Repeating a personal view that he had previously
expressed to other USG visitors, NSC Director Eiland laid out
for Ambassador Djerejian a different end-game solution than
that which is commonly envisioned as the two-state solution.
Eiland's view, he said, was prefaced on the assumption that
demographic and other considerations make the prospect for a
two-state solution between the Jordan and the Mediterranean
unviable. Currently, he said, there are 11 million people in
Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza Strip, and that number will
increase to 36 million in 50 years. The area between Beer
Sheva and the northern tip of Israel (including the West Bank
and Gaza) has the highest population density in the world.
Gaza alone, he said, is already "a huge concentration camp"
with 1.3 million Palestinians. Moreover, the land is
surrounded on three sides by deserts. Palestinians need more
land and Israel can ill-afford to cede it. The solution, he
argued, lies in the Sinai desert.
¶13. (C) Specifically, Eiland proposed that Egypt be persuaded
to contribute a 600 square kilometer parcel of land that
would be annexed to a future Palestinian state as
compensation for the 11 percent of the West Bank that Israel
would seek to annex in a final status agreement. This Sinai
block, 20 kms of which would be along the Mediterranean
coast, would be adjacent to the Gaza Strip. A land corridor
would be constructed connecting Egypt and this block to
Jordan. (Note: Presumably under Egyptian sovereignty. End
Note.) In addition, Israel would provide Egypt a 200 square
km block of land from further south in the Negev. Eiland
laid out the following advantages to his proposed solution:
-- For the Palestinians: The additional land would make Gaza
viable. It would be big enough to support a new port and
airport, and to allow for the construction of a new city, all
of which would help make Gaza economically viable. It would
provide sufficient space to support the return of Palestinian
refugees. In addition, the 20 km along the sea would
increase fishing rights and would allow for the exploration
of natural gas reserves. Eiland argued that the benefits
offered by this parcel of land are far more favorable to the
Palestinians than would be parcels Israel could offer from
the land-locked Negev.
-- For Egypt: Israel would compensate Egypt with a parcel of
land on a 1:3 ratio, which is the ratio of the size of Israel
to the Sinai. Egypt would enjoy the land corridor to Jordan,
thereby controlling the shortest distance between Jordan and
Saudi Arabia to Europe.
-- For Jordan: The greater the capacity of the Gaza Strip to
absorb Palestinian refugees, the fewer the number of refugees
who would "return" to settle in the West Bank, thereby
resulting in less pressure on Jordan. Jordan would also
benefit economically from the land bridge.
¶14. (C) Eiland, having previously debated the merits of this
proposal with Ambassador Kurtzer, conceded the point that
Egyptian President Mubarak "would never agree" to it, and he
also took the point that in negotiating the Israel-Egypt
peace treaty Israel had foregone the entire Sinai and
accepted the Palestinian issue as an "Israeli" problem. He
nonetheless refused to be dissuaded from exploring the idea,
noting that he had reason to believe that Prime Minister
Sharon would support such a proposal, if it were tabled by a
third party.