in the region.
*Sergei Melkonian is a Research Fellow at APRI Armenia, focusing on Russia and Iran. He is also a visiting professor at Yerevan State University. Before joining APRI, he served as an Assistant to the President of Armenia from 2020 to 2022, covering post-Soviet countries and the Middle East.
**Views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not represent those of the IRNA.