I think this is one of the clearest and most balanced evaluations that I have read about the current situation in Iraq. It lays out the reasons why it is certainly too soon to break out the champagne. There's still a long, tough slog ahead if the Americans stay.
Personally, I'd like to see Bush and Cheney taken out and shot for getting the US into this pickle.
jwm
Apres-Surge: The Next Iraq Debates
Kenneth M. Pollack, Director of Research, Saban Center for Middle East Policy
The New Republic
December 31, 2007 —
It took a while, but we appear to have finally reached a national consensus that General David Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker have made progress in Iraq. They have improved security and forged deals among local political leaders in the north, west, and even much of the center of the country (including important parts of Baghdad). This, in turn, has made it possible to start to revive local economies in some of those same areas.
But the progress has been uneven. The national economy remains stagnant, with stubbornly high unemployment. Iraq's central government is still locked in the deadening grip of Shia warlords uninterested in compromising with Iraq's other ethnic and sectarian groups or, for the most part, even with one another. And the southern half of the country is deteriorating even as the northern half improves.
The good news is that this is entirely in keeping with historical norms. Typically, a properly executed counterinsurgency operation begins by creating basic security for key parts of the population. Security prompts local leaders--who are usually more in tune with their war-weary populations than the central government--to strike deals and broker truces that allow their local economies to revive. Over time, this approach forces the national leaders to become more conciliatory or risk losing their jobs.
The civil war in Northern Ireland is a good example. In the 1970s, the British, much like the Americans today, began emphasizing neighborhood security and de-emphasizing search-and-destroy missions. That made economic and political development plans possible in the '80s, which in turn produced national-level reconciliation talks in the '90s. It is worth remembering that Ian Paisley and Martin McGuinness were every bit as savage in their chauvinism as Moqtada Al Sadr and Abu Musab Al Zarqawi in Iraq. They changed their tunes only after a years-long bottom-up approach showed their constituents that peace was possible--and threatened their leadership roles if they didn't pursue it seriously.
The bad news is that, while the pattern we have seen in Iraq is fully consistent with success, it also remains fully consistent with failure. In Vietnam, General Creighton Abrams produced encouraging results at the grassroots level between 1968 and 1972 but could not translate bottom-up progress into top-down reform of the Vietnamese central government before the United States effectively ended its support. The result was a state too weak to stand up to attack from North Vietnam.
As both of these examples illustrate, such campaigns require lots of time. In Iraq, several important factors, including the fortuitous and well-exploited "Anbar awakening," in which large numbers of Sunni tribes turned on their former allies in Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and other Salafi extremist groups, has speeded progress. But there are three hurdles the United States must clear if it is to convert initial success into victory and leave Iraq as the next Northern Ireland, instead of the next Vietnam. This will still require considerable skill--and not a little luck.
The basic idea behind the surge is that counterinsurgency efforts require a certain ratio of security personnel to civilians (usually about 1 to 50). If there aren't enough capable, reliable soldiers and policemen to handle the whole country simultaneously, as has been the case in Iraq from the start, you concentrate those available in key regions, train new indigenous formations in the areas secured, and slowly spread outward as more security personnel become available.
In Iraq, the surge brigades allowed General Petraeus to employ the prescribed amount of force in most of Baghdad and its outlying "belts" of villages. It also allowed him to take advantage of important opportunities in Anbar, Nineveh, and Diyala provinces, which have been critical in mauling AQI and the other Salafi extremist groups. Within these areas, U.S. forces have diligently worked with Iraqis to build up local security formations to supplement the national Iraqi Army (which is making real, but gradual, progress) and to substitute for the national Iraqi Police (which remains mostly a disaster).
But what will happen when the American presence returns to pre-surge levels this coming summer? Will local Iraqi security formations hold together if U.S. combat brigades are removed from their neighborhoods? As the Americans pull out of parts of Iraq, will Salafi extremist groups stage a comeback?
