Basic pilot error blamed for Madrid Spanair crash
Charles Bremner, Paris
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article4685414.ece
Basic pilot error and an electrical failure have emerged as possible causes of the crash of a Spanair airliner at Madrid airport last month that killed 154 people.
The crew of the MD82 jet failed to extend the wing flaps that are vital for take-off and an automatic system did not alert the crew, according to media leaks from the Madrid investigation.
The heavily loaded aircraft, bound for the Canary Islands, smashed to the ground tail-first near Barajas airport on August 20 after struggling to climb following an unusually long take-off run. Eighteen people survived.
Data from the "black box" recorders of the Spanair jet showed that the two engines worked normally up to the crash but that flaps were not set, sources close to the inquiry told The Wall Street Journal and El Mundo newspaper. The flaps on the wing's trailing edge and slats on the leading edge are essential for lift on take-off.
They are one of the "killer items" that pilots triple-check before take-off.
A loud audio alert should have warned the crew of the wrong flap setting the moment they applied take-off power but it did not work. These devices were installed on airliners decades ago because pilots' failure to set flaps caused so many accidents.
Two other alarms — warning of nearby ground and imminent stall — did work in the Spanair aircraft as the pilots struggled to control it.
The alarm failure could have been caused by a technical fault or it could have been switched off. The Spanair jet had already aborted one departure from Madrid before its ill-fated take-off after the failure of an electrically powered external temperature probe. That minor item could have been part of a broader electrical problem, experts said.
Spanish officials called the leaks incomplete but did not deny them. If the theory is confirmed, the disaster would be a carbon copy of the August 1987 crash of a Northwestern Airlines DC9 — predecessor of the MD82 — at Detroit which also killed 154 people. The DC9 pilots forgot to set the flaps and slats and the warning system lost power and failed.
In June 1972, 118 people died when the pilots of a British European Airways Trident inadvertently retracted leading edge slats shortly after take-off from Heathrow. The plane immediately stalled and crashed in Staines, Middlesex. There was no cockpit voice recorder at the time, but the veteran captain and young co-pilot were suspected of being distracted by an argument between them over strike action.
The possibility of distraction will be examined in the Madrid investigation. Despite all the training and the systems on board aircraft, crew still mishandle checklists and flaps are the most often neglected item.
If the Madrid crash were indeed caused by a no-flap take-off, grave questions will be asked about the crew training and aircraft maintenance of Spanair, which is owned by SAS, the Scandinavian airline.
Charles Bremner, Paris
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article4685414.ece
Basic pilot error and an electrical failure have emerged as possible causes of the crash of a Spanair airliner at Madrid airport last month that killed 154 people.
The crew of the MD82 jet failed to extend the wing flaps that are vital for take-off and an automatic system did not alert the crew, according to media leaks from the Madrid investigation.
The heavily loaded aircraft, bound for the Canary Islands, smashed to the ground tail-first near Barajas airport on August 20 after struggling to climb following an unusually long take-off run. Eighteen people survived.
Data from the "black box" recorders of the Spanair jet showed that the two engines worked normally up to the crash but that flaps were not set, sources close to the inquiry told The Wall Street Journal and El Mundo newspaper. The flaps on the wing's trailing edge and slats on the leading edge are essential for lift on take-off.
They are one of the "killer items" that pilots triple-check before take-off.
A loud audio alert should have warned the crew of the wrong flap setting the moment they applied take-off power but it did not work. These devices were installed on airliners decades ago because pilots' failure to set flaps caused so many accidents.
Two other alarms — warning of nearby ground and imminent stall — did work in the Spanair aircraft as the pilots struggled to control it.
The alarm failure could have been caused by a technical fault or it could have been switched off. The Spanair jet had already aborted one departure from Madrid before its ill-fated take-off after the failure of an electrically powered external temperature probe. That minor item could have been part of a broader electrical problem, experts said.
Spanish officials called the leaks incomplete but did not deny them. If the theory is confirmed, the disaster would be a carbon copy of the August 1987 crash of a Northwestern Airlines DC9 — predecessor of the MD82 — at Detroit which also killed 154 people. The DC9 pilots forgot to set the flaps and slats and the warning system lost power and failed.
In June 1972, 118 people died when the pilots of a British European Airways Trident inadvertently retracted leading edge slats shortly after take-off from Heathrow. The plane immediately stalled and crashed in Staines, Middlesex. There was no cockpit voice recorder at the time, but the veteran captain and young co-pilot were suspected of being distracted by an argument between them over strike action.
The possibility of distraction will be examined in the Madrid investigation. Despite all the training and the systems on board aircraft, crew still mishandle checklists and flaps are the most often neglected item.
If the Madrid crash were indeed caused by a no-flap take-off, grave questions will be asked about the crew training and aircraft maintenance of Spanair, which is owned by SAS, the Scandinavian airline.
