tompeepin said:
As Cobra1 accurately corrected me, both in 1967 and in the Lebanon invasion, Israel attacked first preemptively.
With regards to Lebanon, the invasion was made to disrupt terrorist attacks from bases in south Lebanon. In 1978 the PLO, based in Lebanon, made a seaborne raid on Israel and hijacked a bus. 36 passengers were ultimately killed when the IDF stormed the bus. Was the invasion of Lebanon then pre-emptive? Was the American invasion of Taliban Afghanistan in retaliation for Al Qaeda attacks on New York "pre-emptive"? I think the matter is debatable.
Certainly, the Israeli government has always treated itself as "at war" with these terrorist organizations, all of which make no bones of the very reason for their existence - the destruction of Israel. The US, too, after 9/11, considered itself at war with Al Qaeda, in at least some political and legal sense. With the likelihood of old-order national conflicts becoming smaller, and the likelihood of complex internacine wars and wars against terrorist organizations becoming higher, the meaning of "pre-emptive" should be questioned.
In 1967, the attack was certainly pre-emptive - pre-emptive to what seemed (and still seems, even with the benefit of hindsight) to be an Arab attack on Israel.
The PLO had attacked Israel from bases in Syria during the previous year. This led to artillery battles, and in at least one case, dogfights between Israeli and Syrian air forces. The *national armed forces* of these countries had already engaged in combat. Soviet assertions that the Israelis then concentrated invasion troops near the Syrian border were proved false by UN inspection teams. Neither side was, as yet, preparing for invasion, but they were much closer to being at war than at peace.
The problem then became one of Nasser running out of control of his would-be Soviet masters. With the Soviets provoking him with misinformation about Israeli intentions, Nasser moved large formations into the Sinai, then requested that the UN remove peacekeeping troops at many points of the Egypt-Israel frontier. U Thant, in typical UN fashion, promptly complied. One of these abandoned strongpoints was Sharm El Sheikh, from which the Egyptians once again chose to blockade Israel's only Red Sea / Suez port, Eilat. With apparent Soviet backing, and the resurgence of global, united Arab support for the anti-Israeli cause, Nasser had the bit between his teeth, much to the chagrine of the Soviets (and the US).
At the end of May, King Hussein committed, or perhaps resigned, to a Jordanian-Egyptian military agreement. An Egyptian general was subsequently dispatched to take over the Jordanian forces.
Now surrounded by militarily cooperative Arab states, at least two of whom were aggressively fortifying and mobilizing border areas (Jordan and Egypt), with small-scale ground and air combat with the Syrians an on-going matter, and with the Strait of Tiran again closed to Israeli shipping, the Israelis felt they had little choice but to pre-emptively attack. IMO, the blame for this war falls squarely on the shoulders of Nasser, with several parties having contributed - the Soviets and perhaps the UN chief among them.
Of course, in 48-49, 56, and 73, the Israelis were attacked without acting "pre-emptively".