The answer is likely to be found in places like Anbar and Nineveh provinces. In Nineveh, local political deals, economic progress, and improvements in Iraqi Army formations have allowed the United States to reduce its presence by thousands of troops--with most of those serving as advisers and support teams for Iraqi units. In Anbar, the new partnership with the tribal sheiks has transformed Iraq's worst province into arguably its best, allowing for the possibility of a reduction in U.S. troops. If places like Anbar and Nineveh are able to sustain themselves in the coming months, then there is a good chance that Iraq can survive the post-surge drawdown. If not, then we as a nation will have to confront the hard choice of whether it is better to continue to prop up the country to prevent a slide into all-out civil war that could destabilize the region, or to conclude that Iraq is lost and redeploy our resources to try to contain the chaos.
When I was in Iraq this July, there was one question I kept asking senior American officials to which I never got a good answer: "How are you going to handle southern Iraq?" Violence in southern Iraq--virtually all Shia-on-Shia--continues to worsen. Local warlords go after each other, the big national militias like the Mahdi Army and the Badr Organization vie for territory and influence among the local power brokers, and the central government has little control. There are some positive signs--such as Shia villages asking for U.S. help in getting rid of the Mahdi Army, whose members are now fighting among themselves--but the overall trend is toward waxing violence and waning government authority.
This is a serious problem. The south is home to about 40 percent of Iraq's population. It provides Iraq's only access to the sea. Most of Iraq's key religious shrines are in the south. And two-thirds of Iraqi oil production and most of its proven reserves lie there as well.
It is clear that the relative successes in the north, west, and center have only been achieved because of the presence of U.S. combat troops and their change in strategy and tactics. If they continue to make progress, then those parts of the country might be fairly stable and secure in two to five years. However, it seems unlikely that the northern half of the country can be stabilized if the southern half slides into chaos.
American officials suggest that stabilizing southern Iraq will be a job for Iraqi forces with American personnel largely serving as advisers and fire support teams. But, at present, even the best Iraqi formations would have trouble taking back the south from the militias and criminal gangs. And, because failure could decimate the morale and confidence of the Iraqi security forces, it seems unwise to take such a risk until the Iraqis are up to the challenge. It seems equally unwise to send the more competent Iraqi formations south any time soon, lest doing so jeopardize the gains they have made in other areas. In other words, Iraqis won't be ready to start pacifying the south for several years, during which time the problems there will certainly complicate and might undermine further progress in the north, west, and center. Article continues with next posting
Personally, I'd like to see Bush and Cheney taken out and shot for getting the US into this pickle.
jwm
Apres-Surge: The Next Iraq Debates
Kenneth M. Pollack, Director of Research, Saban Center for Middle East Policy
The New Republic
December 31, 2007 —
It took a while, but we appear to have finally reached a national consensus that General David Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker have made progress in Iraq. They have improved security and forged deals among local political leaders in the north, west, and even much of the center of the country (including important parts of Baghdad). This, in turn, has made it possible to start to revive local economies in some of those same areas.
But the progress has been uneven. The national economy remains stagnant, with stubbornly high unemployment. Iraq's central government is still locked in the deadening grip of Shia warlords uninterested in compromising with Iraq's other ethnic and sectarian groups or, for the most part, even with one another. And the southern half of the country is deteriorating even as the northern half improves.
The good news is that this is entirely in keeping with historical norms. Typically, a properly executed counterinsurgency operation begins by creating basic security for key parts of the population. Security prompts local leaders--who are usually more in tune with their war-weary populations than the central government--to strike deals and broker truces that allow their local economies to revive. Over time, this approach forces the national leaders to become more conciliatory or risk losing their jobs.
The civil war in Northern Ireland is a good example. In the 1970s, the British, much like the Americans today, began emphasizing neighborhood security and de-emphasizing search-and-destroy missions. That made economic and political development plans possible in the '80s, which in turn produced national-level reconciliation talks in the '90s. It is worth remembering that Ian Paisley and Martin McGuinness were every bit as savage in their chauvinism as Moqtada Al Sadr and Abu Musab Al Zarqawi in Iraq. They changed their tunes only after a years-long bottom-up approach showed their constituents that peace was possible--and threatened their leadership roles if they didn't pursue it seriously.
The bad news is that, while the pattern we have seen in Iraq is fully consistent with success, it also remains fully consistent with failure. In Vietnam, General Creighton Abrams produced encouraging results at the grassroots level between 1968 and 1972 but could not translate bottom-up progress into top-down reform of the Vietnamese central government before the United States effectively ended its support. The result was a state too weak to stand up to attack from North Vietnam.
