Maybe it was there in his platform, but somehow We missed it?
Do You Remember Giving PM Carney A Mandate To Seek Associate EU Status?
- Thread starter niniveh
- Start date
it fits his stated desire for a coalition of middle powers who still believe in democracy and respectful relations.
We elected him to diversify trade. If that is the path that does it on a mass scale in Europe, and we add travel and work policy that is better, why is this a problem? It adds serious leverage to our bargaining power, sends a very clear message to this and future US administrations, at very little cost to us.
Isolationism is the problem.
So respectful of democracy they have unelected bureaucrates in brussels determining policy
i guess it is beyond your capabilities to ask why Britain wanted out
Right or wrong, Brexit is a red flag
No he was not given a mandate to make this decision at all. At the very least this should go to a referendum with all the facts laid out about what responsibilities Canada will have in this relationship.
Associate EU Status can be an advantage if it is mutually beneficial. Canada needs to recognize the importance of strengthening its economic ties with the European Union and expanding its trading relationships beyond the United States. Economic relationship with the U.S. has historically been to Canada's prosperity, our overwhelming dependence on a single trading partner leaves us vulnerable to its political decisions, economic pressures and whims of unstable dictators. We cannot continue to live economically at the mercy of a neighbour that increasingly tells us it does not need us, does not want us, and may no longer be willing to provide the economic benefits on which we have come to depend. It is like being a slave to a master who reminds you that you are dispensable while holding the power to take away your livelihood. Trump's all for me and nothing for you negotiating style reinforces this uncertainty. One moment he appears uninterested in reaching a deal, the next he wants an agreement but presents it as a personal favour to Canada, with the expectation that America gets what it wants while Canada is left with little in return. Canada must respond strategically by strengthening its relationship with the European Union, opening up new international markets, expanding trade partnerships and diversifying our economy. This is not about abandoning the United States or undermining an important trading partner, it is about protecting Canada's economic sovereignty, bargaining power and long-term prosperity. Canada needs trading partners, not a master. We must build an economy that is no longer dependent on the goodwill or whims of any one country.
The Hidden Cost of Canada’s “Associate Membership” with the EU – The Nemeth Report
October 31, 2026
“It’s a positive alliance, for collaboration, for opportunities, and with this new alliance for the future, to find large scale solutions … for fighting climate change and financing that fight.”
—Mark Carney
Is Canada quietly agreeing to rewrite its rules and regulations so they look more like the EU’s? Whether one likes it or not, that is the practical meaning of the “ever-closer association” now being discussed with the European Union (EU). Media coverage has lingered on issues like water bombers, critical minerals, and AI cooperation. The joint statement’s first area, regulatory cooperation, has been treated as a minor detail, but it isn’t. In fact, it’s the most consequential aspect of this new arrangement and could reshape how Canada governs its economy and undermine the sovereignty Mark Carney says this “associate membership” will strengthen.
The joint statement, reinforced by European Commission (EC) President Ursula von der Leyen’s remarks in Montreal, expects Canada to move toward “much closer alignment” on policies and governance across climate, finance, biodiversity, oceans, emissions pathways, carbon pricing, decarbonization, and coordination at UN meetings. Alignment isn’t cooperation. Cooperation leaves each government free to keep its own rules. Alignment means designing Canadian rules to resemble the EU’s. This would require Canada to redesign its climate, finance, and industrial rules around EU standards and thereby surrender the ability to set its own regulatory course. Von der Leyen said they want to “shape more of our policies together…we want to consult each other more closely at all stages of development—from inception to implementation.” For Canadian businesses, sharing policy-making with 27 EU member nations would mean having operating rules, compliance costs, and market access shaped by a bloc already buckling under the existing rulebook.
Eurochambres has warned that the cumulative weight of regulation is holding back growth. Thirteen member states have called for a Year of Simplification—a pause on new rules while existing ones are reviewed, streamlined, or repealed. The Commission says it hears them, but responded with a new EU Framework for Climate Resilience. The framework requires all member states to adopt the same warming trajectories, climate scenarios (including extreme worst case scenarios), and risk assessments. They must also designate “policy risk owners” to embed climate considerations into policies, assets, investments, and government decision-making. Canada is being invited to align with standards that current EU members are begging Brussels to loosen.
Canada’s strength is in its resource sectors; the costs of all this would hit them hardest. The joint statement places climate and sustainability at the centre of that alignment. The Green Alliance is reaffirmed as the “compass for decarbonisation”, framing it as the shared direction for industrial policy, investment, and strategic sectors. Carbon pricing is highlighted as a key instrument for meeting 2050 goals, alongside industrial decarbonisation pathways. Even the proposed LNG feasibility study must be consistent with climate-neutrality pathways. These signal an expectation that Canadian carbon pricing, emissions standards, and related rules would converge with the EU’s approach.
