So, absolutely irrelevant to the topic we are discussing as that section is a defense the crown uses to argue that an unconstitutional law is nevertheless justified, and no one here is arguing c36 is justified even though it violates the charter.
Here you go blathering again. MacKay could take your correspondence course. A section 1 analysis is TOTALLY relevant to any constitutional challenge. Take C-36 or any challenged law that is argued to breach the charter. When it is demonstrated that there is a breach the crown then has to provide a Section 1 argument for every single one of these. C-36 is argued to limit the rights of people's under sections 7 (safety), 2 (speech) and 15 (discrimination). This last one is less certain, but 2 and 7 are very clear. The only way for MacKay to save his law will be to demonstrate that these effects are justified. Section 2 might be easier to justify, but a breach of section 7 is almost never found to be justified under section 1. Read again the link I posted, there is a nice flow-chart describing this procedure.
Sexual orientation is a legally protected right (s. 15 of the Charter). Being a prostitute (or any other profession for that matter) is not a legally protected right.
There's no reason why someone can't try to argue that the purchase of sex is a fundamental human right.
I agree with colt, but we are not exactly talking about a simple ''profession''. We are talking about the right to have sex with who you want under the terms you decide. We are talking about making personnal life choice, which is not so different than your choice of religion, marital status, etc.
Like TeasePlease, I would argue that it is a fundamental right, on the basis that people have the right to do what they want with their sexuality. Not that you have a right to demand sex per se, but that people have the right to make their sex decisions for themselves. If two consenting adults decide to do something in private it is their right.
However, Section 1 of the Charter says that your rights can be limited if the law has a good reason for it. The argument would be that preventing consenting adults to buy sex is meant to prevent human trafficking. This goal is serious enough I think, but in my opinion the effect of the law would be clearly disproportionate to the objective, since most prostitutes are consenting and most clients are not dangerous and not interested in a slave.
Another point is that after a challenge, the court has different ways of fixing the law. Instead of striking down a law they can ''Read it down'', meaning they narrow some definition to make it acceptable under the charter. For example, they could say the buying or advertisement provisions are too broad and narrow it down to situations of exploited persons and exclude consenting adults.