Reverie

Air France official report crash ruling on AF447: pilots 'lost control'

alexmst

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http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jul/05/air-france-crash-ruling-pilots

A combination of faulty sensors and mistakes by inadequately trained pilots caused an Air France jet to plunge into the Atlantic Ocean, killing all 228 people aboard, according to French investigators.

The damning report into the 2009 crash involving flight AF447 from Rio de Janeiro to Paris was carried out by the Bureau of Investigations and Analysis (BEA), which has called for pilots to have better instruction on flying manually at high altitudes and stricter plane certification rules.

Airbus, manufacturer of the A330 plane, said it was working to improve speed sensors, known as pilot tubes, and making other efforts to avoid future accidents.

Air France said the pilots had "acted in line with the information provided by the cockpit instruments and systems ... The reading of the various data did not enable them to apply the appropriate action."

But the BEA's findings have raised wider concerns about training for pilots flying hi-tech planes when confronted with a high-altitude crisis. The report could also have legal implications: a separate French judicial investigation is under way, and Air France and Airbus have been handed preliminary manslaughter charges.

The BEA said "human and technical factors" had caused the crash, which occurred during a stormy night flight on 1 June 2009.

Some victims' families said investigators had not paid enough attention to equipment problems during the flight, saying the pilots had struggled to cope with a barrage of inaccurate information.

Ice crystals, which blocked the pilot tubes, were the "unleashing event" that set off the plane's troubles, the chief investigator, Alain Bouillard, said. During a nightmare thunderstorm the autopilot shut down and the co-pilots were forced to fly manually while a succession of alarms went off. The captain was on a rest break.

In one fatal decision, the report says, one of the co-pilots nosed the Airbus A330 upward during a stall, instead of downward, because of false data from sensors about the plane's position. Bouillard said that was an "important element" in the crash. He said the pilots had not understood the plane was experiencing a stall, as only a very experienced crew with a clear understanding of the situation could have stabilized the aircraft in those conditions. "The crew was in a state of near-total loss of control," Bouillard said.

Robert Soulas, whose daughter and son-in-law were killed in the crash, said investigators had explained that the flight director system indicated the "erroneous information" that the plane was diving downward, "and therefore to compensate, the pilot had a tendency to pull on the throttle to make it rise up".

However, the plane was in a stall instead. A basic manoeuvre for stall recovery, which pilots are taught at the outset of their flight training, is to push the yoke forward and apply full throttle to lower the nose of the plane and build up speed. But because the pilot thought the plane was diving, he nosed up.

A French pilot, Gerard Arnoux, defended the pilots. He said: "A normal pilot on a normal airliner follows" the signals on the flight director system, which tells them to go left, right, up or down.

Central to this accident is the fact that when the automation failed, the pilots were presented with conflicting information which was obviously incorrect, said William Voss, president of the Flight Safety Foundation in Alexandria, Virginia. But they were unable to look through this and understand what the aircraft was actually doing.

"Pilots a generation ago would have done that and understand what was going on, but (the AF447 pilots) were so conditioned to rely on the automation that they were unable to do this," he said. "This is a problem not just limited to Air France or Airbus, it's a problem we're seeing around the world because pilots are being conditioned to treat automated processed data as truth, and not compare it with the raw information that lies underneath."

Lais Seba, whose daughter Luciana Clarkson Seba, 31, was killed in the crash, said: "It's going to be for ever difficult for survivors to deal with the loss of their loved ones. We are surviving. We live one day at a time, with lots of pain."

The final report included a study of the plane's black-box flight recorders, uncovered in a costly and complex search of the ocean.
 

Aardvark154

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Central to this accident is the fact that when the automation failed, the pilots were presented with conflicting information which was obviously incorrect, said William Voss, president of the Flight Safety Foundation in Alexandria, Virginia. But they were unable to look through this and understand what the aircraft was actually doing.

"Pilots a generation ago would have done that and understand what was going on, but (the AF447 pilots) were so conditioned to rely on the automation that they were unable to do this," he said. "This is a problem not just limited to Air France or Airbus, it's a problem we're seeing around the world because pilots are being conditioned to treat automated processed data as truth, and not compare it with the raw information that lies underneath."
Indeed the heart of the matter and unchanged from the preliminary report a couple of months back.
 

alexmst

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danmand

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When I went to university, we called them Pitot tubes.
 

LKD

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well... leaving aside automated instruments failing and providing conflicting data to the pilots, or the fact that pilots from generation would've noticed the problem, I think it would've been down right difficult for anyone to pinpoint the problem in the middle of a storm, in pitch black darkness at night above the Atlantic ocean.
 