Oil and gas producers would face pressure to meet stricter methane intensity limits, carbon-intensity tests, and reporting requirements written for European markets, while climate and biodiversity screens would be layered onto project assessments. Mining operations would face similar expectations on emissions accounting, environmental disclosures, and taxonomy classifications that determine access to capital. It remains to be seen what strings will be attached to the European Investment Bank financing of critical mineral mining projects. Agriculture would face costs from emissions verification and green-finance criteria that treat certain production methods as higher risk. Across these sectors, alignment with more detailed climate-risk assessments in financial supervision, green taxonomies, and Scope 3 emissions accounting would raise operating costs and steer capital away from conventional production. Banks facing European-style expectations would price, restrict, or withdraw credit from projects that don’t fit Brussels’ categories.
The Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism shows how these costs arrive in practice. Beginning in 2027, CBAM requires Canadian exporters of iron, steel, aluminum, and fertilizers to monitor, report, and verify emissions across their supply chains. Importers then pay the difference between Canada’s industrial carbon price (currently around $95 per tonne) and the higher EU price (around $134 per tonne). Internal government documents put the value of affected Canadian goods at roughly $2.8 billion annually. Canada is not exempt from CBAM because its system is not linked to the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS).
Sympathetic organizations frame ETS linkage as the way for Canadian producers to avoid the EU tariff. That framing misunderstands how CBAM works. Linkage would not remove the costly monitoring, reporting, and verification; companies would still have to track emissions to determine exact liabilities. The change would be who pays the full cost. Under the current CBAM design, EU importers pay the difference. Under an ETS-linked arrangement, Canadian producers would pay the full higher carbon cost themselves. Compliance burdens remain but the full carbon tax cost shifts onto Canadian firms. Canada would also lose the independence and ability to set its own industrial carbon price.
Carney’s statement that associate membership with the EU has “at its base, sovereignty” is laughable from a Canadian perspective. Provinces hold primary jurisdiction over natural resources and energy under the Constitution. Aligning carbon pricing, taxonomy rules, emissions accounting, climate-risk frameworks and any other policies with EU standards would constrain both federal and provincial choices. Von der Leyen also suggested Canada could align with EU courts. That would be a disaster – just ask Norway. Norway is currently appealing an EU court decision reversing approvals of new oil and gas developments. Canadians can expect decisions about project approvals, methane regulations, and capital allocation to be increasingly shaped by what’s acceptable in Brussels rather than by Canadian conditions or priorities. Von der Leyen described the desired relationship as one “closer to membership than anything we have done before.” That closeness is achieved through policy and governance alignment, not merely through trade preferences Canada already enjoys under CETA.
Just a reminder: Canada already has comprehensive tariff-free access for most goods. There are also joint committees under CETA, including the annual Financial Services Committee where officials discuss banking regulation, sustainable finance, and capital markets. The creeping regulatory alignment in the financial sector through the CETA joint committees has been bad enough, but this will be infinitely worse for Canadian businesses and the economy, which can expect a similar economic decline as Europe faces due to the crushing regulatory burden and suicidal energy transition being promoted in this alliance. Further alignment on the terms now being discussed would raise costs for resource producers, lock in higher compliance burdens, and limit the ability of Canadian governments to set their own rules on energy, finance, and the environment.
Existing CETA structures and defence cooperation are sufficient for the relationship Canada needs. They do not require bargaining away the capacity to make independent policy choices. The public deserves a clear national debate on these trade-offs before any further commitments are advanced through Parliament.
October 31, 2026
“It’s a positive alliance, for collaboration, for opportunities, and with this new alliance for the future, to find large scale solutions … for fighting climate change and financing that fight.”
—Mark Carney
Is Canada quietly agreeing to rewrite its rules and regulations so they look more like the EU’s? Whether one likes it or not, that is the practical meaning of the “ever-closer association” now being discussed with the European Union (EU). Media coverage has lingered on issues like water bombers, critical minerals, and AI cooperation. The joint statement’s first area, regulatory cooperation, has been treated as a minor detail, but it isn’t. In fact, it’s the most consequential aspect of this new arrangement and could reshape how Canada governs its economy and undermine the sovereignty Mark Carney says this “associate membership” will strengthen.
The joint statement, reinforced by European Commission (EC) President Ursula von der Leyen’s remarks in Montreal, expects Canada to move toward “much closer alignment” on policies and governance across climate, finance, biodiversity, oceans, emissions pathways, carbon pricing, decarbonization, and coordination at UN meetings. Alignment isn’t cooperation. Cooperation leaves each government free to keep its own rules. Alignment means designing Canadian rules to resemble the EU’s. This would require Canada to redesign its climate, finance, and industrial rules around EU standards and thereby surrender the ability to set its own regulatory course. Von der Leyen said they want to “shape more of our policies together…we want to consult each other more closely at all stages of development—from inception to implementation.” For Canadian businesses, sharing policy-making with 27 EU member nations would mean having operating rules, compliance costs, and market access shaped by a bloc already buckling under the existing rulebook.
Eurochambres has warned that the cumulative weight of regulation is holding back growth. Thirteen member states have called for a Year of Simplification—a pause on new rules while existing ones are reviewed, streamlined, or repealed. The Commission says it hears them, but responded with a new EU Framework for Climate Resilience. The framework requires all member states to adopt the same warming trajectories, climate scenarios (including extreme worst case scenarios), and risk assessments. They must also designate “policy risk owners” to embed climate considerations into policies, assets, investments, and government decision-making. Canada is being invited to align with standards that current EU members are begging Brussels to loosen.