As both of these examples illustrate, such campaigns require lots of time. In Iraq, several important factors, including the fortuitous and well-exploited "Anbar awakening," in which large numbers of Sunni tribes turned on their former allies in Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and other Salafi extremist groups, has speeded progress. But there are three hurdles the United States must clear if it is to convert initial success into victory and leave Iraq as the next Northern Ireland, instead of the next Vietnam. This will still require considerable skill--and not a little luck.
The basic idea behind the surge is that counterinsurgency efforts require a certain ratio of security personnel to civilians (usually about 1 to 50). If there aren't enough capable, reliable soldiers and policemen to handle the whole country simultaneously, as has been the case in Iraq from the start, you concentrate those available in key regions, train new indigenous formations in the areas secured, and slowly spread outward as more security personnel become available.
In Iraq, the surge brigades allowed General Petraeus to employ the prescribed amount of force in most of Baghdad and its outlying "belts" of villages. It also allowed him to take advantage of important opportunities in Anbar, Nineveh, and Diyala provinces, which have been critical in mauling AQI and the other Salafi extremist groups. Within these areas, U.S. forces have diligently worked with Iraqis to build up local security formations to supplement the national Iraqi Army (which is making real, but gradual, progress) and to substitute for the national Iraqi Police (which remains mostly a disaster).
But what will happen when the American presence returns to pre-surge levels this coming summer? Will local Iraqi security formations hold together if U.S. combat brigades are removed from their neighborhoods? As the Americans pull out of parts of Iraq, will Salafi extremist groups stage a comeback?
The answer is likely to be found in places like Anbar and Nineveh provinces. In Nineveh, local political deals, economic progress, and improvements in Iraqi Army formations have allowed the United States to reduce its presence by thousands of troops--with most of those serving as advisers and support teams for Iraqi units. In Anbar, the new partnership with the tribal sheiks has transformed Iraq's worst province into arguably its best, allowing for the possibility of a reduction in U.S. troops. If places like Anbar and Nineveh are able to sustain themselves in the coming months, then there is a good chance that Iraq can survive the post-surge drawdown. If not, then we as a nation will have to confront the hard choice of whether it is better to continue to prop up the country to prevent a slide into all-out civil war that could destabilize the region, or to conclude that Iraq is lost and redeploy our resources to try to contain the chaos.
When I was in Iraq this July, there was one question I kept asking senior American officials to which I never got a good answer: "How are you going to handle southern Iraq?" Violence in southern Iraq--virtually all Shia-on-Shia--continues to worsen. Local warlords go after each other, the big national militias like the Mahdi Army and the Badr Organization vie for territory and influence among the local power brokers, and the central government has little control. There are some positive signs--such as Shia villages asking for U.S. help in getting rid of the Mahdi Army, whose members are now fighting among themselves--but the overall trend is toward waxing violence and waning government authority.
This is a serious problem. The south is home to about 40 percent of Iraq's population. It provides Iraq's only access to the sea. Most of Iraq's key religious shrines are in the south. And two-thirds of Iraqi oil production and most of its proven reserves lie there as well.
It is clear that the relative successes in the north, west, and center have only been achieved because of the presence of U.S. combat troops and their change in strategy and tactics. If they continue to make progress, then those parts of the country might be fairly stable and secure in two to five years. However, it seems unlikely that the northern half of the country can be stabilized if the southern half slides into chaos.
American officials suggest that stabilizing southern Iraq will be a job for Iraqi forces with American personnel largely serving as advisers and fire support teams. But, at present, even the best Iraqi formations would have trouble taking back the south from the militias and criminal gangs. And, because failure could decimate the morale and confidence of the Iraqi security forces, it seems unwise to take such a risk until the Iraqis are up to the challenge. It seems equally unwise to send the more competent Iraqi formations south any time soon, lest doing so jeopardize the gains they have made in other areas. In other words, Iraqis won't be ready to start pacifying the south for several years, during which time the problems there will certainly complicate and might undermine further progress in the north, west, and center. Article continues with next posting