LKD

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When I went to university, we called them Pitot tubes.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jul/05/air-france-crash-ruling-pilots


Airbus, manufacturer of the A330 plane, said it was working to improve speed sensors, known as pilot tubes, and making other efforts to avoid future accidents.

Air France said the pilots had "acted in line with the information provided by the cockpit instruments and systems ... The reading of the various data did not enable them to apply the appropriate action."

But the BEA's findings have raised wider concerns about training for pilots flying hi-tech planes when confronted with a high-altitude crisis. The report could also have legal implications: a separate French judicial investigation is under way, and Air France and Airbus have been handed preliminary manslaughter charges.

.

they still do
 

LKD

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Will all due respect, that's exactly why we pay pilots - to pinpoint those problems in the middle of a storm, in pitch black darkness at night above the Atlantic.

The transcript, from what all the analysis says, is very telling. The pilots were clueless. I think it is a really bad sign when the autopilot snaps off, and the pilots are actually expected to fly the plane - and they can't rise to the challenge.
true.. and they failed horribly
 

Aardvark154

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well... leaving aside automated instruments failing and providing conflicting data to the pilots, or the fact that pilots from generation would've noticed the problem, I think it would've been down right difficult for anyone to pinpoint the problem in the middle of a storm, in pitch black darkness at night above the Atlantic ocean.
There was an excellent article in the Daily Telegraph a few months ago which dealt with this crash and some of the differences between Airbus and Boeing aircraft and how Airbuses design (among other things side sticks that return to a neutral position instead of a pedestal that mirrors the others input and stays in that position until moved to a different position, likewise throttles) compounded the confusion, and that this particular situation would likely not have occurred on a Boeing Aircraft.


Link to the article: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/9231855/Air-France-Flight-447-Damn-it-were-going-to-crash.html
 

smiley1437

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It's a tragedy and certainly attributable to pilot error, but this particular consequence of the alternate law\stall alarm was particularly interesting to me:

- The stall warning deactivates by design when the angle of attack measurements are considered invalid and this is the case when the airspeed drops below a certain limit.

- In consequence, the stall warning stopped and came back on several times during the stall; in particular, it came on whenever the pilot pushed forward on the stick and then stopped when he pulled back; this may have confused the pilots.
No kidding that would be confusing!

I'm just thinking that many inexperienced pilots with their hands on the controls in the same situation would panic the same way...the unfortunate coincidence of the stall alarm coming on when the stick was pushed forward and going away when the stick was pulled back was probably one of the things that caused Bonin to hold the stick back the whole time. And killing them.
 

alexmst

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There was an excellent article in the Daily Telegraph a few months ago which dealt with this crash and some of the differences between Airbus and Boeing aircraft and how Airbuses design (among other things side sticks that return to a neutral position instead of a pedestal that mirrors the others input and stays in that position until moved to a different position, likewise throttles) compounded the confusion, and that this particular situation would likely not have occurred on a Boeing Aircraft.


Link to the article: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/9231855/Air-France-Flight-447-Damn-it-were-going-to-crash.html
Interesting article. The others didn't know the nose was up until too late.

It seems surprising that Airbus has conceived a system preventing one pilot from easily assessing the actions of the colleague beside him. And yet that is how their latest generations of aircraft are designed. The reason is that, for the vast majority of the time, side sticks are superb. “People are aware that they don’t know what is being done on the other side stick, but most of the time the crews fly in full automation; they are not even touching the stick,” says Captain King. “We hand-fly the aeroplane ever less now because automation is reliable and efficient, and because fatigue is an issue. [The side stick] is not an issue that comes up – very rarely does the other pilot’s input cause you concern.”

Boeing has always begged to differ, persisting with conventional controls on its fly-by-wire aircraft, including the new 787 Dreamliner, introduced into service this year. Boeing’s cluttering and old-fashioned levers still have to be pushed and turned like the old mechanical ones, even though they only send electronic impulses to computers. They need to be held in place for a climb or a turn to be accomplished, which some pilots think is archaic and distracting. Some say Boeing is so conservative because most American pilots graduate from flying schools where column-steering is the norm, whereas European airlines train more crew from scratch, allowing a quicker transition to side stick control.

Whatever the cultural differences, there is a perceived safety issue, too. The American manufacturer was concerned about side sticks’ lack of visual and physical feedback. Indeed, it is hard to believe AF447 would have fallen from the sky if it had been a Boeing 777. Had a traditional yoke been installed on Flight AF447, Robert would surely have realised that his junior colleague had the lever pulled back and mostly kept it there. When Dubois returned to the cockpit he would have seen that Bonin was pulling up the nose.
 