Canada’s strength is in its resource sectors; the costs of all this would hit them hardest. The joint statement places climate and sustainability at the centre of that alignment. The Green Alliance is reaffirmed as the “compass for decarbonisation”, framing it as the shared direction for industrial policy, investment, and strategic sectors. Carbon pricing is highlighted as a key instrument for meeting 2050 goals, alongside industrial decarbonisation pathways. Even the proposed LNG feasibility study must be consistent with climate-neutrality pathways. These signal an expectation that Canadian carbon pricing, emissions standards, and related rules would converge with the EU’s approach.
Oil and gas producers would face pressure to meet stricter methane intensity limits, carbon-intensity tests, and reporting requirements written for European markets, while climate and biodiversity screens would be layered onto project assessments. Mining operations would face similar expectations on emissions accounting, environmental disclosures, and taxonomy classifications that determine access to capital. It remains to be seen what strings will be attached to the European Investment Bank financing of critical mineral mining projects. Agriculture would face costs from emissions verification and green-finance criteria that treat certain production methods as higher risk. Across these sectors, alignment with more detailed climate-risk assessments in financial supervision, green taxonomies, and Scope 3 emissions accounting would raise operating costs and steer capital away from conventional production. Banks facing European-style expectations would price, restrict, or withdraw credit from projects that don’t fit Brussels’ categories.
The Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism shows how these costs arrive in practice. Beginning in 2027, CBAM requires Canadian exporters of iron, steel, aluminum, and fertilizers to monitor, report, and verify emissions across their supply chains. Importers then pay the difference between Canada’s industrial carbon price (currently around $95 per tonne) and the higher EU price (around $134 per tonne). Internal government documents put the value of affected Canadian goods at roughly $2.8 billion annually. Canada is not exempt from CBAM because its system is not linked to the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS).
Sympathetic organizations frame ETS linkage as the way for Canadian producers to avoid the EU tariff. That framing misunderstands how CBAM works. Linkage would not remove the costly monitoring, reporting, and verification; companies would still have to track emissions to determine exact liabilities. The change would be who pays the full cost. Under the current CBAM design, EU importers pay the difference. Under an ETS-linked arrangement, Canadian producers would pay the full higher carbon cost themselves. Compliance burdens remain but the full carbon tax cost shifts onto Canadian firms. Canada would also lose the independence and ability to set its own industrial carbon price.
Carney’s statement that associate membership with the EU has “at its base, sovereignty” is laughable from a Canadian perspective. Provinces hold primary jurisdiction over natural resources and energy under the Constitution. Aligning carbon pricing, taxonomy rules, emissions accounting, climate-risk frameworks and any other policies with EU standards would constrain both federal and provincial choices. Von der Leyen also suggested Canada could align with EU courts. That would be a disaster – just ask Norway. Norway is currently appealing an EU court decision reversing approvals of new oil and gas developments. Canadians can expect decisions about project approvals, methane regulations, and capital allocation to be increasingly shaped by what’s acceptable in Brussels rather than by Canadian conditions or priorities. Von der Leyen described the desired relationship as one “closer to membership than anything we have done before.” That closeness is achieved through policy and governance alignment, not merely through trade preferences Canada already enjoys under CETA.
Just a reminder: Canada already has comprehensive tariff-free access for most goods. There are also joint committees under CETA, including the annual Financial Services Committee where officials discuss banking regulation, sustainable finance, and capital markets. The creeping regulatory alignment in the financial sector through the CETA joint committees has been bad enough, but this will be infinitely worse for Canadian businesses and the economy, which can expect a similar economic decline as Europe faces due to the crushing regulatory burden and suicidal energy transition being promoted in this alliance. Further alignment on the terms now being discussed would raise costs for resource producers, lock in higher compliance burdens, and limit the ability of Canadian governments to set their own rules on energy, finance, and the environment.
Existing CETA structures and defence cooperation are sufficient for the relationship Canada needs. They do not require bargaining away the capacity to make independent policy choices. The public deserves a clear national debate on these trade-offs before any further commitments are advanced through Parliament.
Maybe seeking inferior membership of the EU isn't a
bad idea after all. Canada will be fighting climate change
alongside European climate lunatics. And the good
thing is we can finance the fight by exporting more oil,
gas and coal to Europe.
bad idea after all. Canada will be fighting climate change
alongside European climate lunatics. And the good
thing is we can finance the fight by exporting more oil,
gas and coal to Europe.
Good thing there is no indication yet he has signed or will sign anything.
"Over the coming months, we will determine the substance, scale and scope of this form of membership."
It's almost like large, complicated treaties involve lots of negotiations and such before being finalized.
It worse than that.
On another site I explained, Carney was sent to secure Canada as an asset. Now the EU dictates our economy for their own gain.
The EU doesn't take orders, they give orders. There is no upside for Canada.
On that note, we have the example of the U.K. politicians ceding certain authority to the EU without their citizens' approval.
Then there was all the wrenching consternation when the U.K. citizenry voted to leave the EU.