777flyer

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Unfortunately, this is a very damning report on the cockpit management techniques that these two pilots used. While I am always careful to not jump to conclusions, nor judge the decision making process these guys followed....... it certainly does not look good.

They spent far too much time trouble shooting a micro event, when in fact they should have done what ALL OF US are taught day 1 in flight school..... Your number one priority, FLY THE PLANE FIRST.....

Having flown Boeings most of my life and one Airbus (in fact an A330), while their systems differ, I can honestly say both provide an exceptional environment from which the pilot can cary on his duties...... Finally, whether it is a traditional yoke or side stick configuration, pilots spend a considerable amount of time training to fly either system. If in the end, the lack of a yoke caused the pilots to not know what each other were doing....they had no right being behind the 'stick' anyway.

Very sad, but I think the report was what most of us suspected.

SNK
 

FAST

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Unfortunately, this is a very damning report on the cockpit management techniques that these two pilots used. While I am always careful to not jump to conclusions, nor judge the decision making process these guys followed....... it certainly does not look good.

They spent far too much time trouble shooting a micro event, when in fact they should have done what ALL OF US are taught day 1 in flight school..... Your number one priority, FLY THE PLANE FIRST.....

Having flown Boeings most of my life and one Airbus (in fact an A330), while their systems differ, I can honestly say both provide an exceptional environment from which the pilot can cary on his duties...... Finally, whether it is a traditional yoke or side stick configuration, pilots spend a considerable amount of time training to fly either system. If in the end, the lack of a yoke caused the pilots to not know what each other were doing....they had no right being behind the 'stick' anyway.

Very sad, but I think the report was what most of us suspected.

SNK
I thought I read once that the A330 does not have a pitch indicator that is independant of auto pilot, always displayed?

IF it does, why wouldn't the pilots use that, or if it has one, was it giving bad info?

Those "side sticks" almost look like an afterthough.

Thanks, FAST
 

nottyboi

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It's a tragedy and certainly attributable to pilot error, but this particular consequence of the alternate law\stall alarm was particularly interesting to me:



No kidding that would be confusing!

I'm just thinking that many inexperienced pilots with their hands on the controls in the same situation would panic the same way...the unfortunate coincidence of the stall alarm coming on when the stick was pushed forward and going away when the stick was pulled back was probably one of the things that caused Bonin to hold the stick back the whole time. And killing them.
Yeah, when I read about that feature it made me think WTF?? It's probably there to prevent stall warnings on the ground but surely they can use that logic only when the gear is deployed. I suppose the designers never imagined a plane would be in a situation where it has so little airspeed (I think less then 70 knots or something) AND the pilots would have faulty airspeed reading. But surely if the plane was not responding, they should have clued into the fact they were stalled...at least give it a shot....
 

nottyboi

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There was an excellent article in the Daily Telegraph a few months ago which dealt with this crash and some of the differences between Airbus and Boeing aircraft and how Airbuses design (among other things side sticks that return to a neutral position instead of a pedestal that mirrors the others input and stays in that position until moved to a different position, likewise throttles) compounded the confusion, and that this particular situation would likely not have occurred on a Boeing Aircraft.


Link to the article: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/9231855/Air-France-Flight-447-Damn-it-were-going-to-crash.html
Well a very similar accident happened to an MD-82....so it's more befuddling then you think:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/West_Caribbean_Airways_Flight_708
 

Aardvark154

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nottyboi

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Having read the Wikipedia article, I fail to see that there was a problem with one pilot not knowing the flight imputs the other pilot had made.

However, I entirely agree what it is much easier sitting at the computer, than it is in the cockpit with three minutes to live.
Well it all started with a high speed stall, that was misinterpreted by the pilot in control..and the plane fell essentially flat onto the ground.
 

Aardvark154

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I thought I read once that the A330 does not have a pitch indicator that is independant of auto pilot, always displayed?
There was no angle of attack display - having such is one of the recomendations of the French investigators.
 

smiley1437

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There was no angle of attack display - having such is one of the recomendations of the French investigators.
Is the AoA display the same as the artificial horizon? I always thought the artificial horizon would be a very standard (i.e. not optional) piece of instrumentation.

And, if the AH existed, one would think it'd be a simple matter to be safe by just flying a couple of degrees above horizontal and keep the thrust normal...but I guess when you're panicking, nothing seems simple.
 
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